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SUMMARY
We studied the security of anonymized big graph data. Our main contributions
include: new De-Anonymization (DA) attacks, comprehensive anonymity, utility, and
de-anonymizability quantifications, and a secure graph data publishing/sharing system
SecGraph.
New DA Attacks. We present two novel graph DA frameworks: cold start single-
phase Optimization-based DA (ODA) and De-anonymizing Social-Attribute Graphs
(De-SAG). Unlike existing seed-based DA attacks, ODA does not priori knowledge.
In addition, ODA’s DA results can facilitate existing DA attacks by providing more
seed information. De-SAG is the first attack that takes into account both graph
structure and attribute information. Through extensive evaluations leveraging real
world graph data, we validated the performance of both ODA and De-SAG.
Graph Anonymity, Utility, and De-anonymizability Quantifications. We
developed new techniques that enable comprehensive graph data anonymity, utility,
and de-anonymizability evaluation. First, we proposed the first seed-free graph de-
anonymizability quantification framework under a general data model which provides
the theoretical foundation for seed-free SDA attacks. Second, we conducted the first
seed-based quantification on the perfect and partial de-anonymizability of graph data.
Our quantification closes the gap between seed-based DA practice and theory. Third,
we conducted the first attribute-based anonymity analysis for Social-Attribute Graph
(SAG) data. Our attribute-based anonymity analysis together with existing structure-
based de-anonymizability quantifications provide data owners and researchers a more
complete understanding of the privacy of graph data. Fourth, we conducted the
first graph Anonymity-Utility-De-anonymity (AUD) correlation quantification and
xv
provided close-forms to explicitly demonstrate such correlation. Finally, based on our
quantifications, we conducted large-scale evaluations leveraging 100+ real world graph
datasets generated by various computer systems and services. Using the evaluations,
we demonstrated the datasets’ anonymity, utility, and de-anonymizability, as well as
the significance and validity of our quantifications.
SecGraph. We designed, implemented, and evaluated the first uniform and open-
source Secure Graph data publishing/sharing (SecGraph) system. SecGraph enables
data owners and researchers to conduct accurate comparative studies of anonymiza-
tion/DA techniques, and to comprehensively understand the resistance/vulnerability
of existing or newly developed anonymization techniques, the effectiveness of existing





With the rapid development of information technology, a huge amount of data are
generated from various computer systems [30, 38, 53, 88, 97, 122, 129, 131, 137, 142,
152, 158, 159, 160]. Data that can be modeled by graphs as shown in Fig.1, where
nodes represent data items (e.g., users of social networks) and edges/links represent
the relationships (e.g., the friendships among Facebook users, the contact relations
among email users) among data items, are considered graph/structural/complex data
(for convenience, we use graph data in the rest of this dissertation as done in relevant
works [1, 27, 61, 62, 63, 104, 127, 152, 159]).
Figure 1: Graph data.
1.1 Overview of Graph Data
Nowadays, many computer systems generate graph data [152, 159]. Below, we sum-
marize representative computer-generated graph data.
• Social Network Data. It is natural to represent social networks (e.g., Facebook
[46], Google+ [51], Twitter [133], LinkedIn [87], YouTube [153], LiveJournal
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[89], Orkut [110], Slashdot [126], and Pokec [116]) as graphs, where nodes de-
note users and links/edges denote the social relationships (friendship, circle-
relationship, follow relationship, etc.) among users;
• Communication Data. Another typical category of graph data is communi-
cation data, including phone-call networks [71, 73, 100, 109], email networks
[67, 80, 81], wiki-Talk networks [78, 79], instant message networks [127], etc. To
represent communication networks, users are modeled by nodes and the com-
munication relationship (phone calls, emails, talks, etc.) are modeled by links
;
• Mobility Traces. Mobility traces, e.g., WiFi traces [127], Bluetooth traces [127],
check-ins [115], usually consist of records of format (user ID, latitude, longi-
tude, timestamp, location ID). They can be transferred to user-connect graphs
by applying sophisticated data processing techniques (e.g., entropy-based tech-
niques) [115, 127], where nodes represent users and links/edges indicate the
co-appearance or connection relation;
• Epidemiological and Health-care Data. A large amount of healthcare data is in
graph form, leveraging which health-care professionals can study disease prop-
agation as well as other social health problems [22, 28, 58]. For instance, to
study the sexual contact-based disease transmission, an adolescent romantic
and sexual network is published in [28], which consists of a population of over
800 adolescents residing in a mid-sized town in the mid-western United States.
• Collaboration Networks. Collaboration networks, e.g., Arxiv [24, 80], the com-
puter science collaboration network DBLP and ArnetMiner [2, 3], represent the
collaboration relationships among researchers. Straightforwardly, collaboration
networks can be modeled by graphs where nodes represent researchers and links
represent collaborations.
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• Citation Networks [48, 60]. Citation networks carry the citation information
among research papers, which are naturally graph data.
• Web Graphs [21, 25, 81]. Web graphs indicated the link information among web
pages, where nodes represent web pages and edges represent hyperlinks among
them.
• Internet Peer-to-Peer Networks and Other Network Topologies [80, 121]. Peer-
to-Peer networks and other network topologies can be modeled by graph data,
where nodes represent network terminals in the network and edges represent
the connections among them.
• Autonomous System Graphs [60]. The graph of routers comprising the Internet
can be organized into sub-graphs called Autonomous Systems (AS) [60]. Each
AS exchanges traffic flows with some neighbors (peers). Therefore, graphs can
be constructed to represent who-talks-to-whom relationships among AS.
1.2 Need for Graph Data Sharing
Graph data sharing has important implications for research, government, commer-
cial, and healthcare applications. Below, we discuss some typical graph data sharing
scenarios.
1.2.1 Academic Research
As it has been well known, real-world data publishing/sharing/transferring is the most
valuable resource for academic research, e.g., personalized advertising, sense/decision-
making, influence maximization, innovation/disease diffusion, similar users searching,
user classification, reliable email, secure routing, and Sybil detection [4, 5, 27, 61,
63, 104, 127, 152, 159]. In this subsection, we focus on the scenarios of publish-
ing/sharing/transferring graph data to academia for research.
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During the annual KDD Cup events, several datasets (including graph dataset-
s) are published for data mining and knowledge discovery tasks [4]. For instance,
several network topological structure datasets, social network datasets, customer re-
lationship graphs are published or shared with researchers. Similarly, many other
academic events/instituions regularly provide graph data to the research community
[5, 6, 102, 103, 104]. Recently, Twitter introduced its data sharing project to the
academic community, named Twitter Data Grants, through which Twitter’s public
and historical data are accessible [6].
Today were introducing a pilot project were calling Twitter Data Grants,
through which well give a handful of research institutions access to our
public and historical data.
With more than 500 million Tweets a day, Twitter has an expansive set
of data from which we can glean insights and learn about a variety of top-
ics, from health-related information such as when and where the flu may
hit to global events like ringing in the new year. To date, it has been
challenging for researchers outside the company who are tackling big ques-
tions to collaborate with us to access our public, historical data. Our Data
Grants program aims to change that by connecting research institutions
and academics with the data they need.
In order to promote real-world data driven research, many other real-world graph data
have been shared with researchers, e.g., Facebook data [5, 7], QQ data [8], Microblog
data [5], Citation data [5].
1.2.2 Government Data Mining Tasks
In addition to being leveraged by academia for research, graph data are frequently
shared/transferred for government data mining tasks. For instance, customer under-
standing and international fraud detection can be achieved by leveraging the structure
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and pattern analysis of phone-call networks [139]. Furthermore, communication data
(e.g., phone-call networks, email networks) can also be applied to serious national
security data mining tasks, such as graph theory-based terrorist analysis [55]. Re-
cently, it has been shown that a lot that government agencies employ graph data
(e.g., phone data of Verizon, social graph data Google and Facebook, email network-
s, instant messaging networks, and video conference data) for several kinds of data
mining tasks (e.g., fighting terrorism) [40].
In the name of fighting terrorism, the US government has been mining
data collected from phone companies such as Verizon for the past seven
years and from Google, Facebook, and other social media firms for at least
four years, according to government documents leaked this week to news
organizations.
The two surveillance programs one that collects detailed records of tele-
phone calls, the other that collects data on Internet-based activities such as
e-mail, instant messaging, and video conferencing were publicly revealed
in ”top secret” documents leaked to the British newspaper the Guardian
and the Washington Post. Both are run by the National Security Agency
(NSA), the papers reported.
In addition, some companies have been reported to sell graph data-based data mining
solutions to governments [40].
1.2.3 Business Applications
Data sharing/transferring is a standard practice for companies. For instance, as de-
scribed in their privacy policies [9, 10, 11], Google, Facebook, and Twitter share their
data with business partners for personalized advising, under which cost savings and
maximized advertising effectiveness can be achieved. In addition to advertising, graph
data are also shared among companies to build enterprise applications to improve
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business decisions. For instance, recently, Twitter and IBM announced a significant
partnership that will involve Twitter sharing its data with IBM for integration into
IBMs enterprise solutions, including the Watson cloud platform [114].
Twitter and IBM announced a significant partnership today that will in-
volve Twitter sharing its data with IBM for integration into IBMs en-
terprise solutions, including the Watson cloud platform. The deal means
IBM will gain access to the Twitter firehose, allowing businesses to incor-
porate insights gained from the social network into their decision-making
processes.
Additionally, the two companies will also be teaming up to build a unique
collection of enterprise solutions, they say, which puts IBM into a different
category than some of Twitters other data partners, who generally just
ingest the data for use in their own systems.
IBM says the companies will collaborate to build enterprise applications
to improve business decisions across industries and professions, beginning
with applications and services for sales, marketing and customer service.
They will also work together on industry-specific solutions, including those
for banking, consumer products, transportation and retail [114].
We also examine the privacy policies of some companies as follows.
According to google, information used during registration, used while us-
ing the services are collected by google and might be given to trusted par-
ties for processing based on googles instructions and in compliance with
googles Privacy Policy. The information can be given to third parties with
the users consent and given to the users domain administrators as well
as for legal reasons. The aggregated data with no personally identifiable
information can be released publicly and with googles partners.
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–Google Plus Privacy Policy [9].
Facebook have information on users from registration as well as from post-
s a user makes or shares. According to the policy, personal information
can be edited during use and as for the meta information in the things
shared, that is up to the user to remove. In addition with the user consent
Facebook can have the contact information from the users email account,
transaction information from purchases on the site, as well location in-
formation. In addition to information specifically shared with Facebook,
they also have information from third party such as ad companies, infor-
mation from other users, cookies, and user devices. With the information
collected, Facebook can contact the user, send targeted advertisement to
the user, improve their service, and make suggestions to user. With the
information Facebook have, they can share the payment information to
complete a purchase, send email to invite others on behalf on the user,
share information with marketers, help others to find you, and give search
engines access to your public information.
–Facebook Privacy Policy [10].
Twitter have information that are provided during account creation as
well as other information the user choose to give such as the users phone
number for SMS fraud protection, picture, and location. Most of the infor-
mation on twitter are publicly available such as lists created, the people a
user follow and the people that follows a user. Twitter can publish a user
location information and phone numbers with the users consent and this
includes the location information from IP, user device, as well as from cell
towers. In addition to location information Twitter have information on
how a user interacts with links on Twitter and from email by Twitter, as
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well as cookie information, log data, widget data and payment informa-
tion. With all the information Twitter can share them with users consent,
share with service providers with uses that follows Twitters privacy infor-
mation and for uses that are state by Twitter. If making purchases on
Twitter, Twitter can share information such as address and name. In ad-
dition user information might be sold in case that Twitter is in a part of
a buy out or merger or if the information is need for legal reasons. Lastly
public information can be shared to others for reasons such as advertisers
whose link a user clicked on.
–Twitter Privacy Policy [11].
From the above policies, users data (graph data) are clearly shared among part-
ners.
1.2.4 Healthcare Applications
Graph data are also published/shared/transferred for many civil applications. A
typical such scenario is to analyze the propagation of infectious diseases, e.g., the
flu, HIV, Ebola [12, 13, 74]. Real-world graph data are valuable to accurate disease
propagation analysis. As shown in [28], when analyzing sexual contact-based disease
diffusion, real sexual networks-based analysis is very different from that leveraging
simulated or randomly generated graph data. Recently, when studying the Ebola
Outbreak 2014, the Ebola Hemoragic Fever propagation in a modern city is modeled
and analyzed based on the social graphs and other data [13].
1.2.5 Other Scenarios
Graph data are widely available in many other scenarios.
• For conducting research, developing web and mobile applications, designing da-
ta visualizations, and other applications, government agencies regularly release
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data by law [14].
• Many graph data can be crawled employing an API or screen-scraping, e.g.,
Google+ [15], Facebook [7, 16], Twitter [1, 16], YouTube [1, 16, 96], LinkedIn
[86].
• Graph data are widely available on many data sharing websites [1, 15, 16, 17].
For instance, many social network data, communication network data, mobility
traces, collaboration data, autonomous system graphs are available at Stanford
SNAP [16], ASU Network Data Repository [1], Dartmouth CRAWDAD [18],
UCI Network Data Repository [19], CMU Datasets [17], etc.
• Recently, with the emergence of data brokers, many graph data, especially the
sensitive data such as medical records, financial information, credit reports,
social relations, and other personal profiles, are easily obtained [29, 43, 132].
· · · · · ·
Consumer data companies are scooping up huge amounts of consumer
information about people around the world and selling it, providing
marketers details about whether you’re pregnant or divorced or trying
to lose weight, about how rich you are and what kinds of cars you
drive. But many people still don’t know data brokers exist.
· · · · · ·
As we highlighted last year, some data companies recordand then re-
sellall kinds of information you post online, including your screen
names, website addresses, interests, hometown and professional his-
tory, and how many friends or followers you have [29].
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1.3 Graph Data Security and Utility
Different from traditional relational data (e.g., tabular data, set-valued data), where
data items are structurally independent of each other, the most notable characteristic
of the data items of graph data is that they are structurally correlated with each other
in addition to the semantic information they carry [1, 27, 152, 159]. For instance, a
user of a social network is correlated with other users in the network in addition to
the social profiles associated with him/her. On one hand, the correlations of graph
data items enable many new applications. On the other hand, these correlations
allow graph data to suffer security and privacy threats since adversaries can leverage
them to infer private information of the users/systems who generated the graph data.
Recent research by us and others has shown that simply anonymized graph data can
be successfully de-anonymized in large-scale by Structure-based De-Anonymization
(SDA) attacks [27, 61, 63, 64, 104, 127]. The main idea of SDA attacks is to de-
anonymize anonymized users in terms of their uniquely distinguishable structural
characteristics.
To protect graph users’ privacy when sharing graph data, several anonymization
techniques have been proposed, which can be classified into six categorizes: Naive
ID Removal, Edge Editing (EE) based techniques [152], k-anonymity based techniques
[38, 88, 156, 158, 160], Aggregation/Class/Cluster based techniques [30, 53, 131], Dif-
ferential Privacy (DP) based techniques [117, 118, 122, 137, 142], and Random Walk
(RW) based schemes [97]. Basically, these anonymization techniques try to perturb
the original graph structure to protect users’ privacy while preserving as much data
utility as possible.
Therefore, existing anonymization schemes can be evaluated from two perspec-
tives: data utility preservation and resistance to DA attacks (we use DA and SDA
interchangeably). However, most, if not all, existing graph anonymization works
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have not been significantly evaluated in terms of their utility performance. Specif-
ically, most existing graph anonymization works only conducted limited evaluation
on their utility preservation, e.g., degree distribution, path length distribution, cluster
coefficient, which are insufficient to understand their value to high-level network min-
ing tasks and applications, e.g., sense/decision-making, similar users searching, user
classification, reliable email, influence maximization. More Surprisingly, although we
already have many sophisticated anonymization techniques (e.g., [88, 97, 152, 158])
and powerful DA attacks (e.g., [63, 69, 104, 112]), it is still an open problem whether
existing state-of-the-art anonymization techniques can defend against modern SDA
attacks (i.e., the practical vulnerability of anonymized datasets). This is because of
the incomplete evaluation of existing anonymization and DA works. For anonymiza-
tion works, they usually only evaluate the data utility performance of their proposed
techniques (although some work did provide a theoretical security guarantee, howev-
er, these guarantees usually do not hold due to improper assumptions or incomplete
considerations). For DA works, they usually evaluate their attack performance with-
out actually applying state-of-the-art anonymization techniques (e.g., k-anonymity
based schemes, DP based schemes, and RW based schemes) to test their technique.
Furthermore, recently, the concept of graph data de-anonymizability quantifica-
tion has also garnered significant attention[61, 63, 113], where researchers study that,
based only on graph data’s structural information, why graph data can be
de-anonymized, what are the DA conditions, and how many users are de-
anonymizable, i.e., graph data de-anonymizability quantification can quantitatively
examine how vulnerable/de-anonymizable any graph dataset is given its structure.
Therefore, graph data de-anonymizability quantification techniques can be employed
to examine the theoretical vulnerability of both raw and anonymized graph data, and
can therefore evaluate the effectiveness of an anonymization scheme. Furthermore,
the quantification results can serve as auxiliary information that is useful for future
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effective anonymization technique design and DA attack evaluation. However, ex-
isting de-anonymizability quantifications are limited because they treat all the users
within a graph as structurally equivalent and overlook their structural differences. In
practice, different users may have very different structural importance, e.g., the users
with the maximum and minimum degrees are structurally different. Therefore, ex-
isting quantification results are incomplete with regards to quantifying graph users’
actual de-anonymizability in terms of their structural importance.
The two overarching goals of this dissertation are (i) to help graph data hold-
ers understand if and how their data should be shared ; and (ii) to provide graph
data security/privacy researchers a uniform platform to comprehensively study, e-
valuate, and compare existing/newly developed graph data anonymization, utility e-
valuation, DA, and de-anonymizability quantification techniques. This will be ac-
complished by developing (i) new techniques that enable comprehensive graph da-
ta anonymization-utility-de-anonymization evaluation, accurate structure-based de-
anonymizability quantification, and complete utility-de-anonymizability analysis; and
(ii) a new practical, easily-usable, open-source and uniform system that can system-
atically integrate existing and newly developed graph data anonymization, utility
evaluation, DA, and utility-de-anonymizability quantification techniques.
1.4 Research Picture
We summarize the research in this dissertation in Fig.2. Specifically, we made the
following contributions.
• We presented two new de-anonymization frameworks. First, following our
graph de-anonymizability analysis, we proposed a novel Optimization-based De-
Anonymization (ODA) framework. Different from existing SDA attacks (which
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Figure 2: Research picture.
are seed-free attacks) [64, 104, 127], ODA is a single-phase cold start algo-
rithm without any requirement on priori knowledge, e.g., seed/landmark map-
pings. We examined ODA on real graph datasets Gowalla (196,591 users and
950,327 edges) and Google+ (4,692,671 users and 90,751,480 edges). The re-
sults demonstrate that about 77.7% − −83.3% of the users in Gowalla and
86.9% − −95.5% of the users in Google+ are de-anonymizable, which implies
seed-free de-anonymization is implementable and powerful in practice.
Second, according to our attribute-based anonymity analysis, we proposed a
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new de-anonymization attack on graph data, namely De-anonymize Social-
Attribute Graph data (De-SAG), which takes into account both graph struc-
ture and attribute information to the best of our knowledge. Through exten-
sive evaluations leveraging real world graph data, we demonstrated that De-
SAG can significantly enhance existing SDA attacks. For instance, when de-
anonymizing a Facebook dataset (4,039 users, 88,234 user-user links, 1,283 at-
tributes, 37,257 user-attribute links), De-SAG has a 3.82 ∼ 10.1 times better de-
anonymization performance than state-of-the-art structure-based deanonymiza-
tion attacks [63, 69].
• We developed new techniques that enable comprehensive graph data anonymi-
ty, utility, and de-anonymizability evaluation. First, we proposed the first seed-
free graph de-anonymizability quantification framework under a general data
model. In our quantification, we answered several fundamental open prob-
lems: why graph data can be de-anonymized based only on the topological
information? what are the conditions for perfect and (1 − ϵ)-perfect seed-free
de-anonymization, where ϵ is the error tolerated by a de-anonymization scheme?
and what portion of users can be de-anonymized in a graph dataset? Thus, our
quantification provides the theoretical foundation for seed-free SDA attacks.
Second, we conducted the first seed-based quantification on the perfect and par-
tial de-anonymizability of graph data both under the Erdös-Rényi (ER) model
and in general scenarios, where the graph data can follow an arbitrary model.
Therefore, our quantification can be applied to real world graph data and can
quantitatively demonstrate the vulnerability of real world graph data to existing
seed-based SDA attacks. Theoretically, our quantification provides the math-
ematical foundation for existing seed-based SDAs and closes the gap between
seed-based de-anonymization practice and theory.
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Third, we conducted the first attribute-based anonymity analysis for Social-
Attribute Graph (SAG) data under both preliminary and general data models.
By careful quantification, we explicitly demonstrate the correlation between
the achievable graph anonymity and the attribute information. Our theoretical
results demonstrate that the attribute information, even as non-Personal Identi-
fiable Information (non-PII), can also lead to significant anonymity loss of graph
data. Our attribute-based anonymity analysis together with existing structure-
based de-anonymizability quantifications provide data owners and researchers
a more complete understanding of the privacy of graph data.
Fourth, we introduced three metrics to measure the anonymity, utility, and de-
anonymity of anonymized graph data, respectively. Based on these metrics, we
conducted a comprehensive quantification of the correlation of graph anonymi-
ty, utility, and de-anonymity under both the mathematical ER model and a
general data model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on
quantifying the Anonymity-Utility-De-anonymity (AUD) correlation of graph
data and providing close-forms to explicitly demonstrate such correlation.
Finally, based on our quantifications, we conducted large-scale evaluations lever-
aging 100+ real world graph datasets generated by various computer systems
and services. Using the evaluations, we demonstrated the datasets’ anonymity,
utility, and de-anonymizability, as well as the significance and validity of our
quantifications.
• We designed and implemented a uniform and open-source Secure Graph data
publishing/sharing (SecGraph) system (available at [20]). SecGraph enables
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data owners to anonymize their data using state-of-the-art anonymization tech-
niques, measure the anonymized datas graph and application utilities, and com-
prehensively evaluate their datas actual vulnerability against modern DA at-
tacks. To the best of our knowledge, SecGraph is the first such system publicly
available to both academia and industry. More importantly, SecGraph provides
the first uniform platform that enables researchers to conduct accurate compar-
ative studies of anonymization/DA techniques, and to comprehensively under-
stand the resistance/vulnerability of existing or newly developed anonymization
techniques, the effectiveness of existing or newly developed DA attacks, and
graph and application utilities of anonymized data.
1.5 Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: in Chapter 2, we summarize
the research progress in the data anonymization and de-anonymization areas. In
Chapter 3, we study the seed-free DA quantification. In Chapter 4, we study the
seed-based DA quantification. In Chapter 5, we study the impact of non-PII on the
anonymity of graph data. In Chapter 6, we conduct the AUD quantification for graph
data. In Chapter 7, we design, implement, and evaluate SecGraph. We conclude this




In this chapter, we summarize the progress in the data anonymization and de-
anonymization areas. Although we focus on graph data anonymization and de-
anonymization in this dissertation, for completeness and to illustrate the evolution
of techniques, we also briefly summarize the anonymization and de-anonymization
schemes for non-graph data, e.g., micro/tabular data, set-valued data.
2.1 Anonymization
In this section, we summarize and classify existing anonymization techniques.
2.1.1 Micro/Tabular Data Anonymization
2.1.1.1 k-anonymity and Variants
Security/privacy is an important concern when publishing, transferring, and/or shar-
ing data. To protect data’s security and privacy, dozens of techniques have been
proposed. Among them, k-anonymity, defined by Samarati and Sweeney [123, 128],
opened a prosperous research area of data anonymization. Under k-anonymity, one
user’s data cannot be distinguished from at least k−1 other users’ data in the publish-
ing data. In general, to achieve k-anonymity is NP-hard. Therefore, many following
works focus on designing efficient k-anonymization algorithms and/or extending k-
anonymity to more effective privacy models (e.g., ℓ-diversity [90], t-closeness [83]) for
specific data publishing applications.
Following [123, 128], LeFevre et al. provided a practical framework for efficient
full-domain k-anonymity [77]. To improve the k-anonymity performance, Aggarwal
et al. designed a O(k)-approximation algorithm [24] followed by Park and Shim who
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further improved the approximation ratio to O(log k) [111].
To better protect users’ privacy, dozens of improved privacy models of k-anonymity
have been proposed. To defend against the homogeneity attack and background knowl-
edge attack to k-anonymity, Machanavajjhala et al. proposed ℓ-diversity in [90], under
which each equivalence class has at least ℓ well-represented values for each sensitive
attribute. For protecting both identification information and sensitive relationship
information in a dataset, Wong et al. extended k-anonymity to (α, k)-anonymity
[141]. Since privacy disclosure may also happen under ℓ-diversity based on the at-
tribute distribution, Li et al. proposed t-closeness in [83], which requires that the
distribution of a sensitive attribute in any equivalence class should be close to the at-
tribute distribution in the overall dataset. Similar to ℓ-diversity, to defend against the
background knowledge attack on k-anonymity, Martin et al. proposed (c, k)-safety,
where k characterizes the background knowledge and c indicates the desired privacy
level [93]. To improve the accuracy of generalization based k-anonymity/ℓ-diversity,
permutation-based anonymization was designed in [143] by Xiao and Tao and [157]
by Zhang et al.
In [136], Wang and Fung proposed (X,Y )-privacy (including (X, Y )-anonymity
and (X, Y )-linkability) to protect the privacy of sequential data releases, where X
and Y are two attribute sets over the join of two sequential datasets. To address
the inappropriateness of k-anonymity/ℓ-diversity in some situations, Nergiz et al.
presented δ-presence under which an adversary cannot identify any individual as being
in a dataset with certainty greater than δ [105]. To address the privacy leakage of
dynamic datasets, Xiao and Tao proposed a new privacy model named m-invariance,
where m measures the number of different users and sensitive values of each quasi-
identification group [144, 145]. Considering the specific features of healthcare data,
Mohammed proposed LKC-privacy, where L characterizes the adversary’s power, and
K and C measure the privacy thresholds of identity and attribute linkage, respectively
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[99].
Considering that many privacy models (e.g., t-closeness) require that groups of
sensitive attributes follow specified distributions, Koudas et al. proposed P -private
generation, under which a group of sensitive attribute values can be transformed to
a certain target distribution P with minimal data distortion [70]. To defend the
structure-based attack and label-based attack to recommendation data, Chang et al.
extended k-anonymity to a predictive anonymization model, where privacy, utility,
and performance are considered simultaneously [34]. In [23, 91], Aggarwal et al. and
Mahmood et al. generalized k-anonymity to k-Anonymous Cluster (k-AC), which
allows more information being published without compromising privacy. Considering
different personal levels of desired privacy, Choromanski relaxed k-anonymity to b-
matching from adaptive anonymity (b is short for bipartite graph) [39].
k-anonymity + Utility. To make the anonymized data useful, utility-based
anonymization techniques are also extensively studied. In [76], LeFevre extended
k-anonymity and ℓ-diversity to workload-aware anonymization. In [146], Xu et al.
designed two heuristic local recordings for utility-based anonymization. Similarly, K-
ifer and Gehrke investigated utility preserved anonymization schemes which maintain
the same privacy guarantees of k-anonymity and ℓ-diversity [66]. In [32], Brickell and
Shmatikov evaluated the tradeoff between privacy and utility. Their results demon-
strated that even modest privacy gains require almost complete destruction of the
data mining utility.
2.1.1.2 Differential Privacy
Besides k-anonymity and its variants, Differential Privacy (DP), introduced by D-
work [44, 45], is another popular anonymization technique to provide a provable
strong privacy guarantee. Initially, DP is designed for statistical databases aiming at
maximizing the accuracy of queries while minimizing the chance of privacy leakage
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[44]. Following [44], many enhanced DP techniques have been proposed for different
application scenarios.
In [54], Hay et al. proposed an approach to improve the accuracy of differen-
tially private algorithms for both unattributed and universal histograms. In [98],
Mohammed studied how to guarantee ϵ-DP under the non-interactive setting by prob-
abilistically generalizing the raw data and then adding noise. To achieve ϵ-DP and
meanwhile improve data’s utility, Kellaris and Papadopoulos proposed a practical DP
framework via grouping and smoothing [65]. To improve the accuracy of queries, Li
et al. presented a two-stage , data and workload aware mechanism for answering
sets of range queries under DP [82]. In [119], Qardaji et al. considered the scenario
of differentially private releasing of marginal contingency tables. They introduced
PriView, which computes marginal tables for a number of sets of attributes, and then
reconstruct any designed k-way marginal based on these sets of attributes.
Similar to k-anonymity, many variants of ϵ-DP have been designed to better meet
the privacy requirements of specific applications. In [45], Dwork et al. proposed a
relaxed version of ϵ-DP, named (ϵ, δ)-DP, that permits both an additive term (quan-
tified by δ) and a multiplicative term (indicated by ϵ). In [94], McSherry and Mironov
applied (ϵ, δ)-DP to differentially private recommender systems. They designed and
analyzed a recommender system built to provide modern privacy guarantees. In [75],
Lee and Clifton et al. presented an alternative of ϵ-DP called ρ-Differential Identifia-
bility (ρ-DI), which provides the same guarantees as DP while bounds the probability
of individual identification by ρ. Li et al. proposed a general privacy model (D, γ)-
membership privacy, where D captures all states of prior knowledge of an adversary
and γ limits the increase in confidence of accurate membership assertion [85]. In [84],
Li et al. studied the correlation between k-anonymity and DP. They demonstrated
that k-anonymization, when done “safely” and preceded with a random sampling
step, meets (ϵ, δ)-DP with reasonable parameters.
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2.1.2 Set-valued Data Anonymization
Different from traditional micro/tabular data, set-valued data, e.g., transaction data,
web search queries, click streams, and transit data, refer to the data in which each
record owner is associated with a set of items [35, 57]. In [57], He and Naughton
extended k-anonymity to anonymize set-valued data through top-down and local
generalization. Similarly, Xue et al. generalized k-anonymity and ℓ-diversity to set-
valued data by nonreciprocal recording [149]. In [130], Terrovitis et al. proposed
km-anonymization, which prevents an adversary from distinguishing a transaction
from k transactions given him the knowledge of at most m items. In [147], Xu et
al. proposed (h, k, p)-coherence for anonymizing transaction databases, which en-
sures that for an adversary of power p, the probability of identifying a transaction
is limited to 1/k and the probability of linking an individual to a private item is
limited to h. Another anonymization model is ρ-uncertainty, proposed by Cao et al.
[33], which defends against sensitive associations without constraining the nature of
an adversary’s knowledge or falsifying data. Similar to for tabular data, DP is also
extended to set-valued data anonymization. In [35, 36, 37], Chen et al. proposed
several anonymization techniques with DP guarantee for set-valued data in different
scenarios.
2.1.3 Graph Data Anonymization
Now, we discuss our main focus of this section: anonymization techniques for graph
data. With the emergence of many graph data, e.g., social networks, Internet, WWW,
collaboration networks, anonymous systems, mobility traces (which can modeled by
graph data by applying sophisticated techniques [63, 64, 115, 127]), and email net-
works, the security and privacy issues raised during the publishing of these data have
attracted a lot of attention as of recent [152, 159]. Compared to traditional relational
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data (e.g., micro/tabular/set-valued data), anonymizing graph data is more chal-
lenging. First and intuitively, the structure of graph data is much more complicated.
Consequently, in addition to the semantic information carried by data, the correlation
and structure information among users should also be protected. Second, it is more
difficult to model the auxiliary information available to adversaries, e.g., the widely
available and accessible social information make the secure publishing of social data
extremely challengeable [104]. Last but not least, it is more challenging to quan-
titatively measure the information of anonymizing graph data than relational data
[159]. Therefore, anonymization techniques for relational data (micro/tabular/set-
valued data) cannot be applied to graph data, and thus researchers have spent a
lot of efforts to design effective graph data anonymization techniques [159]. Below,
we summarize and categorize existing graph data anonymization techniques (a brief
survey on graph data anonymization techniques proposed before 2008 can be found
in [159]).
2.1.3.1 Naive ID Removal
To publish graph data, a straightforward method is by naive ID removal. Although
this method has been demonstrated to be extremely vulnerable to Structure-based
De-Anonymization (SDA) attacks (see Section 2.2), it is still widely used because of
its simplicity, easy applicability, and scalability (e.g., a recent privacy leakage incident
of the data indicating the locations of New York City’s taxi drivers due to the poor
data anonymization [50]) [27, 63, 104, 127].
2.1.3.2 Edge Editing based Anonymization
To protect graph data’s privacy, Ying and Wu proposed spectrum preserved Edge
Editing (EE) based schemes Add/Del and Switch [152]. Let G(V,E) be a graph
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dataset1, where V = {i|i is a user} is the set of users and E = {ei,j|i, j ∈ V , there
is a relationship between i and j} is the set of all the possible relationships (e.g.,
friendships, contacts, and collaboration relationships) among the users in V . Under
Add/Del, k randomly chosen edges will be added to E followed by another k randomly
chosen edges will be deleted from E. Under Switch, k edge switches are conducted,
where for each edge switch, two existing edges ei,j and eu,v, such that ei,j, eu,v ∈ E
and ei,v, eu,j /∈ E, are randomly selected and switched to ei,v and eu,j.
2.1.3.3 k-anonymity
As we discussed before, k-anonymity has been widely used to anonymize relational
data. Similarly, many efforts have been spent to extend k-anonymity to graph data
[38, 88, 156, 158, 160]. To defend against neighborhood attacks, Zhou and Pei proposed
k-Neighborhood Anonymity (k-NA) for graph data [158]. k-NA is a two-step scheme.
In the first step, the neighborhoods of all users (1-hop neighborhoods) are extracted
and encoded in a concise way. In the second step, the users with similar neighborhoods
are greedily grouped together until each group consists of at least k users, and then
each group is anonymized such that any neighborhood has at least k − 1 isomorphic
neighborhoods in the same group. In another work, Liu and Terzi considered degree
attacks and proposed k-Degree Anonymity (k-DA) for graph data, under which for
each user, there exists at least k − 1 other users with the degree [88]. k-DA also
consists of two steps. First, based on the degree sequence of a graph, a new k-
anonymous degree sequence (any degree appears at least k times in the sequence) is
constructed. Second, an anonymized graph is constructed based on the k-anonymous
degree sequence.
In [160], Zou et al. simultaneously considered four types of structural attacks to
1For simplicity and clarity, we use the same notation system as in existing work [152]-[159], [125]-
[63], the structure of a graph dataset is modeled as a graph G(V,E). More detailed information of
this model will be provided later.
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graph data: neighborhood attacks [158], degree attacks [88], subgraph attacks [27, 53],
and hub-fingerprint attacks [53]. To defend against these attacks, they proposed
k-automorphism (k-auto), under which for each user, there are always k − 1 other
symmetric users with respect to k − 1 automorphic functions. To achieve k-auto,
three techniques are developed, namely graph partitioning, block alignment, and edge
copy. Another similar work is [38], where Cheng et al. proposed k-isomorphism (k-
iso) to defend against structural attacks. Under k-iso, a graph is partitioned and
anonymized into k disjoint subgraphs such that all these subgraphs are isomorphic.
To ensure k-iso, both baseline and refined algorithms are designed. Furthermore, the
authors demonstrated that k-iso is equivalent to k-auto in defending against user-
deanonymization attacks.
In [156], Yuan et al. considered personalized privacy protection for anonymizing
graph data in terms of both semantic and structural information. Based on the
adversary’s semantic and structural background knowledge, they customized three
levels of privacy protection. Subsequently, different techniques are designed based
on label generation (semantically) and noising edge/user addition (structurally) to
achieve k-anonymity.
2.1.3.4 Aggregation/Class/Cluster based Anonymization
Another popular idea to protect graph data is to anonymize users into clusters (e-
quivalently, groups, classes) [30, 53, 131]. In [53], Hay et al. proposed an aggregation
based graph anonymization algorithm, which first partitions users and then describes
the graph at the level of partitions. The anonymized graph consists of supernodes,
each corresponding to the users in a partition, and superedges, indicating the edge
densities among supernodes. Another work in the semantics level is [30], where Bha-
gat et al. designed an interactive query-oriented anonymization algorithm to partition
a graph into classes with respect to users’ attributes (labels). In [131], Thompson and
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Yao first presented two clustering algorithms, named bounded t-means and union-split
respectively, to classify users with similar rules into clusters. Subsequently, they pro-
posed a matching-based anonymization scheme for graph data by strategically adding
and removing edges according to users’ inter-cluster connectivity.
2.1.3.5 Differential Privacy
Recently, there are some works that seek to enable differentially private graph data
release. Aiming at protecting edge/link privacy, defined as the privacy of users’ rela-
tionship (e.g., friendship, contact, collaboration, email) in graph data, in [122], Sala
et al. introduced Pygmalion, a differentially-private graph model. In Pygmalioin, a
graph is first modeled by dK-series, i.e., the degree distributions of connected compo-
nents of some size K within a target graph. Subsequently, the dK-series is perturbed
to meet ϵ-DP. Recently, to bypass many difficulties encountered when working with
worst-case sensitivity [122], Proserpio presented a general platform, named wPING,
for differentially private data analysis and publishing [117, 118]. Compared to previ-
ous solutions which scale up the magnitude of noise for challenging queries, wPING
achieves better accuracy by scaling down the contributions of challenging records.
Similar to [122], Wang and Wu also employed the dK-graph generation model for en-
forcing edge DP in graph anonymization. Another recent work for edge DP is [142],
where Xiao et al. observed that, by estimating the connection probabilities among
users instead of considering the edges directly, the noise scale enforced by edge DP
can be significantly reduced. Following this observation, they proposed a Hierarchical
Random Graph (HRG) model based scheme to meet edge DP.
2.1.3.6 Random Walk based Anonymization
In [97], Mittal et al. proposed a Random Walk (RW) based anonymization technique
for preserving link (edge) privacy. By this technique, an edge between two users i
and j is replaced by another edge between i and u, where u is the destination of a
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random walk starting from j.
2.2 De-anonymization
In this section, we summarize state-of-the-art data de-anonymization attacks.
2.2.1 Relational Data De-anonymization
In [72], Lakshmanan et al. studied how safe anonymized data is with respect to
protecting users’ identities. They proposed various classes of belief functions to cap-
ture various degrees of partial information possessed by an adversary, and derived
formulas for computing the expected number of cracks. In [103], Narayanan and
Shmatikov presented a class of statistical de-anonymization attacks against high-
dimensional micro-data. They further demonstrated the effectiveness of these attacks
by successfully de-anonymizing the Netflix Prize dataset. In [42], Cormode studied
the effectiveness of the minimality attack, which is an information inferring attack
raised due to over-eager attempts to minimize the information lost by anonymiza-
tion. Through careful analysis and experiments, they concluded that the impact of
such attacks can be minimized.
In [101], Nanavati et al. presented an attack against reviewer anonymity. They
showed that with access to a relatively small corpus of reviews, simple classification
techniques from existing toolkits can successfully de-anonymize reviewers with rea-
sonably high accuracy. In [41], Cormode studied the ability of an adversary to use
data meeting privacy definitions to build an accurate classifier. They showed that
private data can be accurately inferred even under DP. Furthermore, they observed
that DP and ℓ-diversity are similar against classifier-based inference attack. In [95],
Merener improved Narayanan and Shmatikov’s work [103] on the de-anonymization
of micro-data. They provided new results by considering cases where the auxiliary
information has error and the dataset contains null values. Given auxiliary informa-
tion of user’s behavior, Unnikrishnan and Naini studied strategies for de-anonymizing
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user statistics [134]. Particularly, they obtained an asymptotically optimal strategy
when users’ data following an independently and identically distribution model.
2.2.2 Graph Data De-anonymization
2.2.2.1 Seed-based De-anonymization
To de-anonymize graph data, it is intuitive to identify some users first as seeds. Then,
the large scale de-anonymization is bootstrapped from these seeds. In [27], Backstrom
et al. presented both active attacks and passive attacks to graph data. The active
attacks are carried out in three steps. First, an adversary chooses a set of victims.
Subsequently, the adversary creates some sybil accounts with edges linked to the vic-
tims, as well as a pattern of links among the sybil accounts before the data release.
Finally, after data release, the adversary identifies the sybil accounts according to
their structural pattern and then de-anonymizes the victims. In the passive attacks,
an adversary is an internal user of the system and tries to de-anonymize the user-
s around him after data release. The attacks in [27] have several limitations, e.g.,
they are not scalable, and they leverage sybil users that can be detected by modern
sybil defense techniques [154, 155]. To improve the attacks in [27], Narayanan and
Shmatikov presented a scalable two-phase de-anonymization attack to social networks
[104]. In the first phase, some seed users are identified between the anonymized graph
and the auxiliary graph. In the second phase, starting from the identified seeds, a
self-reinforcing de-anonymization propagation process is iteratively conducted based
on both graphs’ structural characteristics, e.g., node degrees, nodes’ eccentricity, edge
directionality. Later, Narayanan employed a simplified version of the attack in [104]
(using less de-anonymization heuristics) for link prediction [102]. Besides that, they
also proposed a new simulated annealing-based weighted graph matching algorith-
m for the seed identifying phase (the first phase). In [108], Nilizadeh et al. further
improved Narayanan and Shmatikov’s attack by proposing a community-enhanced de-
anonymization scheme of social networks. Specifically, the scheme first de-anonymizes
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a social network at the community-level. Then, users within de-anonymized commu-
nities are further de-anonymized according to similar heuristics as in [104]. Actually,
the community-level de-anonymization in [108] can also be applied to enhance other
de-anonymization attacks [63, 64, 127, 151].
In [127], Srivatsa and Hicks presented three attacks to de-anonymize mobility
traces, which can be modeled as contact graphs applying multiple preprocessing
techniques (e.g., [115, 127]). Similar to Narayanan-Shmatikov attacks [102, 104],
Srivatsa-Hicks attacks also consist of two phases, where the first phase is for seed
identification and the second phase is for mapping (de-anonymization) propagation.
To achieve mapping propagation, Srivatsa and Hicks proposed three heuristics based
on Distance Vector (DV), Randomized Spanning Trees (RST), and Recursive Subgraph
Matching (RSM). In [64], Ji et al. defined three similarity metrics, namely structural
similarity, relative distance similarity, and inheritance similarity, and proposed two
two-phase de-anonymization attack frameworks, named De-Anonymization (DA) and
Adaptive De-Anonymization (ADA), which are workable when the auxiliary data only
has partial overlap with the anonymized data.
In [69, 151], besides quantifying the de-anonymizability of graph data, the au-
thors also proposed de-anonymization attacks. In [151], Yartseva and Grossglauser
proposed a very simple percolation-based de-anonymization algorithm to graph da-
ta. Given a seed mapping set, the algorithm incrementally maps every pair of users
(from the anonymized and auxiliary graphs respectively) with at least r neighboring
mapped pairs, where r is a predefined mapping threshold. Another similar attack
was presented by Korula and Lattanzi [69], which is also starting from a seed set and
iteratively maps a pair of users with the most number of neighboring mapped pairs.
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2.2.2.2 Seed-free De-anonymization
Recently, following another track, some powerful seed-free de-anonymization attacks
on graph data are proposed. Using degrees and distances to other nodes as a nodes’
fingerprints, Pedarsani et al. proposed a Bayesian model based seed-free algorithm
for graph data de-anonymization [112]. Starting from nodes with the highest degree,
the algorithm iteratively updates the fingerprints of all the nodes and performs a
maximum weighted bipartite graph matching for de-anonymization. Another seed-
free de-anonymization attack to graph data was presented by Ji et al. [63]. Unlike
previous attacks, Ji et al.’s attack is an optimization based single-phase cold start
algorithm. Following their theoretical analysis, their attack is iteratively conducted
and self-reinforced with the objective of minimizing the edge difference between the
anonymized graph and auxiliary graph.
2.2.2.3 Other Techniques
There are some other techniques that de-anonymize graph data, e.g., semantics based
de-anonymization attacks [140], attacks to ego graphs [125], attacks against the link
privacy of graph data [68]. By leveraging web browser history stealing attack, Won-
dracek et al. presented a de-anonymization attack to social networks based on users’
group membership information [140]. Since we focus on structural de-anonymization
attacks in this dissertation, we do not consider this kind of semantics based attacks.
In [125], Sharad and Danezis studied the de-anonymization attacks to ego graphs
with graph radius of one or two, which is a very special case of the general graph
de-anonymization attacks studied in this dissertation. In [68], Korolova studied the
link privacy leakage of anonymized social networks. In this dissertation, we focus on




In [151], Yartseva and Grossglauser quantified the de-anonymizability of graph data
by analyzing a percolation-based graph matching algorithm under the Erdös-Rényi
(ER) random graph model G(n, p) (a random graph consists of n nodes/users, and an
edge exists between any pair of nodes with probability p). Under the ER model, the
degree distribution of the considered graph data should follow the Poisson distribution
[63, 107]. However, real world graph data may follow any distribution (e.g., many
social networks follow the power-law distribution), and more importantly, seldom
do we see any graph data following the Poisson distribution [63, 107]. Therefore,
the quantification under the ER model is only mathematically meaningful but not
practical. Nevertheless, it can shed light on more practical quantification. Another
limitation of [151] is that it leverages seed-associated structural information for de-
anonymizability quantification. In fact, as shown in [63, 113], graph data is de-
anonymizable based solely on data’s structural information, i.e., without seed.
Following the same direction, Korula and Lattanzi conducted another seed-based
de-anonymizablity quantification of graph data under both the ER model and the
Preferential Attachment (PA) model [69]. Again, several limitations make the quan-
tification in [69] unpractical. First, as we mentioned before, the ER model is a
theoretical model (i.e., it is not practical). Accordingly, the PA model is more practi-
cal compared to the ER. However, it still has some limitations, e.g., the existence of
self-loops. Second, as in [151], the quantification in [69] only considers the structural
information associated with seeds. Finally and more importantly, the quantification
in [69] is valid under a strong assumption of existing dense seeds (Θ(ι · n) available
seeds, ι ∈ (0, 1] is a constant), which is not true for real world de-anonymization
attacks. Recently, Ji et al. quantified the seed-based de-anonymizability of social
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networks [61] under both the ER model and a general statistical graph model. Com-
pared to previous seed-based works, the quantification in [61] considers the structural
information among anonymized users in addition to the structural information be-
tween anonymized users and seeds.
2.3.2 Seed-free Quantification
In [113], Pedarsani and Grossglauser quantified the de-anonymizability of graph data
under the ER model. They showed that an anonymized graph is de-anonymizable
when certain conditions on the structures of anonymized and auxiliary graphs are sat-
isfied. Again, the quantification is under the mathematical ER model, which cannot
be applied to real world graph data [63, 107]. Furthermore, for a de-anonymization
attack, although it is improper to assume the availability of dense seeds, it is still rea-
sonable to have some seed mappings as pre-knowledge [27, 64, 104, 127]. However, the
quantification in [113] does not rely on seeds. Recently, Ji et al. improved the quan-
tification in [113]. They quantified the perfect and error-tolerated de-anonymizability
of graph data under a general configuration model [107], where the considered graph
data can have an arbitrary degree sequence. Similar to [113], the quantification in [63]
does not relay on seeds.
2.4 Research Evolution Summarization
As a fundamental and challenging problem space, data anonymization and de-
anonymization have attracted a significant amount of attention from researchers.
With the emergence of big data, this research becomes even more important and












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and de-anonymization research in Tables 1 and 2, from which we have the following
observations.
• For anonymization techniques, following the seminal works of k-anonymity
and DP, many schemes have been proposed to address the security and pri-
vacy concerns of both relational data and graph data in different scenarios,
e.g., ℓ-diversity, (α, k)-anonymity, t-closeness, δ-presence, m-invariance, km-
anonymity, (ϵ, δ)-DP, (D, γ)-membership. This is mainly because these two
privacy models provide formal methodologies for implementation, theoretical
privacy guarantee, and moderate data utility preservation. Specifically, it seems
that DP has attracted more research attention than k-anonymity recently. We
conjecture that this is because DP is a relatively new technique and it provides
an even stronger privacy guarantee than k-anonymity. However, proper appli-
cation of DP for graph data anonymization is still in its infancy. Furthermore,
the research of graph data anonymization started later than that of relational
data, which is generally consistent with the evolution of computer data.
• With the popularity of graph data, more de-anonymization attacks on them
have been presented as of recent. Similar to understanding the fundamental
reasons that are responsible for the success of modern heuristic graph data
de-anonymization attacks, researchers also began to conduct the research on
quantifying the de-anonymizability of graph data.
• Most state-of-the-art graph data anonymization and de-anonymization schemes
are based only on data’s structural information. This is because (i) similar to
the semantic information, the structure itself is also important information car-
ried by graph data, which can be used for many data mining tasks and high level
applications; (ii) many users in graph data have unique/quasi-unique topolog-
ical structures, which can be used for identifying/quasi-identifying users; and
33
(iii) compared to semantic information, structure information is easier to ob-
tain and analyze, which can be exploited for fast and effective de-anonymization
attacks. Therefore, to protect graph data, researchers seek to anonymize the
structural information, while to break the privacy of graph data, researchers try






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Currently, to protect graph/structural data’s privacy, the most common technique
used is to anonymize data by removing the “Personally Identifiable Information (PI-
I)” before releasing data. Unfortunately, this naive method is shown to be vulnerable
to many De-Anonymization (DA) attacks [53, 84, 88]. Latterly, some sophisticated
anonymization schemes to protect graph data privacy, e.g., k-anonymity and its vari-
ants [53, 84, 88], were designed1. They can protect the privacy of graph data to some
extent. However, they are susceptible to emerging Structure based De-Anonymization
(SDA) attacks2 due to the limitations of the schemes (e.g., they are syntactic proper-
ties based) and the rich amount of information available to adversaries [27, 104, 127].
In SDA attacks, some auxiliary data (graphs) are employed to break the privacy
of anonymized graph data based only on the structural information. The fact that
the auxiliary data may come from either the same or a different domain/context with
the anonymized data makes the attack powerful, e.g., using Flickr to de-anonymize
Twitter [104], using Facebook to de-anonymize WiFi mobility traces [127]. Further-
more, the wide availability of auxiliary data makes the attack applicable and practical
[104, 127].
The SDA attacks were initially presented in [27], where Backstrom et al. designed
0Without of specification, “de-anonymization” means “seed-free de-anonymization” in this
chapter.
1Note that, the differential privacy [44] is well developed to protect the privacy of interactive data
release. However, it cannot defense against graph data DA attacks which are designed to breach the
privacy of non-interactive data release [44, 84, 104, 127].
2We use DA and SDA interchangeably.
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both active and passive attacks to break the privacy of social network users. How-
ever, since the attacks in [27] leverage the success of a “sybil” attack before actual
anonymized data publication, they are difficult to extend to large scale datasets. Lat-
er, Narayanan and Shmatikov designed a new SDA attack in [104], which successfully
de-anonymizes a large scale directed social network by applying several heuristics
such as eccentricity, edge directionality, reverse match, etc. In [127], Srivatsa and
Hicks demonstrated that the privacy of three kinds of mobility traces can be com-
promised by SDA attacks. However, the attacks presented in [127] are only suitable
for small datasets due to its computational infeasibility on finding a proper landmark
mappings for large datasets. Note that each of the aforementioned attacks consist of
two phases: a landmark identification phase and a DA propagation phase.
Although we already have some successful SDA practices [27, 104, 127], we do
not have any rigorous theoretical result under a general model yet in answering why
SDA attacks work. In [113], Pedarsani and Grossglauser quantified the privacy of
anonymized graph data under the Erdös-Rényi (ER) random graph model G(n, p)
(every edge exits with identical probability p). However, this quantification is not
suitable in practice since most, if not all, observed real world graph data (e.g., social
networks, collaboration networks [16, 106, 107]) do not follow the ER model. Ac-
tually, they may follow the power-law model, exponential model, etc. [16, 106, 107].
Therefore, under a practical general data model, there are still some open problems in
DA research: (i) why can graph data be de-anonymized? (ii) what are the conditions
for successful graph data DA? and (iii) what portion of users can be de-anonymized
in a graph dataset? To remedy the practice-theory gap, we study the quantifica-
tion, practice, and implications of graph data DA in this chapter. Particularly, our
contributions are as follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on quantifying graph da-
ta DA under a general data model. In our quantification, we answer several
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fundamental open problems: why graph data can be de-anonymized based only
on the topological information (the inherent reason for the success of existing
SDA practices)? what are the conditions for perfect and (1 − ϵ)-perfect DA,
where ϵ is the error tolerated by a DA scheme? what portion of users can be
de-anonymized in a graph dataset? Thus, we close the gap between graph data
DA practice and theory.
• We conduct the first large-scale study on the de-anonymizability of 26 real world
graph datasets, including social networks, location based mobility traces and
social networks, collaboration networks, communication networks (Email, Wik-
iTalk), autonomous system graph data, peer-to-peer network data, etc. Based
on our study, we find all the considered graph datasets are de-anonymizable
perfectly or partially. We also quantitatively show the conditions for perfect
and (1− ϵ)-perfect DA and what portion of users can be de-anonymized for the
26 datasets.
• Following our quantification, we present a novel Optimization based DA (ODA)
attack. Different from existing SDA attacks [27, 104, 127], ODA is a single-
phase cold start algorithm without any requirement on priori knowledge, e.g.,
landmark mappings. We also examine ODA on real datasets Gowalla (196,591
users and 950,327 edges) and Google+ (4,692,671 users and 90,751,480 edges).
The results demonstrate that about 77.7%− 83.3% of the users in Gowalla and
86.9%−95.5% of the users in Google+ are de-anonymizable, which implies SDA
is implementable and powerful in practice.
• Finally, we discuss some implications of this work according to our graph DA
quantification and the ODA attack. We further provide some general sugges-
tions for future secure data publishing.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we give the data
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and attack models. In Section 3.3, we theoretically quantify perfect and (1 − ϵ)-
perfect DA attacks under a general data model, followed by a large-scale evaluation
on 26 diverse real world graph datasets in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, we present a
novel optimization based DA attack with theoretical and experimental analysis. We
discuss the implications of our DA quantification and ODA attack in Section 3.6. The
chapter is concluded and future work is addressed in Section 3.7.
3.2 System Model
In this chapter, we focus on quantifying and analyzing the DA attack (vulnerability)
on anonymized graph data, which could be social data released by social network oper-
ators, e.g., Google+ [49], Facebook [16], Twitter [16], and/or mobility data generated
by mobile devices, e.g., WiFi and Bluetooth traces [127], instant message contacts
[127], email networks [16], classical longitude-latitude spatiotemporal traces [16, 115].
In the following subsection, we formally define the anonymized and auxiliary data
models, as well as the attack model.
3.2.1 Data Model
It is straightforward to model social data using graphs, where nodes represent users
and edges/links indicate the social relationships (friendship, contact, following) a-
mong users. For the mobility data generated by users (users’ devices), they can also
be modeled by contact graphs according to recently proposed techniques [115, 127].
Furthermore, it has been shown that a contact graph derived from mobility data has
strong correlation (similarity) with the social graph of the same group of users that
generated them [115, 127]. Therefore, we model the anonymized graph data by a
graph Ga = (V a, Ea), where V a = {i|i is an anonymized user} is the user set and
Ea = {eai,j| there is a relationship (friend, contact, etc.) between i ∈ V a and j ∈ V a}
is the edge/relationship set. In reality, it is possible that a graph dataset corresponds
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to a directed graph, e.g., Twitter. However, for simplicity and without loss of gen-
erality, we assume Ga as an undirected graph. Note that, the designed algorithm
in this chapter can be extended to the directed scenario directly. For i ∈ V a, its
neighborhood is defined as Nai = {j|∃eai,j ∈ Ea} and we denote the cardinality of Nai
as |Nai |, i.e., the degree of i.
The auxiliary data is also assumed to be graph data, e.g., a social network com-
promising users overlapped with that in the anonymized graph data [104, 127]. Fur-
thermore, the auxiliary data is easily obtainable by multiple means such as academic
and government data mining, advertising, third-party applications, data aggregation,
online crawling, etc. Successful examples can be found in [104, 115, 127, 140]. Conse-
quently, the auxiliary data is also modeled by a graph Gu = (V u, Eu), where V u = {i
is a known user} and Eu = {eui,j| there is a relationship (friend, contact, etc.) be-
tween i ∈ V u and j ∈ V u}. Similarly, the neighborhood of i ∈ V u is defined as
Nui = {j|∃eui,j ∈ Eu}.
3.2.2 De-anonymization Attack
Given Ga and Gu, a DA attack can be formally defined as a mapping :
σ : V a → V u. (1)
For ∀i ∈ V a, its mapping under σ is σ(i) ∈ V u ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ is a special not
existing indicator. Similarly, for ∀eai,j ∈ Ea, σ(eai,j) = euσ(i),σ(j) ∈ Eu ∪ {⊥}. Under σ,
a successful DA on i ∈ V a is defined as
σ(i) =
 i
′, if i′ ∈ V u and i and i′ correspond to the same user;
⊥, otherwise.
. (2)
For other cases, the DA on i fails. Consequently, the objective of a DA attack is to
successfully de-anonymize as many users in V a as possible.
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3.3 De-anonymization Quantification
In this section, given Ga and Gu, we quantify a DA attack under an arbitrary graph
distribution in multiple scenarios. Particularly, we study the condition on the struc-
ture of anonymized data under which a successful DA attack can be conducted. Note
that, our quantification is aiming at providing a theoretical foundation on under-
standing the success of recent heuristic SDA practices [104, 127]. We theoretically
demonstrate that even without any further (e.g., semantic) knowledge, perfect or
(1 − ϵ)-perfect DA attacks can be implemented when some structural conditions on
the underlaying graph corresponding to Ga and Gu are satisfied.
3.3.1 Preliminaries
To make the quantification and proof tractable and convenient, we make some as-
sumptions and definitions. First, we assume V a = V u, i.e., the auxiliary data and the
anonymized data are corresponding to the same group of users [104, 113, 127]. This
does not mean that we know any priori correct mapping from V a to V u. Furthermore,
this assumption is reasonable since one cannot be expected to use Gu to de-anonymize
Ga if they correspond to different groups of users. It is possible that the auxiliary
data only has some overlap with the anonymized data instead of corresponding to
the exactly same group of users. This fact does not limit our theoretical analysis
since we can either (i) apply the quantification to the overlap part, or (ii) redefine
V anew = V
a∪(V u\V a) and V unew = V u∪(V a\V u), i.e. adding the non-overlapped users
to V a and V u respectively as isolated users (with degree 0), and apply the analysis to
Ga = (V anew, E
a) and Gu = (V unew, E
u). Without of causing any confusion, we assume
V a = V u in the rest of this section.
Second, similar to the methodology in [113], for the users in V a (or, V u), we assume
that there exists a conceptual underlying graph G = (V,E) with V = V a = V u
































Figure 3: Edge/relationship projection. Only black edges appear in Ga/Gu.
and Gu can be viewed as the physically observable projections of G on particular
relationships, e.g., “friendship” relationship on Facebook, “circle” relationship on
Google+, “follow” relationship on Twitter, “co-occurrence” relationship in Gowalla,
“coauthor” relationship in DBLP. The projection from G to Ga is characterized by
an edge/relationship projection process [113]: (i) V a = V ; and (ii) ∀ei,j ∈ E, ei,j is
appeared in Ea with probability pa, i.e., Pr(ei,j ∈ Ea|ei,j ∈ E) = pa. Similarly, the
projection from G to Gu can be characterized by another edge/relationship projection
process with probability pu. For instance, we show a projection from G to G
a/Gu
in Fig. 3. Furthermore, we assume both projection processes are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.). Note that, (i) although the assumption on the existence
of a conceptual underlying graph and the projection process makes the quantification
problem theoretically tractable, it is still a challenging issue in practice; and (ii)
assuming Ga and Gu are projected from an underlying network implies Ga and Gu
have a strong structural correlation. Intuitively, this assumption is reasonable since
they correspond to the same group of users and the empirical results in [104, 127]
also supports such strong structural correlation.
Evidently, based on the above assumptions, we have n! possible DA schemes σ :
V a → V u to de-anonymizeGa, among which the only one perfect DA scheme (∀i ∈ V a,
i is successfully de-anonymized) is denoted by σ0.
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3.3.2 Model and Formalization
Now, given G, we denote |V | = n and |E| = m. Let V = {1, 2, · · · , n} and di be
the degree of i ∈ V . Then, we define D =< d1, d2, · · · , dn > as the degree sequence
of the nodes (users) in V . Furthermore, let ∆1 and ∆2 (resp., δ1 and δ2) be the
maximum and second maximum (resp., minimum and second minimum) degrees of
G, respectively. In [113], Pedarsani and Grossglauser quantified the privacy of G when
G is an ER random graph G(n, p) 3. The G(n, p) model is very useful as a source of
insight into the study of graph data, e.g., social networks [107, 113]. However, the
degree distribution of G(n, p) tends to follow the Poisson distribution, which is quite
different from the degree distributions of most, if not all, observed real world graph
data (e.g., social networks, collaboration networks, mobility based contact networks.)
[106, 107]. Actually, the degree distribution of real world graph data (represented by
graphs) may follow any distribution such as the power-law distribution, exponential
distribution, etc. [106, 107]. Therefore, it is significant to understand and quantify
a DA attack (or the privacy and vulnerability) for graph data under an arbitrary
degree distribution. To this end, we characterize G by a generalized graph model, the
configuration model [107]. Under the configuration model, a graph is specified by an
arbitrary degree sequence D rather than a particular degree distribution. Since D is
an arbitrary degree sequence, D can follow an arbitrary degree distribution observed
in real world data [107].









which is a key property of the configuration model [107]. From pi,j, it is more likely
of an existing edge (relationship) between two users with high degrees. Based on pi,j,
we define l = min{pi,j|i, j ∈ V, i ̸= j} and h = max{pi,j|i, j ∈ V, i ̸= j}, i.e., l and
3Based on the projection process, Ga and Gu are also ER random graphs G(n, p ·pa) and G(n, p ·
pu), respectively.
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h are the lower and upper bounds of pi,j respectively. Then, given G with arbitrary
degree distribution, we have l ≥ δ1δ2
2m−1 and h ≤
∆1∆2
2m−1 .
Finally, given any DA scheme σ = {(i, i′)|1 ≤ i, i′ ≤ n, i ∈ V a, i′ ∈ V u} ⊆ V a×V u,
we define the De-anonymization Error (DE) on a user mapping (i, i′) ∈ σ as
ψi,i′ = |Nai \Nui′ |+ |Nui′ \Nai |, (4)
which measures the neighborhoods’ difference between i in Ga and i′ in Gu under the





Taking Ga and Gu shown in Fig. 3 as an example, the DE of the perfect DA scheme
σ0 is Ψσ0 = 20. For another DA scheme σ = (σ0 \ {(4, 4), (5, 5)}) ∪ {(4, 5), (5, 4)}
(users 4 and 5 are incorrectly de-anonymized to each other), its DE is Ψσ = 28. In
the following subsections, we quantify a DA attack by studying the conditions on G
and the projection process under which perfect and (1 − ϵ)-perfect DA attacks can
be conducted. Equivalently, we study the conditions on G and the projection process
such that the perfect/(1− ϵ)-perfect DA scheme minimizes DE (mathematically, this
implies a perfect/(1− ϵ)-perfect DA scheme can be obtained since the number of DA
schemes is bounded).
3.3.3 Perfect De-anonymization
Now, we quantify the conditions for perfect DA attacks. Then, we extend to the
scenario of quantifying (1 − ϵ)-perfect DA attacks. Some useful properties of the
binomial distribution that will be used in the proofs are as follows.
Lemma 1. (i) Let X ∼ B(n1, p) and Y ∼ B(n2, p) be independent binomial variables.
Then, X+Y is again a binomial variable and X+Y ∼ B(n1+n2, p); (ii) [113] Let X
and Y be two binomial random variables with means λx and λy, respectively. Then,
44
when λx > λy,




3.3.3.1 Same Projection Probability
First, we consider the scenario that the projection processes from G to Ga and Gu
are characterized by the same probability ℘, i.e., pa = pu = ℘. Let
f℘ =
℘[l(1− h℘)− h(1− ℘)]2
2(l(1− h℘) + h(1− ℘))
(7)
be a variable depending on ℘. Then, we have the following Theorem 1 which indicates
the conditions on ℘ and f℘ such that it is asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.)
4 that
Ψσ ≥ Ψσ0 for any DA scheme σ ̸= σ0 .
Theorem 1. For any σ ̸= σ0, let k be the number of different mappings between
σ and σ0, i.e., the number of incorrect mappings in σ. Then, 2 ≤ k ≤ n and
Pr(Ψσ ≥ Ψσ0) →
n→∞
1 when ℘ > h−l




Proof: Since k is the number of incorrect mappings in σ ̸= σ0, 2 ≤ k ≤ n is
evidently. For convenience of proof, let σk be a DA scheme that has k incorrect (un-
successful) mappings. Under σk, let Vk ⊆ V be the set of incorrectly de-anonymized
users5, Ek = {ei,j|i ∈ Vk or j ∈ Vk} be the set of all possible edges adjacent to at least
one user in Vk, Eτ = {ei,j|i, j ∈ Vk, (i, j) ∈ σk, and (j, i) ∈ σk} be the set of all possible
edges corresponding to transposition mappings6 in σk, and E = {ei,j|1 ≤ i ̸= j ≤ n}
be the set of all possible edges on V . Furthermore, define mk = |Ek| and mτ = |Eτ |.





+ k(n − k), mτ ≤ k2 since there are at most
k
2





, and ∀ei,j ∈ E , Pr(ei,j ∈ E) = pi,j = didj2m−1 .
4Asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.) implies that as n→∞, with probability goes to 1 an event
happens.
5Without of causing any confusion, we use V , V a, and V u interchangeably since V = V a = V u.
6If both mappings (i, j) and (j, i) are in σk, then {(i, j), (j, i)} is called a transposition mapping,
i.e., two users are incorrectly de-anonymized to each other.
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Now, we quantify Ψσ0 stochastically. During the quantification, we employ a wide-
ly used technique in graph theory [31, 113]. That is, to quantify Ψσ0 , we considering
the DE caused by the projection of each edge rather than considering the mapping
directly. ∀ei,j ∈ E , if it appears in E and is projected to either Ga or Gu but not
both during the edge projection process, then according to the definition of DE, it
will cause a DE of 2. Consequently, the DE caused by ei,j satisfies a binomial distri-
bution B(2, 2pi,j · ℘(1 − ℘)). Furthermore, since the projection process is i.i.d. and












2, 2pi,j · ℘(1− ℘)). (10)
When quantify Ψσk , we consider three cases respectively.
• Case 1 : for ∀ei,j ∈ E \ Ek, the DE caused by ei,j during the projection process
also satisfies the binomial distribution B(2, 2pi,j · ℘(1 − ℘)) since i, j ∈ V \ Vk (i.e.,
i, j are successfully de-anonymized under σk).
• Case 2: for ∀ei,j ∈ Ek \ Eτ , it will be mapped to some other possible edge
σk(ei,j) = eσk(i),σk(j) ∈ E since ei,j /∈ Eτ and at least one of i and j is incorrect-
ly de-anonymized under σk. Therefore, in this case, the DE caused by ei,j during
the projection process satisfies binomial distribution B(2, pi,j · ℘(1 − pσk(i),σk(j)℘) +
pσk(i),σk(j) · ℘(1− pi,j℘)).
• Case 3: for ∀ei,j ∈ Eτ , since it corresponds to a transposition mapping, the DE
caused by ei,j during the projection process also satisfies the binomial distribution
B(2, 2pi,j · ℘(1− ℘)).
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2, pi,j · ℘(1− pσk(i),σk(j)℘) + pσk(i),σk(j) · ℘(1− pi,j℘)). (18)
Now, define X ∼ B(
∑
ei,j∈Ek\Eτ
2, pi,j · ℘(1 − pσk(i),σk(j)℘) + pσk(i),σk(j) · ℘(1 − pi,j℘))
and Y ∼ B(
∑
ei,j∈Ek
2, 2pi,j · ℘(1− ℘)). Let λx and λy by the mean values of X and Y ,




2) · [pi,j · ℘(1− pσk(i),σk(j)℘) + pσk(i),σk(j) · ℘(1− pi,j℘)] (19)
= 2(mk −mτ )[pi,j · ℘(1− pσk(i),σk(j)℘) + pσk(i),σk(j) · ℘(1− pi,j℘)] (20)
≥ 2(mk −mτ ) · [2l℘(1− h℘)] (21)





2) · [2pi,j · ℘(1− ℘)] (23)
≤ 4h℘(1− ℘)mk. (24)
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Then, ∀σk (k ∈ [2, n]),














B(2, 2pi,j · ℘(1− ℘))) (27)
=
stochastically
Pr(X − Y ≤ 0) (28)
We now derive the upper bound on Pr(X − Y ≤ 0). Since ℘ > h−l


















(h− l)mk + lmτ
(h− hl)mk + lhmτ
(29)
⇔℘[(h− hl)mk + lhmτ ] > (h− l)mk + lmτ (30)
⇔l(mk −mτ )− lh(mk −mτ )℘ > hmk − hmk℘ (31)
⇔4l℘(1− h℘)(mk −mτ ) > 4h℘(1− ℘)mk (32)
⇒λx > λy. (33)
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≤ 2 exp(− (4l℘(1− h℘)(mk −mτ )− 4h℘(1− ℘)mk)
2
8(4l℘(1− h℘)(mk −mτ ) + 4h℘(1− ℘)mk)
) (35)
= 2 exp(−℘(l(1− h℘)(mk −mτ )− h(1− ℘)mk)
2
2(l(1− h℘)(mk −mτ ) + h(1− ℘)mk)
) (36)
= 2 exp(−℘[(l(1− h℘)− h(1− ℘))mk − l(1− h℘)mτ ]
2




2 exp(−℘[l(1− h℘)− h(1− ℘)]
2mk
2(l(1− h℘) + h(1− ℘))
) (38)
= 2 exp(−f℘mk) (39)







+ k(n− k))) (40)









. Then, ζ(2) is the Euler-Riemann zeta function with pa-
rameter 2 and thus ζ(2) = π
2
6
< ∞. Consequently, according to the Borel-Cantelli
Lemma, it is a.a.s. that X ≥ Y . It follows that it is a.a.s. that Ψσk ≥ Ψσ0 for
2 ≤ k ≤ n, i.e., Pr(Ψσ ≥ Ψσ0)→ 1 for any σ ̸= σ0. 2
In Theorem 1, we quantified the condition on ℘, l, and h under which the perfect
DA scheme σ0 will cause less DE than any other given DA scheme σ ̸= σ0. To
guarantee the uniqueness of σ0 (i.e., σ0 is the one and the only one DA scheme
introducing the least DE), intuitively, stronger conditions on ℘, l, and h are required.
We quantify such conditions in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Let E be the event that there exists at least one DA scheme σ ̸= σ0
such that Ψσ ≤ Ψσ0. When ℘ > h−lh−hl and f℘ = Ω(
(k+3) lnn+1
kn
), where 2 ≤ k ≤ n,
Pr(E) → 0, i.e., it is a.a.s. that there exists no DA scheme σ such that σ ̸= σ0 and
Ψσ ≤ Ψσ0.
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< ∞, it is a.a.s. that Pr(E) → 0 based on the Borel-
Cantelli Lemma, i.e., it is a.a.s. that there exists no DA scheme such that σ ̸= σ0
and Ψσ ≤ Ψσ0 . 2
From Theorem 2, although we seek a stronger result, the condition on ℘ is the same
as in Theorem 1 and the condition on f℘ only has an increase of order Θ(k). Based
on Theorem 2, if ℘ > h−l
h−hl and f℘ = Ω(
(k+3) lnn+1
kn
), the perfect DA scheme causes
the least DE. Furthermore, the number of possible DA schemes is upper-bounded.
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Therefore, when the conditions on ℘ and f℘ are satisfied, G
a can mathematically be
perfectly de-anonymized by Gu based on the structure information only.
3.3.3.2 Different Projection Probabilities
In this subsection, we quantify the conditions on pa, pu, l, and h when pa ̸= pu for







(l(pa + pu − 2hpapu)− h(pa + pu − 2papu))2
4(l(pa + pu − 2hpapu) + h(pa + pu − 2papu))
(53)
be two variables depending on pa and pu. Then, we have the following theorem
quantifying the conditions on gpa,pu , fpa,pu , l, and h under which it is a.a.s. Ψσ ≥ Ψσ0
for any σ ̸= σ0. Note that, without causing any confusion, we consistently employ
the same notations as in Theorems 1 and 2 in the following of this section.
Theorem 3. When gpa,pu >
h−l
2(h−lh) and fpa,pu = Ω(
2 lnn+1
kn
), Pr(Ψσ ≥ Ψσ0) → 1 for
any σ ̸= σ0.
Proof Sketch: Basically, this theorem can be proven following a similar idea as in
















2, pi,j · pa(1− pσk(i),σk(j)pu) + pσk(i),σk(j) · pu(1− pi,jpa)).
(56)
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Define X ∼ B(
∑
ei,j∈Ek\Eτ




2, pi,j(pa(1− pu) + pu(1− pa))). Then, we have
λx = 2(mk −mτ ) · (pi,j · pa(1− pσk(i),σk(j)pu) + pσk(i),σk(j) · pu(1− pi,jpa)) (57)
≥ 2l(pa + pu − 2hpapu)(mk −mτ ). (58)
and
λy = 2mk · pi,j(pa(1− pu) + pu(1− pa)) (59)















mk(h− l) +mτ l
2mk(h− lh) + 2mτ lh
⇒ λx > λy.
(61)
Then, we have
Pr(Ψσk −Ψσ0 ≤ 0) (62)
≤
stochastically
Pr(X − Y ≤ 0) (63)




≤ 2 exp(− (2l(pa + pu − 2hpapu)(mk −mτ )− 2h(pa + pu − 2papu)mk)
2




2 exp(−(l(pa + pu − 2hpapu)− h(pa + pu − 2papu))
2mk
4(l(pa + pu − 2hpapu) + h(pa + pu − 2papu))
) (66)
= 2 exp(−fpa,pumk) (67)









Based on the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, it is a.a.s. that Ψσk ≥ Ψσ0 for 2 ≤ k ≤ n, i.e.,
Pr(Ψσ ≥ Ψσ0)→ 1 for any σ ̸= σ0. 2
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Again, to guarantee the uniqueness of the perfect DA scheme σ0 to cause the least
DE when pa ̸= pu, we quantify the conditions on pa, pu, l, and h as follows.
Theorem 4. When gpa,pu >
h−l
2(h−lh) and fpa,pu = Ω(
(k+3) lnn+1
kn
), where 2 ≤ k ≤ n, it
is a.a.s. that there exists no DA scheme σ such that σ ̸= σ0 and Ψσ ≤ Ψσ0.
Proof Sketch: This theorem can be proved by employing similar techniques as in
Theorem 2. Let E be the event that there exists at least one DA scheme σ ̸= σ0
such that Ψσ ≤ Ψσ0 . From the proof of Theorem 3 and considering that fpa,pu =
Ω( (k+3) lnn+1
kn





























Then, according to the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, Pr(E)→ 0, i.e., it is a.a.s. that there
exists no DA scheme σ such that σ ̸= σ0 and Ψσ ≤ Ψσ0 . 2
From Theorem 4, to guarantee the uniqueness of inducing the least DE of σ0,
which is a stronger conclusion compared with that in Theorem 3, the condition on
gpa,pu is the same as in Theorem 3 and the condition on fpa,pu has an increase of Θ(k).
Furthermore, Theorem 4 quantifies the conditions under which the anonymized graph
data can be mathematically perfectly de-anonymized when pa ̸= pu.
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3.3.4 (1− ϵ)-Perfect De-anonymization
In the aforementioned subsection, the conditions on perfect DA are quantified. Now,
we study the conditions on (1 − ϵ)-perfect DA. Formally, we define a (1 − ϵ)-perfect
DA, denoted by σϵ, as a DA scheme under which at most ϵ|V a| = ϵn users are
tolerated to be incorrectly (unsuccessfully) de-anonymized, where 0 ≤ ϵ ≤ 1. Under
the (1 − ϵ)-perfect DA assumption, any σk is proper as long as k ≤ ϵn, i.e., we take
it as a satisfiable DA solution. Theoretically, the conditions on (1 − ϵ)-perfect DA
are quantified in Theorem 5. Note that, when we quantify the conditions for (1− ϵ)-
perfect DA, we do not distinguish σ0 and σk with k ≤ ϵn, since they are all proper
solutions. Hence, as in the scenario of perfect DA, our quantification takes σ0 as the
reference point.
Theorem 5. (i) When pa = pu = ℘, ℘ >
h−l
h−hl , and f℘ = Ω(
2 lnn+1
ϵn2
), Pr(Ψσk ≥ Ψσ0)




Pr(Ψσk ≥ Ψσ0) for any σk with k > ϵn.
Proof Sketch: Since the DA schemes σk with k ≤ ϵn are satisfiable solutions under
the (1− ϵ)-perfect DA assumption, we only have to consider σk with k > ϵn.
(i) We first prove the case when pa = pu℘. From the proof of Theorem 1, we
know that Pr(Ψσk − Ψσ0 ≤ 0) ≤
stochastically









℘(1− ℘)). Now, considering ℘ > h−l
h−hl , f℘ = Ω(
2 lnn+1
ϵn2
), and k > ϵn, we have
Pr(Ψσk −Ψσ0 ≤ 0) ≤ Pr(X − Y ≤ 0) (77)







= 2 exp(−Ω(2 lnn+ 1
ϵn2
) · Ω(ϵn2)) (80)




Consequently, according to the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, we have Pr(Ψσk−Ψσ0 ≤ 0)→ 0
for k > ϵn when pa = pu = ℘.
(ii) We now prove the case when pa ̸= pu. From Theorem 3, when gpa,pu > h−l2(h−lh) ,
we have Pr(Ψσk −Ψσ0 ≤ 0) ≤ 2 exp(−fpa,pumk) for 2 ≤ k ≤ n. Considering that k >
ϵn and fpa,pu = Ω(
2 lnn+1
ϵn2




. Hence, it is a.a.s. that Ψσk ≥ Ψσ0 for σk with k > ϵn when pa ̸= pu. 2
From Theorem 5, we can see that (i) for any DA scheme σk, if it has more than
ϵn incorrect mappings, with probability 1, it will cause more DE than σ0. On the
other hand, if σk is a (1 − ϵ)-perfect DA scheme, i.e., k ≤ ϵn, we cannot a.a.s.
distinguish σk and σ0 based on DE under the quantified conditions; (ii) compared
with the quantifications in Theorems 1 and 3, the conditions on f℘ and fpa,pu change
from Ω( lnn
kn
) to Ω( lnn
n2
) explicitly, which implies a relaxation of the condition on f℘
and fpa,pu . This relaxation comes from the toleration of ϵn incorrect user mappings.
As in the scenario of perfect DA, stronger conditions can be quantified to guarantee
(1 − ϵ)-perfect DA schemes causing the least DE. The quantification is shown in
Theorem 6, which can be proven by employing similar techniques as in Theorems 2
and 4. Therefore, we omit the detailed proof here. From Theorem 6, we can see that
even ϵn matching errors are tolerated, the conditions on ℘ and gpa,pu stay the same
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while the conditions on f℘ and fpa,pu only have some constant relaxation compared
with the perfect DA scenario.
Theorem 6. (i) When pa = pu = ℘, ℘ >
h−l




a.a.s. that there exists no σk such that k > ϵn and Ψσk ≤ Ψσ0; (ii) When pa ̸= pu,
gpa,pu >
h−l
2(h−lh) , and fpa,pu = Ω(
(ϵn+3) lnn+1
ϵn2
), it is a.a.s. that there exists no σk such
that k > ϵn and Ψσk ≤ Ψσ0.
3.4 Evaluation
According to our quantification, even without semantic/contextual priori knowledge,
anonymized graph data can be de-anonymized perfectly or (1 − ϵ)-perfectly when
certain structural conditions are satisfied. In this section, we conduct comprehensive
evaluations of our DA quantification on 26 real world graph datasets7.
3.4.1 Evaluation Setup
During the quantification, pi,j is an important parameter although we quantify the
conditions in laconic expressions in terms of its bounds l and h. However, it is difficult
to accurately determine pi,j in practice [107, 113, 115]. Fortunately, it is not necessary
to know the exact pi,j to numerically evaluate our DA quantification. Actually, ac-
cording to our derivation, we only have to determine the statistical expectation value
of pi,j, denoted by E(pi,j). For a dataset with degree sequence D, define pD = E(pi,j).
Then, it is statistically reasonable (especially for large datasets) to use the graph
density ρ = 2m
n(n−1) to approximate pD, i.e., pD ≃ ρ [107, 113]. On the other hand,
we focus on demonstrating the statistical behavior of our perfect/(1− ϵ)-perfect DA
quantification. Therefore, we use ρ to approximate pD in our evaluation. Further-
more, for the convenience of evaluation, we evaluate the quantification in the scenario
7We conduct more evaluations on 60+ real world datasets. Here, partial of the results on 26
representative datasets are shown. Complete results and source codes are available up to request.
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of pa = pu = ℘. This does not limit our evaluation since it is straightforward to ex-
tend to the pa ̸= pu scenario (actually, both scenarios exhibit similar behaviors, which






Then, we have the following conclusions, which can be proven by similar techniques
as in Theorems 1, 2, 5, and 6 from the statistical perspective.
Theorem 7. For perfect DA, (i) when ℘ > k
(1−pD)(2kn−k2)+(2pD−1)k
and fD = Ω(
4 lnn+2
2kn−k2−k ),
Pr(Ψσ ≥ Ψσ0) → 1 for any σ ̸= σ0; (ii) when ℘ > k(1−pD)(2kn−k2)+(2pD−1)k and
fD = Ω(
2(k+3) lnn+2
2kn−k2−k ), it is a.a.s. that there exists no σ such that σ ̸= σ0 and Ψσ ≤ Ψσ0.





), Pr(Ψσk ≥ Ψσ0)→ 1 for any σk with k > ϵn; (ii) when ℘ > k(1−pD)(2kn−k2)+(2pD−1)k
and fD = Ω(
lnn
n
), it is a.a.s. that there exists no σk such that k > ϵn and Ψσ ≤ Ψσ0.
Now, based on Theorems 7 and 8, we evaluate our quantification on perfect and
(1− ϵ)-perfect DA.
3.4.2 Datasets
We evaluate our quantification on 26 datasets from multiple domains, including So-
cial Network (SN) data, Location based Mobility traces and SN (LMSN) data, Col-
laboration Network (ColN) data, communication network (Email, WikiTalk) data,
Autonomous Systems (AS) graph data, and Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network graph data
[16, 49, 115, 127]. In Table 3, we show some statistics on the employed datasets,
where d represents the average degree of n nodes and p(i) indicates the percentage of
nodes with degree of i or less in the corresponding dataset.
57
Table 3: Data statistics.
Name Type n m ρ d p(1) p(5)
Google+ SN 4.7M 90.8M 8.24E-6 38.7 .054 .273
Twitter SN .5M 14.9M 1.20E-4 54.8 .053 .198
LiveJournal SN 4.8M 69M 3.70E-6 17.9 .210 .505
Facebook SN 4K 88K 1.08E-2 43.7 .019 .113
YouTube SN 1.1M 3M 4.64E-6 5.3 .531 .855
Orkut SN 3.1M 117.2M 2.48E-5 76.3 .022 .073
Slashdot SN 82.2K 1M 1.73E-4 14.2 .022 .593
Pokec SN 1.6M 30.6M 1.67E-5 27.3 .100 .307
Infocom LMSN 73 212 8.07E-2 5.8 .068 .493
Smallblue LMSN 120 375 5.25E-2 6.3 .133 .625
Brightkite LMSN 58K .2M 1.32E-4 7.5 .354 .718
Gowalla LMSN .2M 1M 4.92E-5 9.7 .252 .645
HepPh ColN 12K .2M 1.87E-3 21.0 .100 .500
AstroPh ColN 18.8K .4M 1.23E-3 22.0 .053 .337
CondMat ColN 23.1K .2M 4.00E-4 8.6 .078 .518
DBLP ColN .3M 1.1M 2.09E-5 6.6 .136 .670
Enron Email 36.7K .2M 3.19E-4 10.7 .281 .679
EuAll Email .3M .4M 1.35E-5 3.0 .837 .973
Wiki WikiTalk 2.4M 5M 1.63E-6 3.9 .738 .962
AS733 AS 6.5K 13.9K 6.63E-4 4.3 .355 .896
Oregon AS 11.5K 32.7K 4.98E-4 5.7 .289 .876
Caida AS 26.5K 53.4K 1.52E-4 4.0 .375 .924
Skitter AS 1.7M 11.1M 7.73E-6 13.1 .128 .554
Gnutella3 P2P 26.5K 65.4K 1.86E-4 4.9 .413 .710
Gnutella4 P2P 36.7K 88.3K 1.32E-4 4.8 .448 .718
Gnutella5 P2P 62.6K .1M 7.56E-5 4.7 .458 .725
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Due to space limitations, we briefly introduce the datasets as follows. Detailed
descriptions can be found in [16, 49, 115, 127].
• SN. We employed 8 SN datasets in our evaluation as shown in Table 3. Google+
is a SN developed by Google indicating the “circle” relationships (e.g., friends, fami-
lies, colleagues.) among people [49]. Twitter is a SN that enables users to send and
read “tweets” [16]. LiveJournal is a SN that allows members to maintain journals,
blogs, etc. [16]. Facebook is a SN where users are connected by “friendships” [16]. In
the YouTube and Orkut SNs, users form “friendships” and create groups where other
users can join [16]. Slashdot is a SN for sharing and maintaining technology-related
news [16]. Pokec is also a “friendship” based SN [16].
• LMSN. Infocom consists of a Bluetooth contact trace and a coauthor network of
Infocom 2006 conference attendees [127]. Smallblue consists of an instant messenger
contact trace and a Facebook SN of the employees of a company [127]. Both Brightkite
and Gowalla are consisting of a SN and a check-in trace of the SN users [16, 115].
• ColN. HepPh, AstroPh, and CondMat are three collaboration networks from
arXiv in the areas of High Energy Physics-Phenomenology, Astro Physics, and Con-
dense Matter Physics, respectively [16]. DBLP is a collaboration network of re-
searchers mainly in Computer Science [16].
• Email and WikiTalk. Enron and EuAll are two email communication net-
works [16]. WikiTalk is a network containing the discussion relationships among a
group of users on Wikipedia [16].
• AS. AS733, Oregon, Caida, and Skitter are four AS graphs at different locations
[16].
• P2P. Gnutella3, Gnutella4, and Gnutella5 are three P2P network graphs where
nodes represent hosts in Gnutella and edges are connections between hosts [16].
Before evaluating our quantification, we preprocess the datasets as follows. First,
we remove isolated users (or nodes) from a dataset if present (most of the datasets
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do not have isolated users). This is intuitively reasonable since isolated users carry
no structural information. Second, we do not consider the direction information of
the directed data, i.e., all the datasets are represented by undirected graphs. This is
because our network model is an undirected graph. Even direction takes some extra
auxiliary information [104], we do not consider it in this chapter and would include
it in the future. More importantly, our quantification demonstrates that undirected
structure information is powerful enough to de-anonymize graph data, which can also
be seen in our following evaluation.
3.4.3 Evaluation on Perfect De-anonymization Quantification
For each of the datasets considered, we represent it as graph G. Given ℘, Ga and
Gu can be projected from G according two independent edge/relationship projection
processes. Furthermore, the conditions in Theorems 7 and 8 are quantified in the
sense of n being a large number. Therefore, in the evaluation of perfect/(1 − ϵ)-
perfect DA quantification, we also derive an extra condition on the lower bound on
n, denoted by Ω(n). Then, based on Theorem 7, the conditions on (Ω(fD),Ω(n)) for
perfect DA under different projection probabilities ℘ are shown in Table 4.
From Table 4, we have the following observations.
• When ℘ increases, Ω(fD) shows an increasing trend. For instance, Ω(fD) is
increased from 6.5E-8 when ℘ = .3 to 2.7E-6 when ℘ = .9, which implies the condition
on fD becomes stronger. This is consistent with our quantification since fD is an
increasing function on ℘ given pD. On the other hand, we find that although Ω(fD)
increases for large ℘, it still keeps relatively loose bounds, i.e., fD is easily be satisfied.
For example, when ℘ = .9, the condition on Ω(fD) is 2.7E-6 for Google+ (a large
scale dataset) and 1.6E-5 for Gowalla (a medium scale dataset).












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































when ℘ = .3 to 3.2E5 when ℘ = .9 for Twitter. This is because a large ℘ implies that
Ga is topologically more similar to Gu. Thus, a weaker condition on Ω(n) is sufficient
to enable a perfect DA scheme a.a.s. inducing the least DE.
• For datasets with similar graph densities, e.g., Google+ (ρ = 8.24E-6) and
Skitter (ρ = 7.73E-6), the conditions on (Ω(fD),Ω(n)) are also similar for perfect
DA, which is consistent with our theoretical quantification. This comes from the
similarity of their statistical pD. For perfect DA on datasets with different graph
densities (with similar or different sizes), e.g., HepPh (n = 1.2E4, ρ = 1.87E-3) and
Oregon (n = 1.15E4, ρ = 4.98E-4), Facebook (n = 4.0E3, ρ = 1.08E-2) and Twitter
(n = 4.6E5, ρ = 1.2E-4), dense datasets require a stronger condition on fD while a
weaker condition on Ω(n) given ℘, which is also consistent with our quantification. A
stronger condition requirement on fD is because of that fD is an increasing function
on pD ≃ ρ ∈ (0, 0.5] given ℘ and all the considering datasets have ρ ≤ 0.5. A looser
bound on Ω(n) comes from the fact that more structural information can be projected
to Ga and Gu in dense datasets.
• From Table 4, some datasets can be perfectly de-anonymized under some con-
ditions. For instance, Orkut and Facebook are a.a.s. can be perfectly de-anonymized
when ℘ ≥ Ω(.8), and Twitter is a.a.s. can be perfectly de-anonymized when ℘ ≥
Ω(.9). The perfect DA is due to their good structural characteristics, e.g., high av-
erage degree (from Table 3, the average degree d is 76.3 for Orkut, 54.8 for Twitter,
and 43.7 for Facebook), small percentage of nodes with a low degree (p(1) is 2.2% for
Orkut, 5.3% for Twitter, and 5.4% for Facebook).
3.4.4 Evaluation on (1− ϵ)-Perfect De-anonymization Quantification
Based on our quantification, the percentage of successfully de-anonymized users by
any (1 − ϵ)-perfect DA scheme is at least 1 − ϵ. Given ℘ varied from .3 to .95, we
evaluate the minimum number of users in the 26 datasets considered that can be
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successfully de-anonymized with probability 1 in terms of our quantification, i.e., the
lower bound of 1− ϵ, (Ω(1− ϵ)), and the results are shown in Table 5.
From Table 5, we make some important observations and comments as follows.
• When ℘ increases, more users can be de-anonymized for every dataset as ex-
pected. For example, when ℘ = .5, it is a.a.s. at least 29.7% of the users in Google+
can be successfully de-anonymized; when ℘ is increased to .8, at least 72.5% of the
users in Google+ can be successfully de-anonymized; when ℘ = .95 all the users in
Google+ can a.a.s. be successfully de-anonymized. From Table 5, similar DA phe-
nomena applied to all the datasets, which is consistent with our quantification. The
reason is straightforward. When ℘ increases, more edges/relationships appear in both
Ga and Gu (the expected number of common edges is m℘2). Thus, the structural
similarity between Ga and Gu is increased followed by more users can statistically be
successfully de-anonymized with probability 1.
• Most of the existing graph datasets, including SN data, LMSN data, Email
and Wiki data, AS data, P2P data, etc., are a.a.s. de-anonymizable completely or
at least partially just based on the topological information. For instance, Facebook
and Orkut datasets can be completely de-anonymized when ℘ = .8, Twitter can
be completely de-anonymized when ℘ = .85, and Google+ can be completely de-
anonymized when ℘ = .95. Even a dataset cannot be completely de-anonymized, it
may be de-anonymizable partially in a large-scale. For example, when ℘ = .9, at
least 60.9%, 48.9%, and 85.7% of the users in LiveJournal, Gowalla, and AstroPh
can be successfully de-anonymized, respectively. This fact is consistent with our
quantification as well as the intuition that structure itself can be used to de-anonymize
data.
• An interesting observation is that the DA results on two datasets with similar





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































similar graph densities, e.g., Google+ (ρ = 8.24E-6) and Skitter (ρ = 7.73E-6), the
theoretical bounds on (Ω(fD),Ω(n)) for perfect DA are also similar. However, from
Table 5, the DA results of Google+ and Skitter are very different: when ℘ = .6, the
number of de-anonymizable users in Google+ (41.8%) is about twice of that in Skitter
(23.1%); while when ℘ = .95, all the users in Google+ are a.a.s. de-anonymizable
while the de-anonymizable users in Skitter is only bounded by Ω(59.1%). To study the
reason of this fact, we need to consider the degree distribution of Google+ and Skitter
besides the graph density (as well as Ω(fD) and Ω(n)). From Table 3, the percentage
of low degree users in Skitter (p(1) = 12.8% and p(5) = 55.4%) is much higher than
that in Google+ (p(1) = 5.4% and p(5) = 27.3%). On the other hand, intuitively, low
degree users, especially users with degree of 1, do not have too much distinguishable
structural information (this intuition is confirmed by our theoretical quantification on
different DEs caused by mismatching high degree users and low degree users), which
implies that they are difficult to be de-anonymized based on structural information.
Consequently, the existence of a large amount of low degree users in Skitter makes it
less de-anonymizable than Google+, which is consistent with our quantification. In
summary, from Tables 3 and 5, if a dataset has a high average degree and a small
percentage of low degree users, e.g., Orkut, Facebook, Twitter, Google+, it is easier to
de-anonymize and a large amount of its users are a.a.s. de-anonymizable; otherwise,
for datasets with a low average degree and a large percentage of low degree users,
e.g., EuAll, Wiki, Caida, they are difficult to be de-anonymized based solely on the
structural information.
• Following the above observation, we find that there exists some difference be-
tween theory and practice on the dominating factor of DA. Theoretically, the graph
density plays as a dominating factor on determining the bound of (Ω(fD),Ω(n)) (Ta-
ble 4). In practice, the degree distribution and the average degree have more impact
on the DA results (Table 5). This is mainly because that we study the quantification
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Table 6: Evaluation of Ω(n) in (1− ϵ)-perfect DA.
Dataset
℘ = .3 ℘ = .6 ℘ = .9
ϵ = .1 ϵ = .2 ϵ = .3 ϵ = .4 ϵ = .1 ϵ = .2 ϵ = .3 ϵ = .4 ϵ = .1 ϵ = .2 ϵ = .3 ϵ = .4
Google+ 2.4E8 1.9E8 1.4E8 1.1E8 2.2E7 1.7E7 1.3E7 9.5E6 4.6E6 3.6E6 2.7E6 2.3E6
Twitter 1.4E7 1.1E7 8.4E6 6.2E6 1.2E6 9.6E5 7.3E5 5.4E5 2.5E5 2.3E5 2.3E5 2.3E5
LiveJournal 5.6E8 4.4E8 3.4E8 2.5E8 5.1E7 4.0E7 3.0E7 2.2E7 1.1E7 8.4E6 6.4E6 4.7E6
Facebook 1.1E5 9.0E4 6.9E4 5.2E4 9.2E3 7.2E3 5.5E3 4.1E3 2.0E3 2.0E3 2.0E3 2.0E3
YouTube 4.5E8 3.6E8 2.7E8 2.0E8 4.0E7 3.2E7 2.5E7 1.8E7 8.6E6 6.8E6 5.2E6 3.8E6
Orkut 7.5E7 5.9E7 4.6E7 3.5E7 6.7E6 5.3E6 4.1E6 3.1E6 1.5E6 1.5E6 1.5E6 1.5E6
Slashdot 9.7E6 7.7E6 5.9E6 4.4E6 8.5E5 6.7E5 5.2E5 3.8E5 1.7E5 1.4E5 1.1E5 7.7E4
Pokec 1.1E8 8.9E7 6.8E7 5.1E7 1.0E7 8.0E6 6.1E6 4.5E6 2.1E6 1.7E6 1.3E6 9.4E5
Infocom 1.5E4 1.3E4 1.1E4 9.0E3 1.2E3 9.8E2 7.8E2 6.8E2 2.5E2 2.5E2 1.7E2 1.7E2
Smallblue 2.2E4 1.8E4 1.5E4 1.2E4 1.8E3 1.4E3 1.2E3 8.8E2 3.4E2 3.2E2 2.2E2 2.2E2
Brightkite 1.3E7 1.0E7 7.7E6 5.7E6 1.1E6 8.8E5 6.7E5 4.9E5 2.3E5 1.8E5 1.4E5 1.0E5
Gowalla 3.6E7 2.9E7 2.2E7 1.6E7 3.2E6 2.5E6 1.9E6 1.4E6 6.7E5 5.3E5 4.0E5 3.0E5
HepPh 7.4E5 5.8E5 4.4E5 3.2E5 6.2E4 4.9E4 3.7E4 2.7E4 1.2E4 9.7E3 7.3E3 5.6E3
AstroPh 1.2E6 9.2E5 7.0E5 5.2E5 9.9E4 7.8E4 5.9E4 4.4E4 2.0E4 1.6E4 1.2E4 9.0E3
CondMat 3.9E6 3.1E6 2.4E6 1.9E6 3.4E5 2.7E5 2.1E5 1.6E5 6.9E4 5.5E4 4.2E4 3.2E4
DBLP 9.1E7 7.3E7 5.7E7 4.3E7 8.1E6 6.5E6 5.0E6 3.8E6 1.7E6 1.4E6 1.1E6 8.0E5
Enron 5.0E6 3.9E6 3.0E6 2.2E6 4.3E5 3.4E5 2.6E5 1.9E5 8.8E4 6.9E4 5.2E4 3.8E4
EuAll 1.5E8 1.2E8 9.3E7 7.0E7 1.3E7 1.1E7 8.3E6 6.2E6 2.8E6 2.2E6 1.7E6 1.3E6
Wiki 1.3E9 1.1E9 8.4E8 6.3E8 1.2E8 9.9E7 7.7E7 5.7E7 2.6E7 2.1E7 1.6E7 1.2E7
AS733 2.3E6 1.8E6 1.4E6 1.1E6 2.0E5 1.6E5 1.2E5 9.0E4 4.0E4 3.2E4 2.4E4 1.8E4
Oregon 3.1E6 2.5E6 1.9E6 1.4E6 2.7E5 2.1E5 1.6E5 1.2E5 5.5E4 4.3E4 3.3E4 2.4E4
Caida 1.1E7 8.9E6 6.9E6 5.1E6 9.8E5 7.8E5 6.0E5 4.5E5 2.0E5 1.6E5 1.2E5 9.1E4
Skitter 2.6E8 2.0E8 1.6E8 1.2E8 2.3E7 1.8E7 1.4E7 1.0E7 4.9E6 3.9E6 3.0E6 2.2E6
Gnutella3 9.0E6 7.1E6 5.5E6 4.0E6 7.8E5 6.2E5 4.8E5 3.5E5 1.6E5 1.3E5 9.7E4 7.1E4
Gnutella4 1.3E7 1.0E7 8.0E6 5.9E6 1.1E6 9.0E5 6.9E5 5.1E5 2.3E5 1.9E5 1.4E5 1.0E5
Gnutella5 2.3E7 1.9E7 1.4E7 1.1E7 2.1E6 1.6E6 1.3E6 9.3E5 4.3E5 3.4E5 2.6E5 1.9E5
from an asymptotical sense in the theoretical scenario (i.e., n → ∞) and the key
parameter pi,j asymptotically converges to graph density ρ, i.e., E(pi,j) ≃
n→ ∞
ρ. On
the other hand, when quantifying the percentage of de-anonymizable users for each
dataset, the actual degree sequence/distribution D is used to examine when the DA
conditions are satisfied.
We also evaluate the impact of ℘ and ϵ on the bound of Ω(n) in (1 − ϵ)-perfect
DA (we do not show Ω(fD) since it depends on ℘ and exhibits the same behavior as
in the perfect DA). The results are shown in Table 6. From Table 6, we have the
following observations.
• When ϵ is fixed, the impact of ℘ on Ω(n) in (1 − ϵ)-perfect DA is similar to
that in perfect DA, i.e., when ℘ increases, Ω(n) decreases. The reason is also the
same as before since a large ℘ implies more similarity between Ga and Gu and thus




• When ℘ is fixed, Ω(n) is also decreasing with the increase of ϵ. For instance,
when ℘ = 0.6, Ω(n) is decreased from 2.2E7 to 9.5E6 for Google+ when ϵ is increased
from .1 to .4. This is because of that when ϵ increases, more DE is tolerated, and
thus loose condition is required for Ω(n) to distinguish σk (k ≤ ϵn) and σk′ (k′ > ϵn),
which is consistent with our quantification.
• As in the perfect DA scenario, graph density is an important factor to impact
Ω(n). Datasets with similar graph density, e.g., Google+ and Skitter, exhibits similar
requirement on Ω(n). A dataset with high graph density, e.g., Facebook and HepPh,
corresponds to a loose bound on Ω(n). The reason is also the same as before.
Finally, we also want to evaluate the required bounds on (Ω(℘),Ω(fD),Ω(n)) in
(1 − ϵ)-perfect DA. We demonstrate the results in Table 7 and make the following
observations.
• Theoretically, the condition on the lower bound of ℘ is very loose, e.g., when
ϵ = .1, Ω(℘) = 1.1E-7 for Google+ and Ω(℘) = 1.7E-7 for Orkut, which suggests that
(1− ϵ)-perfect DA is implementable in practice. On the other hand, we can also see
that the theoretical loose requirement on Ω(℘) is at the expense of a strong condition
on Ω(n), e.g., when ϵ = .1, Ω(n) = 2.2E28 for Google+ and Ω(n) = 2.0E27 for Orkut.
Consequently, to de-anonymize most of existing graph datasets which have sizes of
million-level or less, a higher ℘ is desired (as we show in Tables 4, 5, and 6).
• From Table 7, we can see that the conditions on Ω(fD) and Ω(n) exhibit the
same behavior as in perfect DA, i.e., Ω(fD) increases and Ω(n) decreases as Ω(℘)
increases, which is consistent with our quantification. Again, this is because fD is an
increasing function of ℘ given pD and Ω(n) decreases when more similarity appears







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































• From Table 7, we can also see that the impact of graph density on Ω(fD) and
Ω(n) is also similar to that in the perfect DA scenario.
3.5 Optimization based De-anonymization Practice
In Section 3.3, we comprehensively quantify conditions for perfect DA and (1 − ϵ)-
perfect DA. Based on our large-scale study on 26 real world datasets in Section 3.4,
we find most, if not all, existing graph datasets are de-anonymizable partially or
completely (Table 5). Interestingly, our DA quantification leads to a DA scheme,
denoted by A∗, straightforwardly. Basically, A∗ can be implemented as follows: we
can calculate the DE caused by each σk (1 ≤ k ≤ n!) and let σ0 be the σk that induces
the least DE. According to the quantification, the σ0 produced by A
∗ should be the
optimum DA scheme. However, A∗ is computationally infeasible in practice due to
its high computational complexity O(n!). In this section, we present a novel relaxed
and operational version of A∗ followed by analyzing its performance theoretically and
experimentally on large scale real datasets.
3.5.1 Optimization based De-anonymization
Before proposing our relaxed and computationally feasible version of A∗, we define
some useful structural features for i ∈ V a or V u as follows.
• Degree: For i ∈ V a (resp., V u), its degree feature fd(i) is its degree in Ga (resp.,
Gu), i.e., fd(i) = |Nai | (resp., |Nui |).
• Neighborhood: For i ∈ V a (resp., V u), its neighborhood feature fn(i) is a β-
dimensional vector (di1, d
i
2, · · · , diβ), where dik (1 ≤ k ≤ β) is the k-th largest degree
in {|Naj ||j ∈ Nai } (resp., {|Nuj ||j ∈ Nui }), i.e., dik is the k-th largest degree of the
neighboring users of i. In the case that |Nai | < β (resp., |Nui | < β), we set di|Nai |+1 =
di|Nai |+2
= · · · = diβ = ∆a (resp., di|Nui |+1 = d
i
|Nui |+2
= · · · = diβ = ∆u), where ∆a =
max{|Nai ||i ∈ V a} (resp., ∆u = max{|Nui ||i ∈ V u}) is the maximum degree of Ga
(resp., Gu).
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• Top-K reference distance: For i ∈ V a (resp., V u), its Top-K reference distance




2, · · · , hiK), where hik (1 ≤ k ≤ K) is the
distance (the length of a shortest path) from i to the user with the k-th largest degree
in Ga (resp., Gu). Note that it is possible hik =∞ if the graph is not connected.
• Landmark reference distance: Suppose V aL = {v1, v2, · · · , vL|vk ∈ V a} is a
set of users that has been de-anonymized (evidently, V aL = ∅ initially) to UuL =
{u1, u2, · · · , uL|uk ∈ V u} under some DA scheme σ with σ(vk) = uk (1 ≤ k ≤ L).
Intuitively, V aL and U
u
L can be used as auxiliary information for future DA. Therefore,





2, · · · , hiL), where hik (1 ≤ k ≤ L) is the distance from i to vk ∈ V aL
(resp., uk ∈ UuL).
• Sampling closeness centrality: For i ∈ V a (resp., V u), we define the sampling
closeness centrality feature fc(i) to characterize its global topological property without
inducing too much computational overhead. Formally, we first randomly sample a











), where h(i, j) is the distance from i to j.
According to the aforementioned definitions, (i) we consider both local and global
structural features of a user, e.g., the degree and neighborhood features character-
ize the local topological properties of a user while the Top-K reference distance and
sampling closeness centrality features demonstrate the global topological character-
istics of a user; (ii) we also consider the computational efficiency of obtaining these
features for a user. For instance, instead of using the accurate closeness centrality of
a user, we introduce a sampling closeness centrality feature, which can characterize
the global feature of a user without causing too much computation overhead.
Now, based on the features defined for each user, we can quantitatively measure
the similarity between an anonymized user i ∈ V a and a known user j ∈ V u. Let
fd,c(i) = (fd(i), fc(i)). Then, we define the structural similarity between i ∈ V a and
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j ∈ V u as
ϕ(i, j) = c1 · s(fd,c(i), fd,c(j)) + c2 · s(fn(i), fn(j)) (84)
+ c3 · s(fK(i), fK(j)) + c4 · s(fl(i), fl(j)), (85)
where c1,2,3,4 ∈ [0, 1] are constant values representing the weights and c1+c2+c3+c4 =
1, and s(·, ·) is the Cosine similarity between two vectors.
According to our theoretical quantification in Section 3.3, A∗ is inherently an
optimization based algorithm with the objective of minimizing the DE Ψσk , which
is different from most of existing DA algorithms (heuristics based) [27, 104, 127].
Inspired by our quantification, we design a novel and operational Optimization based
De-Anonymization (ODA) scheme, which is a relaxed version of A∗.
In ODA, rather than using the DE function as in the quantification, we re-define
ψi,j and Ψσ as follows. Given a DA scheme σ = {(i, j)|i ∈ V a, j ∈ V u}, we define the
DE on a user mapping (i, j) ∈ σ as
ψi,j = |fd(i)− fd(j)|+ (1− ϕ(i, j)) · |fd(i)− fd(j)|, (86)





Based on Ψσ, we give the framework of ODA as shown in Algorithm 1. In Algo-
rithm 1, Λa ⊆ V a is the target DA set and Λu ⊆ V u is the possible mapping set
of Λa. GetTopDegree(X, y) is a function to return y users with the largest degree
values in X, i.e., return {i|i has the Top-y degree in X}. C(i) ⊆ Λu is the candidate
mapping set for i ∈ Λa, which consists of the γ most possible mappings of i in Λu.
GetTopSimilarity(i,Λu, γ) is a function to return γ users having the highest similarity
scores (ϕ(i, ·)) with i in Λu, i.e., return {j|j ∈ Λu, and j has the Top-γ ϕ(i, j) in Λu}.
From Algorithm 1, ODA de-anonymizes Ga iteratively. During each iteration,
ODA is trying to de-anonymize a subset of V a and seeking the sub-DA scheme σ∗(Λa)
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Algorithm 1: Optimization based De-Anonymization (ODA)
1 Define Λa = Λu = ∅;
2 while true do
3 Λa = GetTopDegree(V a, α), Λu = GetTopDegree(V u, α);
4 for every i ∈ Λa, compute a candidate mapping set C(i) =
GetTopSimilarity(i,Λu, γ);




(i× C(i)) which induces the least DE Ψσ(Λa), denoted by
σ∗(Λa) = {(i1, j1), (i2, j2), · · · , (iα, jα)};
6 for each (i, j) ∈ σ∗(Λa), if ϕ(i, j) ≥ θ then
7 accept the mapping (i, j);
8 V a = V a \ {i}, V u = V u \ {j};
9 if no mapping in σ∗(Λa) is accepted, break ;
which induces the least DE. We explain the idea of ODA in details as follows. In
Line 3, we initialize the target DA set Λa and the candidate mapping set Λu. From
the initialization, |Λa|, |Λu| ≤ α (since it is possible |V a|, |V u| ≤ α), where α is an
important parameter to control how many anonymized users will be processed each
iteration. In Line 4, we compute a candidate mapping set C(i) for each i ∈ Λa. C(i)
consists γ most similar users of i in Λu. Here, we define C(·) mainly for reducing the
computational complexity. Instead of trying every mapping from i to Λu, we only
consider to map i to some user in C(i). Hence, γ is another important parameter
to control the computational complexity of ODA. We will demonstrate how to set α
and γ to make ODA computationally feasible in Theorem 9. In Line 5, we find a DA




σ∗(Λa) causes the least DE. Furthermore, the consistent rule and the pruning rule
are applied in this step. The consistent rule makes any possible DA scheme σ(Λa)
consistent, i.e., no mapping confliction which is defined as the situation that two or
more anonymized users are mapped to the same known user. This is because it is
possible that C(i1) ∩ C(i2) ̸= ∅ for i1 ̸= i2 ∈ Λa, and the situation σ(i1) = σ(i2) in
a DA scheme should be avoided. Note that, it possible that no σ(Λa) is consistent.
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In this case, we should increase γ to guarantee at least one σ(Λa) is consistent. The
pruning rule is used to remove some DA schemes whose DE is larger than the current
known least DE. For instance, let σ∗(Λa) be the DA scheme having the least DE
after testing k possible DA schemes. Then, when testing the (k + 1)-th possible DA
scheme σk+1(Λ
a), if partial of mappings in σk+1(Λ
a) has already induced a larger DE
than σ∗(Λa), we stop test σk+1(Λ
a) and continue the next one. On the other hand,
if σk+1(Λ
a) induces a smaller DE than σ∗(Λa), we update σ∗(Λa) to σk+1(Λ
a). Both
the consistent rule and the pruning rule can remove some unqualified DA schemes in
advance, which can speed up ODA. Actually, although σ∗(Λa) causes the least DE,
σ∗(Λa) is a local optimization solution (according to our quantification, the solution
of A∗ is the optimum solution). This is because we try to seek a tradeoff between
computational feasibility and DA accuracy. After obtaining σ∗(Λa), we accept the
mappings in σ∗(Λa) with similarity scores no less than a threshold value θ (Lines 6-8).
For the mappings that had been rejected, they will be re-considered in the following
iterations for possible better DA. If no mapping can be accepted, we stop ODA.
Subsequently, we analyze the time and space complexities of ODA in the following
theorem.
Theorem 9. (i) The space complexity of ODA is O(min{n2,m + n}). (ii) Let γ
be some constant value, α = Θ(log n), and Γ be the average number of accepted
mappings in each iteration of ODA. Then, the time complexity of ODA is O(m +
n log n+ nΘ(1) log γ+1/Γ) in the worst case.
Proof: (i) The space complexity of ODA is upper bound by O(min{n2,m + n}).
The proof is straightforward and thus we omit it.
(ii) In ODA, we assume fd(i), fn(i), fK(i), fl(i), and fc(i) are computed before the
iteration starts. Then, the time consumption of computing these features is bounded
by O(m + n log n). Then, from ODA, the worst case time consumption of each
iteration is upper bounded by γα = γΘ(logn) = 2log γ
Θ(logn)
= 2Θ(logn) log γ = nΘ(1) log γ.
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Furthermore, the number of iterations in ODA is Θ(n/Γ). It follows the worst case
time complexity of ODA is O(m + n log n) + O(nΘ(1) log γ+1/Γ) = O(m + n log n +
nΘ(1) log γ+1/Γ). 2
Finally, we make some remarks on ODA as follows.
• ODA is a cold start algorithm, i.e., we do not need any priori knowledge, e.g.,
the seed mapping information [27, 104, 127], to bootstrap the DA process. Further-
more, unlike existing DA algorithms [27, 104, 127] which consist of two phases (land-
mark/seed identification phase and DA propagation phase), ODA is a single-phase
algorithm. Interestingly, ODA itself can act as a landmark identification algorithm.
From our experiment (Section 3.5.2), ODA can de-anonymize the 60-180 Top-degree
users in Gowalla and Google+ (see Table 3) perfectly, which can serve as landmarks
(V aL and U
u
L) for future DA. In addition, ODA as a landmark identification algorithm
is much faster than that in [104] (with complexity of O(ndk−1) = O(nk), where d
is maximum degree of Ga/Gu and k is the number of landmarks) and [127] (with
complexity of k!, could be computationally infeasible for a PC when k ≥ 20).
• Similar to A∗, ODA is an optimization based DA scheme, which is different from
most of existing heuristics based solutions [27, 104, 127]. In ODA, the objective is
to minimize a DE function. The reasonableness and soundness of ODA lie on one
direct conclusion of our theoretical quantification: minimizing the DE leads to the
best possible DA scheme.
• In ODA, we seek an adjustable tradeoff between DA accuracy and computa-
tional feasibility. Although A∗ obtains the optimum solution a.a.s. in terms of our
quantification, it is computationally infeasible (O(n!)). ODA has a polynomial time
complexity of O(m+n log n+nΘ(1) log γ+1/Γ) in the worst case, which is computation-
ally feasible at the cost of sacrificing some accuracy. Based on our experiments on
large scale real datasets in the following subsection, ODA is operable while preserves
satisfiable DA performance.
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• ODA is a general framework. Line 5 can also be implemented by seeking a




(i× C(i))), where the weight on each edge is ϕ(i, j) (i ∈ Λa, j ∈ C(i)).
• In ODA, one implicit assumption is V a = V u, i.e., the Ga and Gu are defined on
the same group of users. In practice, it is possible that V a and V u are not exactly the
same. In this case, if V a and V u are not significantly different, ODA is also workable
at the cost of some performance degradation ((1−ϵ)-perfect DA). One better solution
could be estimating the overlap between Ga and Gu first, and then apply ODA to
the overlap to achieve better performance. We will take the estimation of the overlap
between Ga and Gu as one of the future works.
3.5.2 Experimental Evaluation and Analysis
3.5.2.1 Datasets and Setup
We evaluate the performance of ODA on two real world datasets: Gowalla and
Google+ (see the basic information in Section 3.4). Gowalla is a location based
social network and consists of two different datasets [16, 115]. The first dataset is a
spatiotemporal mobility trace consisting of 6,442,890 check-ins generated by 196,591
users. Each check-in has the format of <UserID, latitude, longitude, timestamp, lo-
cation ID>. The second dataset is a social graph (950,327 edges) of the same 196,591
users. Assume the mobility trace is anonymized. Our objective is to de-anonymize
the mobility trace using the social graph as auxiliary data. Since the mobility trace
does not have an explicit graph structure, supposing the social graph is the ground
truth, we apply the technique in [115] on the mobility trace to construct four graphs
with different recalls and precisions, denoted by M1,M2,M3, and M4, respectively
(recall = true positive
true positive+false negative
and precision = true positive
true positive+false positive
). Particularly,
the recall and precision of M1 are 0.6 and 0.865, of M2 are 0.72 and 0.83, of M3
are 0.75 and 0.78, and of M4 are 0.8 and 0.72, respectively. The second consider-







































Figure 4: Landmark identification. c1, c2 ∈ [0.1, 0.3], c3 ∈ [0.4, 0.8], c4 = 0, α ∈
[10, 30], γ ∈ [1, 4].
90,751,480 edges. Given some projection probability ℘ ∈ [0.5, 0.9], We first use the
projection process in Section 3.3 to produce Ga and Gu, and then use ODA to de-
anonymize Ga with Gu as auxiliary data. Note that, the auxiliary data is from a
different contextual domain (social data) with the anonymized data (mobility trace)
in Gowalla while the auxiliary and anonymized data are from the same domain in
Google+.
All the experiments are implemented on a PC with 64 bit Ubuntu 12.04 LTS
operating system, Intel Xeon E5620 CPU (2.4GHz × 8 Threads), 48GB memory, and
2 disks with 8TB storage.
3.5.2.2 Results
Landmark Identification. As we mentioned in the previous subsection, ODA itself
can work as a landmark identification algorithm. Let V aL = U
u
L = ∅ in ODA, i.e.,
s(fl(·), fl(·)) = 0 in ϕ(·, ·). Then, we run ODA on Gowalla and Google+ to identify
some landmarks as shown in Fig. 4 (note that, the DA in ODA is conducted according
to the degree non-increasing order). The results show that we can de-anonymize the
first 60-94 users in Gowalla and the first 129-179 users in Google+ perfectly (100%
correctly). For instance, when Ga = M2 in Gowalla, the first 75 users are perfectly
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Figure 5: De-anonymize Gowalla and Google+. c1, c2 ∈ [0, 0.2], c3 + c4 ∈ [0.4, 1], α ∈
[10, 30], γ ∈ [2, 10].
de-anonymizable and when ℘ = 0.7, the first 137 users in Google+ are perfectly de-
anonymizable. According to ODA, the identified landmarks can serve as references
for future DA.
From Fig. 4 (a), we can see that when the recall increases, there are more common
edges between Ga and Gu, which implies it is easier to identify the high degree users
based on the increased structural information and thus more landmarks can be iden-
tified. Because of a similar reason, we can see from Fig. 4 (b) that more landmarks
can be identified in Google+ for large ℘ due to more edge overlap between Ga and
Gu.
De-anonymization Results. By taking the users identified in Fig. 4 as land-
marks, we employ ODA to de-anonymize Gowalla (M1,M2,M3,M4) and Google+
(Ga with different ℘) as shown in Fig. 5, where the x-axis represents the accumu-
lated percentage of users de-anonymized and the y-axis represents the accumulated
percentage of users successfully de-anonymized. From Fig. 5, we can see that the
successful DA rate is higher for large-degree users than that of small-degree users,
i.e., when x increases, the percentage of successfully deanonymized users generally
show a decreasing trend. The reason is that large-degree users carry more structural
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Figure 6: DA error distribution.
information, which can thus be more accurately de-anonymizable. This can also be
seen from our quantification. For Gowalla, we observe from Fig. 5(a) that although
recall dominates the landmark identification process, the large-scale DA performance
is impacted more by precision. Generally, a high precision implies this dataset is
more de-anonymizable, e.g. M4. This is because a high precision implies a low false
positive, which can be viewed as noise in practice, and thus the DA accuracy is
better. For Google+, we see from Fig. 5 (b) that the Ga projected with a large
℘, e.g., ℘ = 0.9, is more de-anonymizable. As shown in our quantification, this is
because a large ℘ implies more similar between Ga and Gu and thus more users can
be successfully de-anonymized.
From Fig. 5, we also see that the DA performance of ODA on Gowalla and
Google+ is better than the evaluation results shown in Table 5, e.g., when ℘ =
0.9, Table 5 indicates 91.2% of the users in Google+ are a.a.s. de-anonymizable
while ODA successfully de-anonymizes 95.5% of the users. This is because the values
shown in Table 5 are the lower bounds on de-anonymizable users. In summary, about
77.7% − 83.3% of the users in Gowalla and 86.9% − 95.5% of the users in Google+
are de-anonymizable in different scenarios. Thus, SDA is powerful in practice.
De-anonymization Error Analysis. For i ∈ V a, let i′ ∈ V u be i’s correct
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Figure 7: Time consumption.
mapping. Suppose i is incorrectly mapped to some j ∈ V u (i.e., j ̸= i′) by ODA. Then,
the distance between i′ and j in Gu is defined as the error distance corresponding
to i. For Gowalla and Google+, we analyze the distribution of the error distance of
all the incorrect mappings as shown in Fig. 6. From Fig. 6, we can see that almost
all the incorrect mappings have an error distance of 2− 10 for Gowalla and of 2− 6
for Google+. Google+ has a smaller average error distance than Gowalla because
its graph density is higher than Gowalla followed by shorter average distance among
users. Furthermore, we can also see that the average error distance decreases with
the increase of ℘ for Google+ in Fig. 6 (b). This is also because a large ℘ implies a
dense graph followed by shorter average distance.
Time Consumption. We calculate the time consumption on de-anonymizing
Gowalla and Google+ as shown in Fig. 7, where we provide the initialization time
used for loading files and other initializations, the execution time used for executing
the iterations in ODA, and total time consumed by ODA. Generally, the time con-
sumption for Gowalla/Google+ is similar in different scenarios (the time difference
may be caused by running other applications when run ODA). On average, the ini-
tialization time, execution time, and total time are 1.79 mins, 1.6 mins, and 3.39 mins
for Gowalla and 0.88 hours, 5.61 hours, and 6.49 hours for Google+, respectively.
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3.6 Implications and Discussion
Based on our DA quantification, evaluation results on 26 real world datasets, and
DA practice ODA, we provide some implications in this section. We also discuss the
impacts of our findings to secure data publishing in practice and the guidelines for
future data publishing.
Structural information may induce privacy leakage. Although we have
some practices (including ODA) that show SDA is possible, in this chapter, we theo-
retically demonstrate the reasons by providing rigorous quantification under a general
data model. From the quantification, structural information can enable large-scale
perfect or (1− ϵ)-perfect DA. Therefore, for secure data publication, besides the data
itself, the information carried by data structure is also essential and deserves dedicated
consideration and efforts.
The fact is that we still have a long way to go to achieve secure data
publishing. From our large scale study on 26 real world datasets, most of existing
graph datasets are de-anonymizable based only on their structural information. On
the other hand, existing anonymization techniques are vulnerable to SDA attacks.
Therefore, new anonymization techniques should be developed. Meanwhile, since graph
data release/sharing/trasferring has significant business and social value, the data
utility should be preserved in the new developed anonymization schemes. In summary,
we are expected to develop new secure data publishing schemes that properly achieve
a balance between data privacy protection and data utility preservation.
Suggestions for secure data publishing. Secure data publishing is impor-
tant for businesses, research, and the society. However, with the wide availability
of richer auxiliary information, especially with the emerging of Collaborative Infor-
mation Seeking (CIS) systems and data/knowledge brokers [124, 148], the privacy of
people, businesses, governments, etc. will increasingly be compromised. For secure
data publishing, we have some general suggestions as follows. (i) Carefully sharing
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data with or transferring data to third parties and partners. Before sharing the data,
the data owners should examine the dedicated applications to see if the data sharing
is necessary. Based on the requirements of applications, the data could be shared in
different granularity levels: digest level : share/transfer a digest/summary of the data
to third parties or partners; partial and density-control level : based on our quantifi-
cation, controlling the graph density could increase the difficulty of DA. Therefore,
in this level, only a density-controlled anonymized version (e.g., by sampling) of a
subset of the data (e.g., a community) is shared/transferred; density-control level : a
density-controlled anonymized version of the data is shared/transferred; full level : an
anonymized version of the full dataset is shared/transferred. (ii) Evaluate the poten-
tially vulnerability of the dataset before actual publishing. Before actually publish the
data, the data owners can evaluate the vulnerability of the data. For instance, if the
data is graph data, the data can be evaluated using our quantification as in Section
3.4. (iii) Develop proper policy on data collection. Many graph data owners allow
public data collection, e.g., Twitter, Facebook. allow crawlers and other automatic
programs to collect users information online. This could increase the data DA risk by
providing auxiliary information to adversaries. Therefore, it is better for data owners
to develop proper policies to limit such public data collection.
3.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we study the quantification, practice, and implications of graph data
DA. First, for the first time, we address several fundamental open problems in the
data DA research by quantifying the conditions for perfect DA and (1− ϵ)-perfect DA
under a general data model. This remedies the gap between graph data DA practice
and theory. Second, we conduct a large scale study on the de-anonymizability of 26
diverse real world graph datasets, which turn out to be de-anonymizable partially or
perfectly. We also quantitatively demonstrate the necessary conditions and reasons
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for the de-anonymizability of the 26 datasets. Third, following our quantification, we
propose a practical DA technique that is a cold start single-phase Optimization based
De-Anonymization (ODA) algorithm. We also analyze ODA theoretically and exper-
imentally. The experimental results show that 77.7%− 83.3% of the users in Gowalla
(196,591 users, 950, 327 edges) and 86.9%−95.5% of the users in Google+ (4,692,671
users, 90,751,480 edges) can be de-anonymized, which implies SDA is implementable






Due to the vulnerability of existing anonymization schemes, the emerging Structure
based De-Anonymization (SDA) attacks have been experimentally demonstrated to
break the privacy of graph data effectively only based on the data’s structural in-
formation, e.g., Narayanan and Shmatikov’s De-Anonymization (DA) attack [104],
Srivatsa and Hicks’ DA attack [127]. Furthermore, there is some preliminary analysis
on the de-anonymizability of graph data under the the Erdös-Rényi (ER) random
graph model or the preferential attachment model [69, 113, 151]. On one hand, these
existing analyses shed light on the research of quantifying the de-anonymizability of
graph data. On the other hand, however, all the existing analyses have some lim-
itations, e.g., some did not consider the seed information, the use of an unrealistic
network model, unrealistic assumptions, overlooked other more powerful structural
information. These limitations prevent most existing analyses to be applicable to real
world graph data. Aiming at addressing the limitations of existing de-anonymizability
quantification techniques, we study the seed-based de-anonymizability of graph data
in this chapter. Specifically, our contributions can be summarized as follows.
1. To the best of our knowledge, we conduct the first seed-based theoretical
quantification on the perfect de-anonymizability and partial de-anonymizability of
graph data under the ER model as well as in general scenarios, where the graph can
0Without of specification, “de-anonymization” means “seed-based de-anonymization” in this
chapter.
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follow an arbitrary data model. Therefore, our quantification can be applied to real
world graph data and can quantitatively demonstrate the vulnerability of real world
graph data to existing seed-based DA attacks. More importantly, our quantification
provides the theoretical foundation for existing seed-based DA attacks, which closes
the gap between practice and theory.
2. Based on our quantification, we implement a large scale evaluation on the
perfect and partial de-anonymizability of 24 various real world social networks. In
our evaluation, we show the conditions on perfectly and partially de-anonymizing a
social network; how de-anonymizable a social network is according to its topological
properties; and how many users of a social network can be successfully de-anonymized.
Our evaluation results demonstrate that most of social networks, if not all, can be
perfectly or at least partially de-anonymized depending on their structural properties.
3. Based on our quantification and evaluation, we find that compared to the struc-
tural information associated with known seed users, the other structural information
(the structure among anonymized users) is more useful in improving DA attacks. We
show that, both theoretically and experimentally, the overall structural information
based DA is more powerful than seed-based DA, and a graph dataset is perfectly
or partially de-anonymizable even without any seed information. As a result, this
finding provides the foundation of an implication that one can design new effective
DA attacks without seed information.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe the
system model, assumptions, and problem definition. The preliminary quantification
under the ER model is implemented in Section 4.3. We conduct the quantification on
perfect and partial seed-based de-anonymizability of graph data in general scenarios
in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, we evaluate the de-anonymizability of 24 real world
social networks. Finally, the chapter is concluded in Section 4.6.
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Table 8: Summarization of notations.
notation definition
Ga = (V a, Ea) anonymized graph
Gu = (V u, Eu) auxiliary graph
i, j nodes/users
n number of users
eai,j, e
u
i,j user tie (links/edges)
dai , d
u
i degree of i
sa, su, s graph sampling probabilities
σ a DA scheme
σ0 the perfect DA
σk a DA scheme with k errors
S seed mappings
Λ = |S| the cardinality of S
∆σ:(i,j) edge difference induced by (i, j) ∈ σ
∆σ edge difference of σ
G(n, p) ER random graph with parameters n and s
ϵ tolerated DA error
m number of edges
ρ, ρU graph density
γU,W graph connectivity
4.2 System Model, Assumption, and Definition
In this section, we introduce the system model, assumptions, and definitions. Gen-
erally, we employ similar data model, assumptions, and definitions as in Chapter 3.
For conveniently reference and for the purpose of the discussion in this chapter, we
restate the data model, assumptions, and definitions. To improve the readability, we
summarize the frequently used acronyms and symbols in Table 8.
Data Model. In our quantification and evaluation, we employ the same graph
model as in [27, 63, 64, 69, 104] to represent graphs. Specifically, the anonymized
data is modeled by graph Ga = (V a, Ea), where V a = {i|i is an anonymized user}
and Ea = {eai,j|i, j ∈ V a, a tie exists between i and j}. To de-anonymize Ga, we
use an auxiliary graph which has overlap users with Ga and can be obtained through
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multiple manners, e.g., data aggregation, data mining, collaborative information sys-
tems, knowledge/data brokers [27, 63, 69, 104, 124, 148]1. The auxiliary data is
also modeled by a graph Gu = (V u, Eu), where V u = {i|i is a known user} and
Eu = {eui,j|i, j ∈ V u, a tie exists between i and j}. To conduct the theoretical quan-
tification without involving too much mathematical details, we assume both Ga and
Gu are undirected graphs2. Furthermore, since our quantification and evaluation are
based on the graph model, our work can be potentially applied to other kinds of data
which can be modeled by graphs.
Given i ∈ V a, its neighborhood is defined as Nai = {j|j ∈ V a ∧ ∃eai,j ∈ Ea}.
Then, we define dai = |Nai | as the degree of i. Similarly, for j ∈ V u, we can define its
neighborhood Nuj and degree d
u
j .
Graph Sampling. To make the quantification mathematically tractable, we
employ the same assumptions on Ga and Gu in [69, 113, 151]. First, V a = V u =
{1, 2, · · · , n} [69, 113, 151]. In the case that V a ̸= V u, we can simply satisfy this
assumption by adding the users in V u \ V a to V a and adding the users in V a \ V u
to V u without changing Ea or Eu, i.e. adding the dissimilar users to each other with
degree zero to make V a and V u are mathematically equivalent. Note that this is
only a mathematical assumption without limiting the generality of this work. Our
quantification is also valid in the case V a ̸= V u.
1For the detailed means of obtaining the auxiliary data, please refer to the discussion in [63, 104].
Especially, with the emergence of data brokers, many auxiliary data can be easily obtained with an
affordable cost.
2In reality, many graph data carry direction information, i.e., they are directed graphs. Fur-
thermore, some DA attacks are designed to utilize the direction information to improve the DA
performance, e.g., [104]. In this chapter, we do not take into account the direction information. The
main reason is that we want to make our quantification sufficiently general. Although our quantifi-
cations are based on the undirected graph model, they can be extended to directed graphs directly
by overlooking the direction information on edges.
Nevertheless, when applying our quantifications to directed graphs, the overlooking of the direction
information may lead to inaccurate de-anonymizability quantification (potentially underestimate the
de-anonymizability of the data). The problem of studying the impact of direction information on
the de-anonymizability of graph data itself is an interesting research topic, which requires a proper
model to characterize the direction information, elegant quantification techniques, and dedicated
research. We take this research as one of our future research directions.
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Second, based on the first assumption, we assume thatGa and Gu are two sampling
versions of an underlying conceptual graph G = (V,E) in the physical world, where
V = V a = V u and E is the set of the true relationships among users in V [69, 113,
151]. Particularly, we assume Ga is sampled from G by independently and identically
sampling each edge in E with probability sa, i.e., for ∀ei,j ∈ E, Pr(ei,j ∈ Ea|ei,j ∈ E).
Similarly, Gu is another sampled version of G with probability su. This assumption
is also reasonable since people usually involve in multiple computer system contexts
(e.g., social networks) and Ga and Gu are some particular graphs of users in V .
For instance, Ga could be LinkedIn (a professional social network of V ) while Gu is
Facebook (a friendship social network of V ).
De-anonymization. Based on our data model, a DA scheme can be formally
defined as a mapping: σ : Ga → Gu. Under σ, ∀i ∈ V a, its mapping is σ(i) ∈ V u.
Since V a = V u, for simplicity, we define a successful DA of i ∈ V a is achieved under
σ if i = σ(i). In addition, we use σ0 to denote the perfect DA, i.e., σ0 = {(i, i)|i =
1, 2, · · · , n} (all the users of in Ga are correctly de-anonymized), and σk to denote
any DA scheme with k incorrect mappings, i.e., k users are incorrectly de-anonymized
under σk. Evidently, k ∈ [2, n]. In the rest of this chapter, we say that i ∈ V a is
perfectly de-anonymizable if i can be correctly de-anonymized and V a is perfectly
de-anonymizable if all the users in V a can be correctly de-anonymized.
Most existing DA algorithms (e.g., [27, 104, 127]) consist of two phases: seed
identification phase which identifies some seed mapping information from V a to V u
andmapping propagation phase which propagates the seed mapping information to de-
anonymize the rest of the anonymized users. In this chapter, we focus on quantifying
the de-anonymizability of graph data with seed knowledge. Therefore, as in [27,
104, 127], we assume we have identified a seed mapping set from V a to V u by some
technique (e.g., the methods in [27, 104, 127]), denoted by S = {(i, σ(i))|i ∈ V a, σ(i) ∈
V u, i = σ(i)}. Furthermore, we define Λ = |S| as the number of seed mappings. For
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convenience, we denote the seed users in V a and V u as Sa = {i|(i, σ(i)) ∈ S} and
Su = {i|(σ−1(i), i) ∈ S}, respectively. Then, our problem now is to quantify the
de-anonymizability of a graph Ga given S, Gu, and the existing of G, sa, and su.
To make the quantification easy to follow and the conclusions succinct, we further
assume sa = su = s, i.e., we assume G
a and Gu are two instances of G with the same
sampling probability. Note that, this assumption does not change our analysis in any
material detail. All our quantification results can be extended to the case sa ̸= su
only with more complex expressions.
Measuring σ. Given Ga, Gu, and a DA scheme σ, we measure σ by the edge
difference between Ga and Gu under σ. First, ∀eai,j ∈ Ea, we define σ(eai,j) = euσ(i),σ(j).
Furthermore, let Eai (A ⊆ V a) = {eai,v|v ∈ Nai ∩ A}, and σ(Eai (A)) = {σ(eai,v)|eai,v ∈
Eai (A)} (σ(eui,j), Eui (A), and σ−1(Eui (A)) are defined in the same way). Specifically,
let Eai = E
a
i (V
a) and Euj = E
u
j (V
u) for convenience. Then, we can define the edge
difference induced by mapping (i, σ(i) = j) ∈ σ as
∆σ:(i,j) = |σ(Eai ) \ Euj |+ |σ−1(Euj ) \ Eai |, (88)
i.e., ∆σ:(i,j) measures the edge difference of users i and j under σ. Based on ∆σ:(i,j),





which indicates the edge difference between Ga and Gu under σ. Intuitively, since
Ga and Gu are strongly correlated (highly similar), it is expected that ∆σ0 ≤ ∆σk for
k ∈ [2, n] (we demonstrate this conclusion in Sections 4.3 and 4.4).
Similar as ∆σ:(i,j) and ∆σ, we define ∆σ:(i,j)(S) which measures the the edge dif-
ference of a mapping (i, j) with respect to S:
∆σ:(i,j)(S) = |σ(Eai (Sa) \ Euj (Su)|+ |σ−1(Euj (Su) \ Eai (Sa)|,
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4.3 Quantification under the Erdös-Rényi Model
In this section, we quantify the de-anonymizability of Ga with S, Gu, G, and s under
the Erdös-Rényi (ER) model, i.e. we assume G(V,E) is a random graph generated
from the ER model G(n, p), where n is the number of nodes in the graph and p
specifies the probability of an edge existing between any pair of nodes. Although real
world graph data rarely satisfy the ER model [107], the analysis in this section can
shed the light of the quantification in general scenarios (Section 4.4).
4.3.1 S based Quantification
As a warm up, we first quantify the de-anonymizability of Ga only based on the
seed information S. For the DA scheme σ, we assume σ de-anonymizes each user
i ∈ V a\Sa to some user σ(i) ∈ V u\Su such that (i, σ(i)) induces the least ∆σ:(i,σ(i))(S)
3.







(i.e., Λ ≥ 4(2 lnn+1)(2−s−ps)
ps3(1−p)2 ), then it is asymp-
totically almost surely (a.a.s.)4 that ∀i ∈ V a \ Sa, i is perfectly de-anonymizable (i
can be successfully de-anonymized).
Proof: For ∀i ∈ V a \ Sa and ∀v ∈ Sa, Pr(eai,v ∈ Ea) = ps. This is because
Pr(ei,v ∈ E) = p (G(V,E) is a ER random graph G(n, p)) and Pr(ei,v is sampled
into Ea|ei,v ∈ E) = s. Similarly, Pr(euσ(i),v ∈ Ea) = ps. Now, given a DA scheme
3Since our focus is on quantifying the de-anonymizability of Ga, we do not consider the actual DA
algorithms. Specifically, we are aiming at providing the theoretical foundation on the workability of
seed-base SDA attacks, e.g., [27, 104, 127].
4Asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.) implies that an event happens with probability goes to 1
as n→∞.
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σ, if (i, σ(i)) = (i, i), i.e., i is correctly de-anonymized under σ, then, for a possible
edge ei,v ∈ E, it induces an edge difference if ei,v exists and ei,v is sampled into
exactly one of Ea and Eu, which has a probability of 2ps(1− s); on the other hand,
if (i, σ(i)) = (i, j ̸= i), i.e., i is incorrectly de-anonymized under σ, then, for an
possible edge ei,v ∈ E, it induces an edge difference with probability 2ps(1− ps). Let
∆σ:(i,σ(i))(S) = X if σ(i) ̸= i and ∆σ:(i,σ(i))(S) = Y if σ(i) = i. Then, we have
X ∼ B(Λ, 2ps(1− ps)), if σ(i) ̸= i (91)
Y ∼ B(Λ, 2ps(1− s)), if σ(i) = i (92)
where B(x, y) is a binomial distribution with parameters x and y. Then, the mean
values of X and Y are λX = 2ps(1 − ps)Λ and λY = 2ps(1 − s)Λ, respectively.
Applying Lemma 1, we have
Pr(X − Y ≤ 0) ≤ 2 exp(−1
8
[2ps(1− ps)Λ− 2ps(1− s)Λ]2




















<∞, it is a.a.s. that Pr(X − Y ≤ 0) →
n→ ∞
0, i.e., with probability
goes to 1, the correct DA of i leads to the least ∆σ:(i,σ(i))(S). Since the number of
possible mappings (i, σ(i)) is upper bounded by |V u \ Su|, it a.a.s. that i is perfectly
de-anonymizable. 2
In Theorem 10, we quantify the condition on p, s, and S on perfectly de-anonymizing
any user in V a \ Sa. Now, we quantify the condition requirement for a stronger con-
clusion in Theorem 11, which indicates the condition on p, s, and S such that all the
users in V a \ Sa are perfectly de-anonymizable.







(i.e., Λ ≥ 4(2 lnn+ln(2(n−Λ)))(2−s−ps)
ps3(1−p)2 ), it
is a.a.s. that all the users in V a \ Sa are perfectly de-anonymizable.
90
Proof: To prove this theorem, it is sufficient to prove that ∃σ such that σ perfectly
de-anonymizes all the users in V a \ Sa in bounded time. As in Theorem 10, in σ,
we de-anonymize i ∈ V a \ Sa to σ(i) ∈ V u \ Su such that (i, σ(i)) induces the least
∆σ:(i,σ(i))(S). Let E be the event that there is at least one incorrectly de-anonymized
user in V a \Sa, and X and Y are as defined in the proof of Theorem 10. Then, based



























Therefore, it is a.a.s. that Pr(E) →
n→ ∞
0, with probability 1, all the users in V a \ Sa








4.3.2 Sophisticated Quantification: Considering more Structure Informa-
tion
In the previous subsection, we quantified the de-anonymizability of Ga based only
on the seed knowledge. Actually, besides the edges in Eai (S)/Eui (S), all the edges in
Eai /E
u
i can provide structure information which can be used for DA. In this subsec-
tion, we consider to quantify the de-anonymizability of Ga based on all the adjacent
edges of i ∈ V a, i.e., we consider both the structural information carried by seed map-
pings in S and the overall topological information of Ga and Gu. First, we quantify
the structural conditions on Ga and Gu for perfect DA in Theorem 12. Theorem 12
has two parts. The first part shows the condition such that ∆σ0 < ∆σk for any given
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σk. The second part demonstrates the condition for a much stronger conclusion such
that σ0 is the one and the only one inducing the least edge difference. Basically, the
first part of Theorem 12 can be proven using a similar technique as in [113]. Here,
we obtain a tighter bound by applying more elegant quantification techniques.





k(n−k/2−1) , it is a.a.s. that ∆σ0 < ∆σk (k ∈ [2, n]),
i.e., it is a.a.s. that the perfect DA scheme σ0 induces less edge difference than any




k(n−k/2−1) , it is a.a.s. that the
perfect DA scheme σ0 induces the least edge difference than all the other DA schemes,
i.e., it is a.a.s. that σ0 is the only scheme inducing the least edge difference.
Proof: (i) First, let Vk ⊆ V be the set of users that are incorrectly de-anonymized
under σk, V0 = V \Vk be the set of users been correctly de-anonymized, Ek = {ei,j|i ∈
Vk∨j ∈ Vk} be the set of all possible edges that adjacent to at least one incorrectly de-
anonymized users, and E0 = {ei,j|i, j ∈ V0} be the set of all possible edges among the
correctly de-anonymized users. Furthermore, let mk = |Ek| and m0 = E0. Therefore,










. Now, we define two random variables
X = ∆σk and Y = ∆σ0 .
It is evident that if an edge is sampled into exactly one of Ga and Gu, this edge
will induce one edge difference in ∆σ0 . Consequently, Y is a binomial variable with
parameters m0 +mk and 2ps(1− s), i.e.
Y ∼ B(m0 +mk, 2ps(1− s)). (103)
Similarly, under σk, each edge in E0 will induce an edge difference if it is sampled into
exactly one of Ga and Gu. For each edge in Ek, if it is not a transposition edge
5, it will
cause an edge difference with probability of 2ps(1−ps); otherwise, if is a transposition
edge, it will cause an edge difference with probability of 2ps(1− s). Since we have at
5A transposition edge is an edge such that the two endpoints of this edge are incorrectly de-
anonymized to each other, i.e., a transposition edge an edge ei,j such that (i, j) ∈ σk ∧ (j, i) ∈ σk.
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most k/2 transposition edges, we have
X ≥
stochastically
B(m0, 2ps(1− s)) +B(mk − k/2, 2ps(1− ps)) +B(k/2, 2ps(1− s)).
(104)
Let X̃ ∼ B(mk− k/2, 2ps(1− ps)) and Ỹ ∼ B(mk− k/2, 2ps(1− s)) be two binomial
random variables. Then, we have
Pr(X ≤ Y ) =
stochastically
Pr(X̃ ≤ Ỹ ). (105)
Applying Lemma 1, we have
Pr(X ≤ Y ) =
stochastically
Pr(X̃ ≤ Ỹ ) (106)
≤ 2 exp(−
(λX̃ − λỸ )2






(mk − k/2)) (108)













<∞, it is a.a.s. that X > Y , i.e., ∆σ0 < ∆σk , for any σk ̸= σ0.
(ii) Let E be the event that there is some DA scheme σk such that σk ̸= σ0 and


























Consequently, it is a.a.s. that Pr(E) ∼ 0 as n → ∞, i.e., it is a.a.s. that σ0 is the
only scheme that induces the least edge difference. 2
Theorem 12 has a very strong implication: even without any seed information,
it still possible to perfectly de-anonymize a large scale graph. We summarize this
implication in Corollary 1.





k(n−k/2−1) , it is a.a.s. that the perfect DA scheme
σ0 induces the least edge difference than all the other DA schemes, i.e., it is a.a.s.
that σ0 is the only scheme inducing the least edge difference.
Based on Theorems 11, 12 and Corollary 1, it is straightforward to obtain a more
accurate (tighter) bound on the structure condition of Ga and Gu for perfect DA as
shown in Theorem 13.








k(n−k/2−1) }, where Λ ∈
[0, n], Ga is perfectly de-anonymizable.
4.3.3 Quantification with Error Toleration
Now, we study the structural condition on Ga and Gu given S such that some DA
error is tolerated. Let ϵ ∈ [0, 1− Λ
n
] be some constant value. We define Ga is (1− ϵ)-
de-anonymizable if at least (1− ϵ)n users in Ga are perfectly de-anonymizable. Then,
we specify the condition such that Ga is (1 − ϵ)-deanonymizable with or without
seed information in Theorem 14, i.e., the condition that at most ϵn incorrect DA are
allowable.









Λ ∈ [0, n], then Ga is (1− ϵ)-de-anonymizable.







, Ga is (1 − ϵ)-de-
anonymizable. Let Vc ⊆ V a \ Sa and |Vc| = n − ϵn − Λ. Furthermore, let E be the
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event that there is at least one incorrectly de-anonymized user in Vc. Then, using the







































a is also (1 − ϵ)-de-
anonymizable. The proof is similar to the part 2 of Theorem 12. The difference is
that we do not have to distinguish σ0 and σk when k ≤ ϵn. Let E now be the event






















Consequently, it a.a.s. that Pr(E) ∼ 0 as n→ 0, i.e., Ga is (1− ϵ)-de-anonymizable.











4.4 Quantification in General Scenarios
Although the ER model is suitable to enable elegant theoretical analysis on the de-
anonymizability of graph data, the fact is that it is extremely rare, if not impossible,
to see real world graph data actually follow the ER model [107]. Nevertheless, the
analysis under the ER model can shed light on the theoretical quantification of the
de-anonymizability of graph data in general scenarios.
In this section, we quantify the de-anonymizability of Ga in general scenarios,
i.e., unlike in Section 4.3, we assume G(V,E) now could be some graph following an
arbitrary network model. To accelerate the quantification, we make some definitions
as follows. Given a graph G(V,E) with |V | = n and |E| = m, its graph density is
defined as ρ = 2m
n(n−1) . Let U ⊆ V . The subgraph of G on U is defined as G[U ] =
G(U,EU = {ei,j ∈ E|i, j ∈ U}). Furthermore, let nU = |U | and mU = |EU |. Then,
the subgraph density of G on U is ρU =
2mU
nU (nU−1)
. Let U andW be two disjoint subsets
of V (U ∩W = ∅), EU,W = {ei,j ∈ E|i ∈ U, j ∈ W} be the set of edges connecting




. Finally, for the seed mapping set S, we assume it is randomly
identified, which implies each user in V is selected with a probability of q = Λ
n
. For
the seed users in V , we denote them as a set S for convenience, i.e., S = Sa = Su.
For the other users, we denote them by set A = V \ S.
4.4.1 S based Quantification
In this subsection, we quantify the de-anonymizability of a graph given a seed mapping
set S. First, we show the condition for perfectly de-anonymizing an anonymized user
in Theorem 15.







, where q = Λ/n and γS,A =
mS,A
Λ(n−Λ) , it is
a.a.s. that ∀i ∈ A, i is perfectly de-anonymizable.
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Proof: To prove this theorem, it is sufficient to prove that ∀i ∈ A, ∆σ:(i,i)(S) <
∆σ:(i,j ̸=i)(S) under any given σ (it follows that i is perfectly de-anonymizable in terms
of ∆σ:(i,σ(i))(S)). Let X = ∆σ:(i,j ̸=i)(S) and Y = ∆σ:(i,i)(S) be two random variables.
Similar as in Theorem 10, we have
X ∼
stochastically
B(diq, 2s(1− sγS,A)) (125)
Y ∼ B(diq, 2s(1− s)). (126)
Applying Lemma 1, we have
Pr(X ≤ Y ) ≤ 2 exp(− (λX − λY )
2


















<∞, it is a.a.s. that Pr(X ≤ Y ) ∼ 0 as n→∞, i.e., i is perfectly
de-anonymizable. 2
In Theorem 15, the condition where a user is perfectly de-anonymized is quantified.
We further quantify the condition to perfectly de-anonymize all the users in A in
Theorem 16.







, where q = Λ/n and γS,A =
mS,A
Λ(n−Λ) ,
it is a.a.s. that Ga is perfectly de-anonymizable.
Proof: This theorem can be proven by using similar techniques as in Theorems 11
and 15. 2
4.4.2 Sophisticated Quantification: Considering more Structure Informa-
tion
In the previous subsection, the perfect de-anonymizability of graph data is quantified
in general scenarios based on S. As we discussed in Section 4.3, for i ∈ A, besides the
structural connection to the users in S, the structural information between i and other
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users in A is also helpful to improve the DA performance (as shown in Theorem 12).
Similar to the quantification under the ER model, we quantify the de-anonymizability
of graph data by considering the overall structure information in Theorem 17.








, it is a.a.s. that ∆σ0 <
∆σk (k ∈ [2, n]), i.e., it is a.a.s. that the perfect DA scheme σ0 induces less edge







, it is a.a.s. that the perfect DA scheme σ0 is the only scheme
inducing the least edge difference, i.e., Ga is perfectly de-anonymizable.
Proof: (i) Let Vk ⊆ V \ S be the set of incorrectly de-anonymized users under
σk ̸= σ0 and V0 = V \ Vk. Furthermore, let X = ∆σk and Y = ∆σ0 be two random
variables. Then, similar as the derivation in Theorem 12, we have
Y ∼ B(m, 2s(1− s)). (130)
Furthermore, we can consider four cases to quantify X. First, the edge difference
caused by the edges in EV0 follows B(mV0 , 2s(1 − s)); second, the edge difference
caused by the edges in EV0,Vk stochastically follows B(mV0,Vk , 2s(1 − sγV0,Vk)); third,
the edge difference caused by the non-transposition edges in Ek stochastically follows
B(mVk − x, 2s(1 − sρVk)), where x here is the number of transposition edges under
σk; and finally, the edge difference caused by the transposition edges in Ek follows
B(x, 2s(1− s)). Since x ≤ k/2, we have
X ≥
stochastically
B(mV0 , 2s(1− s)) +B(mV0,Vk , 2s(1− sγV0,Vk)) (131)
+B(mVk − k/2, 2s(1− sρVk)) +B(k/2, 2s(1− s))
≥ B(mV0 , 2s(1− s)) +B(mV0,Vk +mVk − k/2, (132)
2s(1− s ·max{γV0,Vk , ρVk}))
+B(k/2, 2s(1− s)).
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Define X̃ ∼ B(mV0,Vk +mVk − k/2, 2s(1− s ·max{γV0,Vk , ρVk})) and Ỹ ∼ B(mV0,Vk +
mVk − k/2, 2s(1− s)). Then, we have
Pr(X ≤ Y ) =
stochastically




2− s− s ·max{γV0,Vk , ρVk}
(mV0,Vk +mVk − k/2)) (134)












< ∞, it is a.a.s. that Pr(X ≤ Y ) ∼ 0 as n → ∞, i.e., it is a.a.s.
that ∆σ0 < ∆σk given σk ̸= σ0.
(ii) Similar as in the proof Theorem 12, let E be the event that there exists some












nk · 2 exp(−1
4
s3(1−max{γV0,Vk , ρVk})2
2− s− s ·max{γV0,Vk , ρVk}









Consequently, it is a.a.s. that σ0 is the only scheme inducing the least edge difference,
i.e., it is a.a.s. that Ga is perfectly de-anonymizable. 2
Similar as Theorem 12, Theorem 17 also implies a large scale graph is perfectly
de-anonymizable without seed information in general scenarios. We summarize the
condition in Corollary 2.
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, it is a.a.s. that the
perfect DA scheme σ0 is the only scheme inducing the least edge difference, i.e., G
a
is perfectly de-anonymizable.
Based on Theorems 16, 17 and Corollary 2, it is straightforward to have the
following conclusion.
















, where Λ ∈ [0, n], it is a.a.s. that Ga is perfectly de-anonymizable.
4.4.3 Quantification with Error Toleration
Now, we quantify the (1 − ϵ)-de-anonymizability of graph data in general scenarios,
where now ϵn (ϵ ∈ [0, 1− Λ
n
]) users are allowed to be incorrectly de-anonymized. We
demonstrate the quantification in Theorem 19.
















, where Λ ∈ [0, n], Ga is (1− ϵ)-de-anonymizable.
Proof: (i) As in Theorem 14, let Vc be the set of users that are perfectly de-
anonymizable and |Vc| = n − ϵn − Λ. Furthermore, let E be the event that there





















Consequently, it is a.a.s. that Pr(E) ∼ 0 as n → ∞, i.e. it is a.a.s. that Ga is
(1− ϵ)-de-anonymizable.
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(ii) As in Theorem 14, we do not have to distinguish σk with σ0 when k ≤ ϵn.









nk · 2 exp(−1
4
s3(1−max{γV0,Vk , ρVk})2
2− s− s ·max{γV0,Vk , ρVk}









Again, it is a.a.s. that Pr(E) ∼ 0 as n → ∞, i.e. it is a.a.s. that Ga is (1 − ϵ)-de-
anonymizable. 2
4.5 Large Scale Evaluation
4.5.1 Datasets and Setup
In the evaluation, we employ 24 various real world social datasets that mainly come
from the Stanford Large Network Dataset Collection [16], ASU Social Computing Data
Repository [1], and other sources [15, 135]. The employed datasets are shown in Table
9 with preliminary statistics, where n is the number of users (nodes), m is the number
of edges among users, ρ is the graph density, d is the average degree of the users, and
p(k) (k = 1, 5, 10) is the percentage of users with degree less than or equal to k. We
further briefly introduce the datasets below. The detailed descriptions can be found
in the corresponding references.
• Hyves [1]. Hyves is the most popular social network in the Netherlands and
competes in that country with other well known international social networks
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Table 9: Dataset statistics.
Name n m ρ d p(1) p(5) p(10)
Hyves 1,402,673 2,777,419 2.82E-06 3.96 56.76% 88.74% 91.80%
Douban 154,908 327,162 2.73E-05 4.22 66.57% 90.81% 93.86%
Friendster 5,689,498 14,067,887 8.69E-07 4.95 60.19% 91.27% 95.86%
YouTube 1,138,499 2,990,443 4.61E-06 5.25 53.16% 85.53% 92.78%
Flixster 2,523,386 7,918,801 2.49E-06 6.28 59.49% 87.26% 92.86%
Last.fm 1,191,812 4,519,340 6.36E-06 7.58 47.27% 81.62% 89.54%
FB-NO-wall 45,813 183,412 1.75E-04 8.01 24.18% 60.91% 77.42%
Gowalla 196,591 950,327 4.92E-05 9.70 25.20% 64.50% 79.90%
Foursquare 639,014 3,214,986 1.57E-05 10.06 51.10% 79.11% 83.21%
Enron 33,696 180,811 3.19E-04 10.73 28.09% 67.86% 82.88%
Skitter 1,694,616 11,094,209 7.73E-06 13.09 12.80% 55.41% 76.21%
Slashdot 82,168 582,533 1.73E-04 14.18 2.19% 64.78% 78.30%
Digg 771,229 5,907,413 1.99E-05 15.32 45.64% 77.31% 85.97%
LiveJournal 4,843,953 43,362,750 3.70E-06 17.90 20.99% 50.53% 64.88%
HepPh 11,204 117,649 1.87E-03 21.00 9.95% 49.99% 66.45%
AstroPh 17,903 197,031 1.23E-03 22.01 5.34% 33.69% 50.66%
FB-NO-links 63,731 817,090 4.02E-04 25.64 12.71% 36.11% 50.02%
Pokec 1,632,803 22,301,964 1.67E-05 27.32 10.04% 30.66% 44.48%
BlogCatalog 97,884 1,668,647 3.48E-04 34.10 28.24% 59.59% 71.45%
Google+ 4,692,671 90,751,480 8.24E-06 38.68 5.44% 27.33% 46.37%
Livemocha 104,103 2,193,083 4.05E-04 42.13 6.56% 27.56% 44.02%
Twitter 456,293 12,508,272 1.20E-04 54.83 5.30% 19.76% 34.50%
Orkut 3,072,441 117,185,083 2.48E-05 76.28 2.21% 7.28% 13.35%
Flickr 80,513 5,899,882 1.82E-03 146.56 0.00% 11.63% 20.58%
102
(e.g., Facebook, MySpace) [1]. The employed Hyves dataset is a friendship
network.
• Douban [1]. Douban is a Chinese Web 2.0 site that provides user review and
recommendation services for movies, books, and music. It is also the largest
online Chinese language book, movie, and music database and one of the largest
online communities in China. The employed Douban dataset is a friendship
network of the users of Douban.
• Friendster [1]. Friendster is a social gaming site and was a social networking
service website before being redesigned. The service allows users to contact
other members, maintain those contacts, and share online content and media
with those contacts. The employed Friendster dataset is a friendship network.
• YouTube [1]. YouTube is a well known video sharing website on which users
can upload, share, and view videos. The employed YouTube dataset is a user
contact network.
• Flixster [1]. Flixster is a social movie site allowing users to share movie rat-
ings, discover new movies and meet others with similar tastes in movies. The
employed Flixster is a friendship network.
• Last.fm [1]. Last.fm is a music discovery service that gives you personalized
recommendations based on the music you listen to. The employed Last.fm
dataset is a friendship network.
• Facebook-New Orleans-links (FB-NO-links) and Facebook-New Orleans-
wall (FB-NO-wall) [135]. Facebook is one of the most popular social net-
works, which connects people with friends and others who work, study, and
live around them. The employed FB-NO-links dataset is a Facebook friendship
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network at the New Orleans area and the FB-NO-wall is a Facebook interaction
(wall posts) network at the New Orleans area.
• Gowalla [16]. Gowalla is a location-based social networking website where
users share their locations by checking-in. The employed Gowalla dataset is a
friendship network.
• Foursquare [1]. Foursquare helps people to find the places to go with friend-
s and discover food, nightlife, and entertainment for users. The employed
Foursquare dataset is friendship network.
• Enron [16]. Enron is an email communication dataset released by Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission during its investigation.
• Skitter [16]. The Skitter dataset is an Internet topology graph of Autonomous
Systems.
• Slashdot [16]. Slashdot is a technology-related news website known for its spe-
cific user community. The website features user-submitted and editor-evaluated
current primarily technology oriented news. The employed Slashdot dataset is
a friendship network.
• Digg [1]. Digg is a news aggregator with an editorially driven front page,
aiming to select stories specifically for the Internet audience such as science,
trending political issues, and viral Internet issues. The employed Digg dataset
is a friendship network.
• LiveJournal [16]. LiveJournal is social network for journals and blogs. It also
offers privacy controls, photo storage, publishing tools, style templates, and
online communities for many interests. The employed LiveJournal dataset is a
friendship network.
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• HepPh [16]. HepPh is a citation graph of the papers posted on arXiv in the
high-energy physics area.
• AstroPh [16]. AstroPh is a collaboration network of the authors of papers
posted on arXiv in the astro physics area.
• Pokec [16]. Pokec is the most popular on-line social network in Slovakia. The
employed Pokec dataset is a friendship network.
• BlogCatalog [1]. BlogCatalog is a social blog directory which manages the
bloggers and their blogs. The employed BlogCatalog dataset is a friendship
network.
• Google+ [15]. Google+ is one of the most popular social networking and
identity services. The employed Google+ dataset is a friendship network.
• Livemocha [1]. Livemocha is the world’s largest online language learning com-
munity, offering free and paid online language courses in 35 languages. The
employed Livemocha dataset is a friendship network.
• Twitter [1]. Twitter is an online social networking and microblogging service
that enables users to send and read short 140-character text messages, called
“tweets”. The employed Twitter dataset is a friendship network.
• Orkut [1]. Orkut is an on-line social network where users form friendship with
each other. It also allows users to form a group which other members can then
join. The employed Orkut dataset is a friendship network.
• Flickr [1]. Flickr is an image hosting and video hosting website. The employed
dataset is a friendship network of Flickr users.
For each employed dataset, we use the raw data except for removing isolated users
(most datasets do not contain any isolated users). Note that, our quantification is
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not limited to connected graphs. It is also applicable to disconnected social network-
s. Furthermore, we do not consider the direction information even if a dataset is a
directed network. Again, this assumption does not limit the evaluation or quantifica-
tion. Since the direction information can be used to improve the effectiveness of DA
attacks [104], it is possible that our quantification and evaluation can be improved if
we have more knowledge, e.g., the direction information. One of the future works is
to quantify the de-anonymizability of directed social networks.
To generate the anonymized and auxiliary graphs, we follow the data sampling
approach discussed in Section 4.2, i.e., we construct Ga and Gu from the raw data
using the sampling probabilities sa and su, respectively. Here, for simplicity, we set
sa = su = s. After constructing G
a and Gu, the seed mappings are chosen randomly
from them (note that, seed mappings are some pre-known user mappings between
Ga and Gu), which implies that the high-degree users are not given preference as in
[69, 151] although they may be more helpful as seed mappings. Consequently, our
evaluation results represent the general results of our quantification. Each group of
evaluations is repeated for 50 times and the results are the average of these 50 runs.
We quantify the de-anonymizability of a graph using seed information and using
the overall structural information, respectively. Therefore, we use suffixes “-S” and “-
A” to distinguish these two scenarios (e.g., Twiiter-A and Twitter-S), where “-S” and
“-A” imply using seed information and overall structural information, respectively.
If we do not specify the suffix or the particular context, it implies using the overall
structural information by default.
4.5.2 Evaluation of Perfect De-anonymizability
In this subsection, we evaluate the condition on perfect de-anonymizability of the
datasets in Table 9.
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Figure 8: Perfect DA: Θ(Λ/n) vs. s. Since the quantification (Theorem 18) for
perfect DA is meaningful for large n, we set n = 1000/ρ for each social network
in this group of evaluations. All the other network properties, e.g., ρ, d, degree
distribution, etc., remain the same as in the original dataset.
4.5.2.1 Evaluation on Λ
Based on our quantification, we evaluate the requirements on the size of seed mappings
Λ and the sampling rate s for the perfect de-anonymizability of each dataset in Fig.8.
Since all the datasets have different sizes, for convenience, we show Θ(Λ/n) instead
of Λ directly.
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From Fig.8, we have the following observations.
• If the overall structural information is considered, each dataset is asymptotically
perfectly de-anonymizable6 even without any seed information when s is above some
threshold value, which is consistent with our theoretical quantification7. For instance,
the Twitter dataset is asymptotically perfectly de-anonymizable when s ≥ 0.61 with-
out seed information if the overall structural information is considered. This implies
that the structure itself is sufficient to break the privacy. The reason for this re-
sult is that the perfect DA scheme induces the least edge difference as shown in our
quantification.
• If s is below some threshold value, it is necessary to have Θ(n) seed mappings to
perfectly de-anonymize each social network, i.e., each social network is not perfectly
de-anonymizable unless Θ(n) users are identified as seeds. For instance, Google+ is
not perfectly de-anonymizable when s < 0.61. The reason is that a small s implies
less edges are sampled into Ga and Gu. It follows that most of the users are low
degree users and thus the structural information is not sufficient to achieve perfect
DA.
• For the DA only based on seed information (“*-S”), to achieve perfect DA,
the required number of seed mappings decreases when s increases as expected. For
instance, to perfectly de-anonymize Google+, 49.27% seed users are needed when
s = 0.8 while 31.89% seed users are needed when s = 0.9. This is because a large s
implies more structural similarity between Ga and Gu. Thus, less seed mappings are
needed to distinguish all the users.
• Given some s, a social network with higher graph density requires fewer seed
mappings. For example, to be perfectly de-anonymizable, 49.27% (ρ = 2.48E-5) seed
6To be accurately, asymptotically perfectly de-anonymizable here implies Θ(n) users of each
dataset can be successfully de-anonymized.
7Actually, the quantification does not implies a computationally efficient algorithm. It is still an
open problem to find an efficient (polynomial-time) algorithm with provable performance guarantee.
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Figure 9: Perfect DA: Θ(Λ/n) vs. n. Default setting: s = 0.7.
users are required for Orkut-S while 37.47% seed users are required for Flickr-S (ρ =
1.82E-3). This is also true for the overall structural information based DA. This is
because a higher graph density implies that more structural information is carried by
the data, followed by more structural information can be used to distinguish users.
Now, we examine the behavior of Λ when we fix the graph density of each social
network while varying n. The results are shown in Fig.9, where x × n (the x-axis)
denotes the number of users is x times of the original size n.
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From Fig.9, we have the following observations.
• When n is above some threshold value, each social network is perfectly de-
anonymizable based on the overall structural information, which confirms the con-
clusion of Theorem 17. The reason is straightforward. More structural information
will be available when n increases and ρ is fixed. Consequently, more users can be
de-anonymized based on the structural information. Because of the same reason, for
the seed-based DA, the required number of seed mappings decreases when n increases.
• Given Θ(Λ/n), the required threshold value on n is smaller for social networks
with high graph densities and vice versa. This is because a high ρ implies more
structural information is available followed by more similarity between Ga and Gu
when s is fixed.
• Similar to the scenario of changing s, when n is below some threshold value,
it is necessary to have Θ(n) seed user mappings to perfectly de-anonymize a social
network. This can be seen from our quantification: it is a.a.s. that σ0 induces the
least edge difference when the required condition holds and n→∞, i.e., n should be
large enough.
4.5.2.2 Evaluation on n
In this subsection, we study the condition on n to perfectly de-anonymize a social
network given different s or Λ. The objective of this group of evaluation is to s-
tudy the asymptotic behavior of n in different scenarios, since our quantification is
mathematically meaningful when n is a large number. Furthermore, based on our
quantification, when n→∞, the overall structure based quantification will dominate
the perfect de-anonymizability of a social network (this claim can be confirmed by
the evaluation results in Fig.11). Consequently, we consider the overall structural
information (including seed mappings) in the evaluation of n. When s is changed
from 0.5 to 0.95, the requirement on the lower bound of n, i.e., Ω(n), is shown in
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Fig.10. From Fig.10, we have two observations as follows.
•When s increases, Ω(n) decreases, e.g., to perfectly de-anonymize Google+, Ω(n)
decreases from 2.85E8 to 3.19E7 when s increases from 0.5 to 0.9. This is because
a large s implies more similarity between Ga and Gu since they share more common
edges. Consequently, the condition on Ω(n) to perfectly de-anonymize a social net-
work becomes loose. This observation can also be explained by our quantification.
From Theorem 18, a large s implies a large value on the left hand of each condition,
followed by smaller n requirement on the right hand.
• The graph density has positive influence on Ω(n), i.e., a social network with high
graph density requires loose condition on Ω(n) for perfect DA. For instance, Orkut
(ρ = 2.48E-5) requires a smaller Ω(n) than Google+ (ρ = 8.24E-6). The reason is that
a large ρ implies more structural information is carried by the dataset. Therefore, it
is much easier to perfectly de-anonymize this dataset.
Now, we want to study the impact of Λ on Ω(n) to perfectly de-anonymize a social
network. The results are shown in Fig.11. From Fig.11, we have the following two
observations.
• When Ω (i.e., Θ(Ω/n)) increases, Ω(n) only has a very slight decrease, e.g.,
the Ω(n) of Friendster, Skitter, LiveJournal, etc. This is because given that Ω(n),
the overall structural information based DA has already been achieved. However,
even the seed information based DA can de-anonymize a large portion of each social
network given the same Ω(n) (as shown in Fig.8 and Fig.9), more seed mappings are
necessary to perfectly de-anonymize all the users.
• Again, the graph density has positive influence on Ω(n) in different settings of
Ω. The reason is the same as explained before: a large ρ implies more similarity
between Ga and Gu when s is fixed.
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Figure 10: Perfect DA: n vs. s. Default setting: Λ/n = 0.015 (1.5% users are
randomly chosen as seed mappings).
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Figure 11: Perfect DA: n vs. Λ. Default setting: s = 0.8.
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4.5.3 Evaluation of (1− ϵ)-De-anonymizability
4.5.3.1 Evaluation on (1− ϵ)
In this subsection, we evaluate the actual de-anonymizability of the 24 real world
datasets by quantitatively demonstrating (1− ϵ) (note that, ϵn is the error tolerated
during the DA process), i.e., how many users in each social network can be successfully
de-anonymized in each specific scenario.
When all the structural information (including seed mappings) are considered,
the lower bound on the percentage of de-anonymizable users in the 24 social networks,
i.e., Ω(1− ϵ), is shown in Fig.12 with different s. From Fig.12, we have the following
observations.
• All the 24 social networks are partially de-anonymizable although they may not
be perfectly de-anonymizable. For instance, when s = 0.55, 20.88% YouTube users,
33.62% Foursquare users, 66.69% Facebook users at New Orleans, 72.94% Google+
users, and 97.6% Twitter users are de-anonymizable based on the overall structural
information. Consequently, the obtained quantitative results confirmed the success of
existing heuristic algorithms [104, 127]. This is also consistent with our quantification
on (1 − ϵ)-DA: if the low-degree users are treated as the tolerated DA errors, the
high-degree users are more likely to be successfully de-anonymized, i.e., these social
networks are partially de-anonymizable. In other words, when perfect DA is not
achievable, these high-degree users are still de-anonymizable since they carry enough
structural information.
• When s increases, Ω(1 − ϵ) also increases, i.e., more users can be successfully
de-anonymized for each social network. For instance, when s changes from 0.5 to
0.65, the percentage of de-anonymizable users of Google+ increases from 58.76% to
99%. The reason is similar as explained in the previous subsection: a large s implies
more common edges shared by Ga and Gu, i.e., more structural similarity between
Ga and Gu. Consequently, it is more likely that the correct user DA induces less edge
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difference (DA error).
•When s is increased above some value, several social networks can be asymptot-
ically perfectly de-anonymizable (Θ(n) users can be successfully de-anonymized). For
instance, when s ≥ 0.78, s ≥ 0.66, and s ≥ 0.63, over 99% users of Slashdot, FB-NO-
link, and Google+ can be successfully de-anonymized, respectively. This fact comes
from the same reason as the previous observation: a large s implies more structural
similarity followed by more de-anonymizable a social network is.
• The social networks with higher average degree d is more de-anonymizable, e.g.,
when s = 0.6, 53.23% LiveJournal users (d = 17.9) are perfectly de-anonymizable
while 73.38% Pokec users (d = 27.32) are perfectly de-anonymizable. The reason is
evident: a higher d implies more common edges in Ga and Gu. Therefore, the correct
DA is more likely inducing less edge difference.
Now, we study the (1− ϵ)-de-anonymizability of the 24 social networks when we
fix the network density, s, and Λ/n while change n. The results are shown in Fig.13.
From Fig.13, we have the following observations.
• When n increases, the percentage of de-anonymizable users of each social net-
work also increases for both seed-based DA and overall SDA. For instance, when
the network size changes from 10n to 20n, the percentage of de-anonymizable Flickr
users increases from 41.65% to 59.08% in seed-based DA; similarly, when network
size is 5n, 67.81% of LiveJournal users are de-anonymizable while when the network
size is above 10.5n, LiveJournal is asymptotically perfectly de-anonymizable. This
fact is consistent with our quantification. The reason is that a large n implies richer
structural information when ρ is fixed. Hence, more users are de-anonymizable.
•As expected, the overall structural information is more powerful in de-anonymizing
social networks. This is also consistent with our quantification. Since more struc-
tural information is considered, the probability that correct DA induces more edge
differences than incorrect DA will be decreased. Consequently, “*-A” de-anonymizes
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Figure 12: (1 − ϵ)-DA: Ω(1 − ϵ) vs. s. Default setting: Λ = 0.05n (5% users are
seeds).
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Figure 13: (1− ϵ)-DA: Ω(1− ϵ) vs. n. Default setting: s = 0.8 and Λ/n = 0.05.
more users than “*-S”.
• As validated before, graph density also has positive impact on Ω(1 − ϵ), i.e., a
social network with a high graph density is more de-anonymizable. The reason still
comes from the fact that a high ρ implies more structural similarity between Ga and
Gu.
Intuitively, if we have more seed mappings, more users should be de-anonymizable
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even we do not consider the overall structural information. Theoretically, this intu-
ition is quantified in Theorem 16. We evaluate this quantification by studying the
impacts of the number of seed mappings on the percentage of de-anonymizable users.
The results are shown in Fig.14. From Fig.14, we have the following observations.
• When more seed mappings are available, more users are de-anonymizable, e.g.,
when Ω(Λ/n) changes from 0.05 to 0.15, the percentage of de-anonymizable Google+
users increases from 40.07% to 72.28%. The reason is evident since more seed map-
pings implies more knowledge is available to improve the DA accuracy, which can also
be seen from our quantification.
• Although ρ and d have a positive influence to Ω(1− ϵ), it is still possible that a
social network with smaller ρ or dmay be more de-anonymizable than a social network
with higher ρ or d in some cases, e.g., BlogCatalog has a smaller d while larger ρ than
Google+, and Orkut has a smaller ρ while larger d than BlogCatalog. This is because
the seed mappings in seed-based DA are randomly identified and the DA process is
also affected by the degree distribution of the social network. Consequently, both
ρ and d have impacts on the de-anonymizability of a social network. However, it
is difficult to determine which one will dominate the de-anonymizability. Generally
speaking, the richer the structural information, i.e., the higher ρ and d, the more
de-anonymizable the social network is.
4.5.3.2 Evaluation on Λ
In this subsection, we evaluate the condition on Λ in (1− ϵ)-DA. When ϵ = 0.4, i.e.
up to 40% user DA error is tolerable, the condition on Λ to perfectly de-anonymize
at least 1− ϵ = 60% users of each social network under different settings of s is shown
in Fig.15. From Fig.15, we can observe that:
•When s is below some threshold value, Θ((1− ϵ)n) seed mappings are necessary
to perfectly de-anonymize (1 − ϵ)n anonymized users. For instance, when s < 0.72,
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Figure 14: (1− ϵ)-DA: Ω(1− ϵ) vs. Λ. Default setting: s = 0.8
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Θ(Λ/n) ∼ 0.6 for Google+ in seed-based DA, i.e., almost 60% Google+ users have to
be identified as seeds; similarly, when s < 0.51, the condition on Λ is also Θ(Λ/n) ∼
0.6 for Google+ in overall structural information based DA. This is because when s is
small, less common edges are shared by Ga and Gu. Consequently, it tends to involve
all the anonymized users as seeds to achieve perfect de-anonymizability.
• For seed-based DA, when s is above some threshold value, Θ(Λ/n) decreases
with the increases of s (less seed mappings are needed), e.g., when s is increased
from 0.8 to 0.9, Θ(Λ/n) decreases from 0.47 to 0.3. For overall structural information
based DA, when s is above some value, it is a.a.s. that a social network is (1 − ϵ)-
de-anonymizable even without any seed mapping information, e.g., when s ≥ 0.51,
Θ(Λ/n) ∼ 0 for Google+. This is because: (i) when s increases, Ga and Gu are more
structurally similar. Thus, Ga is more de-anonymizable in both seed and overall
structural information based DA; and (ii) when the overall structural information is
considered, the perfect DA scheme tends to induce the least edge difference when s
is above some threshold value, i.e., a social network becomes (1− ϵ)-de-anonymizable
when s is large enough, which is also consistent with our quantification.
If we fix s = 0.8, the condition on Λ to make each social network (1 − ϵ)-de-
anonymizable under different ϵ is shown in Fig.16. From Fig.16, we can see that:
• In seed-based DA, to make the social networks with low average degree (1− ϵ)-
de-anonymizable, it is necessary to identify Θ((1− ϵ)n) seed mappings. For example,
the social networks shown in Fig.16 (a)-(d) have d < 15 and the condition on Λ
to make them (1 − ϵ)-de-anonymizable is Θ(Λ/n) ∼ 1 − ϵ. The reason is that a
low d implies less edges from anonymized users to seed users. Consequently, more
seed mappings are necessary. On the other hand, if a social network has a large d,
e.g., most of the social networks in Fig.16 (e)-(h), less seed mappings are needed to
be (1 − ϵ)-de-anonymizable in seed-based DA. For instance, when ϵ = 0.6, to make
Google+ 0.4-de-anonymizable, 22.52% users are needed to serve as seeds.
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Figure 15: (1− ϵ)-DA: Λ vs. s. Default setting: ϵ = 0.4.
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Figure 16: (1− ϵ)-DA: Λ vs. ϵ. Default setting: s = 0.8.
• In overall structural information based DA, if ϵ (the tolerated DA error) is above
some threshold value, all the 24 social networks are (1 − ϵ)-de-anonymizable except
for Hyves, which has a very low d = 3.96. The reason is that when overall structural
information (including seed mappings) is considered and s = 0.8, the correct DA
induces the least edge difference with higher probability than in the seed-based DA,
which is consistent with our quantification. Again, the results also confirmed that
the overall structural information based DA is more effective.
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Now, we evaluate the condition on Λ when the network size changes while other
network properties are fixed. The results are shown in Fig.17. From Fig.17, we have
the following observations.
• When n varies, the behavior of Θ(Λ/n) is similar to that when s varies. For
the social networks with low d, e.g., the social networks shown in Fig.17 (a)-(d), it is
necessary to have Θ(Λ/n) ∼ 1−ϵ in seed-based DA. The reason is also similar to that
presented in the earlier analysis. A small d implies less edges between anonymized
users and seed users. Hence, it is necessary to have Θ(Λ/n) ∼ 1− ϵ to perfectly de-
anonymize (1 − ϵ)n users. On the other hand, when the network size is above some
threshold value and continues to increase, less seed mappings are needed for social
networks with high d (social networks in Fig.17 (e)-(h)) to be (1−ϵ)-de-anonymizable.
The reason is also similar to that presented in the earlier analysis.
• Again, the overall structural information based DA is more powerful, i.e., even
without seed information, the structure itself can make a social network perfectly
de-anonymizable. The quantification along with the evaluation results provides the
foundation of the DA attack without seed information.
4.5.3.3 Evaluation on n
In this subsection, we evaluate the condition on n for the (1− ϵ)-de-anonymizability
of each social network. First, we examine Ω(n) under different settings of s. The
results are shown in Fig.18, where y× n (y-axis) denotes the required network size is
y times that of the original network size n. From Fig.18, we can see that:
•When s increases, the condition on n becomes loose for (1−ϵ)-DA. For instance,
when s increases from 0.5 to 0.9, the network size requirement to make Google+
(1 − ϵ)-de-anonymizable decreases from 2.85E8 to 3.19E7. This is because a large s
implies more common edges between Ga and Gu followed by more structural similarity
between them. Consequently, as shown in our quantification, it is still a.a.s. that the
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Figure 17: (1− ϵ)-DA: Λ vs. n. Default setting: s = 0.8 and ϵ = 0.4.
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Figure 18: (1− ϵ)-DA: n vs. s. Default setting: ϵ = 0.4 and Λ/n = 0.05.
correct DA induces the least edge difference under such loose condition.
• Generally speaking, a high d implies loose condition requirement on n. From
Table 9, the average degree range of the social networks shown in Fig.18 (a), (b), (c),
and (d) are (3.96, 7.58), (8.01, 14.18), (15.32, 27.32), and (34.1, 146.56), respectively.
It is evident that the social networks in Fig.18 (d) (e.g., Flickr, Orkut, Twitter.)
have a looser requirement on network size than the social networks in Fig.18 (a)
(e.g., Hyves, Douban, YouTube.). This is because a higher d implies richer structural
information and more connections between anonymized users and seed users.
When the tolerated error ϵ is increased, the condition on network size for (1− ϵ)-
DA is shown in Fig.19. From Fig.19, we can see that:
• When ϵ increases, the condition on network size becomes loose. For instance,
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Figure 19: (1− ϵ)-DA: n vs. ϵ. Default setting: s = 0.8 and Λ/n = 0.05.
when ϵ is increased from 0.1 to 0.4, the network size is changed from 2.01n to 1.05n,
where n is the size of the Twitter dataset, which implies Twitter is a.a.s. (1 − ϵ)-
de-anonymizable at its current form when ϵ ≥ 0.4. The reason is evident since more
tolerable error (i.e., a large ϵ) implies higher probability to be (1−ϵ)-de-anonymizable,
followed by a loose condition requirement on the network size.
• As in the evaluation of examining the network size while changing s, the social
networks with higher d have a loose condition requirement on the network size, e.g.,
Flickr (d = 146.56) and Orkut (d = 76.28) have a looser network size requirement
than that of Hyves (d = 3.96) and Douban (d = 4.22). The reason is the same as
explained before. A higher d implies more structural similarity between Ga and Gu,
followed by a loose condition on the network size as shown in our quantification.
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Finally, we evaluate the condition on network size when various seed mappings
are available. The results are shown in Fig.20 (note that, y ≥ 1). From Fig.20, we
have observations as follows.
• For seed-based DA, when Θ(Λ/n) increases, the required network size decreases
fast. The reason is that if more seed mappings are available, more edges are expected
to appear between the anonymized users and seed users, followed by a higher proba-
bility that the correct DA inducing the least edge difference. This is also consistent
with our quantification.
• The number of available seed mappings has a limited impact on overall structural
information based DA. This is because the overall structural information based DA
scheme considers all the structural information simultaneously and seeks the DA
which minimizes the overall edge difference. As long as Λ/n < 0.5, it is expected that
the structural information carried by anonymized users dominates the DA process
instead of the structural information carried by seed users (note that our seeds are
randomly chosen).
• Similar to the results in Fig.18 and Fig.19, the social networks with high d
requires a loose condition on network size given the same Θ(Λ/n) in general. The
reason is also the same as that presented in the earlier analysis.
4.6 Chapter Summarization
In this chapter, we study the de-anonymizability of graph data based only on their
structural information. First, we quantify the perfect de-anonymizability and (1− ϵ)-
de-anonymizability of graph data with seed information under the mathematical ER
model. Subsequently, we extend our quantification to general scenarios, where a
graph can follow an arbitrary model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
comprehensive quantification study on the perfect and partial de-anonymizability
of graph data with seed information under a general model. Third, based on our
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Figure 20: (1− ϵ)-DA: n vs. Λ. Default setting: s = 0.8 and ϵ = 0.4.
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quantification, we conduct a large scale evaluation on the de-anonymizability of 24
various real world social networks. In the evaluation, we demonstrate the conditions
on perfectly or partially de-anonymizing a social network, how many users of each
social network can be successfully de-anonymized, etc. Furthermore, we show that,
both theoretically and experimentally, the overall structural information based DA
attack can be powerful, and even without any seed information available, a graph
can also be perfectly or partially de-anonymizable. Our findings are expected to shed
light on the future research in the structural data anonymization and DA areas, and
help data owners evaluate their data vulnerability before data sharing/publishing.
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CHAPTER V
DE-SAG: DE-ANONYMIZING SOCIAL ATTRIBUTE
GRAPHS
5.1 Introduction
In most real scenarios of sharing/publishing graph data, in addition to sharing/publishing
the graph structure, a lot of non-Personal Identifiable Information (non-PII), or at-
tribute information, associated with graph users is also shared or published, e.g., gen-
der, education, city, country, interests [15, 16]. Therefore, when studying anonymiza-
tion and De-Anonymization (DA) techniques for graph data, the following question
can be posed: what are the impacts of the attribute information on the anonymity/de-
anonymizability of graph data? However, in existing graph data DA research [27, 64,
69, 104, 127, 151], only graph structure information is considered. Similarly, existing
graph anonymity/de-anonymizability quantification research [61, 63, 69, 113, 151]
only consider the graph structure, which gives an incomplete picture of the actual
privacy vulnerability of graph data. To address the aforementioned open problem,
we study the impact of attribute information (non-PII) on the privacy of graph data
both theoretically and empirically. In this chapter, to distinguish between graph da-
ta with just graph structure and graph data with structure and attributes, we name
the graph data with structure and attribute information Structure-Attribute Graph
(SAG) data. Our main contributions in this chapter can be summarized as follows.
1. We conduct the first attribute-based anonymity analysis of SAG data under both
preliminary and general data models. By careful quantification, we explicitly
demonstrate the correlation between the achievable graph anonymity and the
attribute information. Our theoretical results demonstrate that the attribute
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information, even as non-PII, can also lead to significant anonymity loss of
graph data. We also validate our analysis by both numerical evaluation and
real world SAG data-based evaluation. The evaluation results further confirm
our anonymity analysis. Our attribute-based anonymity analysis together with
existing structure-based de-anonymizability quantifications provide data owners
and researchers a more complete understanding of the privacy of graph data.
2. According to our attribute-based anonymity analysis, we propose a new DA
attack on graph data, namely De-SAG, which takes into account both graph
structure and attribute information to the best of our knowledge. Through
extensive evaluations leveraging real world SAG data, we demonstrate that De-
SAG can significantly enhance existing graph DA attacks. For instance, when
de-anonymizing a Facebook dataset (4,039 users, 88,234 user-user links, 1,283
attributes, 37,257 user-attribute links), De-SAG has a 3.82 ∼ 10.1 times better
DA performance than state-of-the-art structure-based DA attacks [63, 69].
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We provide the data model,
preliminaries, and definitions in Section 5.2. The attribute-based anonymity analysis
and evaluation are conducted in Section 5.3. Then, we propose and evaluate De-SAG
in Section 5.4. The chapter is concluded in Section 5.5.
5.2 Data Model, Preliminaries, and Definitions
5.2.1 Data Model
Given a SAG, we model it as a graph G = (V,E,A,W ) as shown in Fig.21, where
V = {i|i is a user} (the set of users), E = {lij|lij is a link between users i and j} (the
set of all the links among users), A = {i|i is an attribute} (the set of all the non-PII
associated with the users in V ), and W = {aij|i ∈ V, j ∈ A, aij is a link between user
i and attribute j, i.e., user i has attribute j} (the set of all the links between users






Figure 21: The SAG model.
Ai = {j|j ∈ A, ∃aij ∈ W}. Furthermore, we define n = |V | and N = |A| to be the
numbers of users and attributes, respectively.
5.2.2 De-anonymization
Given a raw SAGG, we assume that it will be anonymized before being shared/published.
The anonymized G is denoted by G′ = (V ′, E ′, A′,W ′) (we use an apostrophe to dis-
tinguish between the notations associated with G′ from G when necessary). Note
that, in G′, although we cannot distinguish between the users in V ′ (we do not know
the identities of the users in V ′), we still know the attributes associated with each
anonymized user since they are non-PII, e.g., in the published SAG data [15, 16, 49],
the attributes (non-PII) associated with anonymized users are explicitly available.
On the other hand, in reality, for ∀i ∈ V , it is also possible that Ai ̸= A′i after the
anonymization process, i.e., the anonymization scheme may add some new attributes
to and/or remove some existing attributes from a user.
For the adversaries, as in existing DA attacks [63, 104, 108, 127], they try to
de-anonymize G′ leveraging some auxiliary graph denoted by G′′ = (V ′′, E ′′, A′′,W ′′)
(we use double-apostrophe to distinguish between the notations associated with G′′
from G′ and G when necessary), e.g., an adversary can leverage a Flickr graph to
deanonymize a Twitter graph [104]. In reality, the auxiliary graphs can be obtained
through multiple means, e.g., online crawling, data aggregation, data mining tasks,
third-party information collection, public data sharing [63, 104].
Without loss of generality, we assume V ′ = V ′′ = V (although we do not know
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the users in V ′) and A′ = A′′ = A. Note that, as in [63, 113], this assumption does
not limit the results of this chapter. When V ′ ̸= V ′′ (respectively, A′ ̸= A′′), the







are defined as V ′new = V
′′
new = V
′ ∪V ′′ (respectively, A′new = A′′new = A′ ∪V ′′); and the
algorithm proposed in this chapter can still work directly.
According to G′ and G′′, a DA attack/scheme can mathematically be defined as
a mapping from V ′ to V ′′ [61, 63, 104, 108], denoted by
π = V ′ → V ′′ = {(i, π(i) = j)|i ∈ V ′, j ∈ V ′′}. (150)
Then, for convenience of discussion, ∀i ∈ V ′, a correct DA of i is denoted by mapping
(i, i), i.e., the identical mapping corresponds to the correct DA.
5.2.3 Anonymity of G′
Entropy has been widely used to quantify the randomness/uncertainty of a pro-
cess/system. Similarly, it can also be employed to measure the anonymity of G′
given G′′ and π [108]. Let π be an arbitrary DA scheme (mapping) from V ′ to
V ′′. ∀i ∈ V ′ and ∀j ∈ V ′′, let pπij be the probability of the event that i is mapped





i2, · · · , pπin >. Hence, the uncertainty of i under π can be measured by














which is the average entropy of all the users in G′.
Let Hmax(i) = max{Hπ(i)} and Hmax(G′) = {Hπ(G′)}, respectively. Evidently,
for each i ∈ V ′, Hπ(i) is maximized when i can be mapped to each user in V ′′
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equiprobably. Hence, we have Hmax(i) = log n. Similarly, we have Hmax(G
′) = log n
when every user in G′ achieves its maximum entropy. Then, based on Hπ(G′) and
Hmax(G





From the definition, we have A(G′) ∈ [0, 1], where a large value of A(G′) implies a
better anonymity of G′. Specifically, A(G′) = 0 implies all the users in G′ can be
successfully de-anonymized under π while A(G′) = 1 implies that G′ achieves the
perfect anonymity.
5.3 Anonymity Analysis: From the Attribute Perspective
As we discussed in Sections 5.1, the structure-based de-anonymizability analysis for
graph data has been studied in [61, 63, 69, 113, 151]. However, understanding the
impacts of attributes on the anonymity/de-anonymizability of graph data is still an
open problem. Furthermore, no existing DA scheme employs both the graph struc-
ture and the associated attributes to de-anonymize graph data. In this section, we
address the first open problem by measuring the impacts of attributes on SAG data’s
anonymity. To be mathematically tractable, we conduct the analysis under a prelim-
inary model first. Then, we generalize the analysis to the more complicated practical
scenarios.
5.3.1 Preliminary Analysis
First, we conduct attribute-based anonymity analysis for SAGs under a random At-
tribute Attachment (A2) model: given a SAG G, we assume that for ∀i ∈ V and
∀j ∈ A, the existing probability of link aij is p, i.e., Pr(aij ∈ W |∀i ∈ V,∀j ∈ A) = p.
Furthermore, we assumeW ′ andW ′′ are random subsets ofW : for each user-attribute
link inW , it appeares inW ′ andW ′′ with positive probabilities p′ and p′′, respectively,
i.e., Pr(aij ∈ W ′|aij ∈ W ) = p′ and Pr(aij ∈ W ′′|aij ∈ W ) = p′′.
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To facilitate our analysis, we introduce the concept of Attribute Difference (AD)
between the users in V ′ and V ′′. ∀i ∈ V ′ and ∀j ∈ V ′′, their AD is defined as
Dij = (A′i ∪ A′′j ) \ (A′i ∪ A′′j ). (154)




. Then, we have the following theorem which quantifies the attribute-based
anonymity loss of G′.
Theorem 20. Let t be a natural number and t ∈ [1, n − 1]. Then, (i) if ϑ ≥
2 lnn+t ln(n−1)−ln t!+1
Nt
, A(G′) = log t
logn
; and (ii) if ϑ ≥ 3 lnn+t ln(n−1)−ln t!+1
Nt
, A(G′) = 0, i.e.,
G′ lost all of the anonymity.
Proof Sketch: (i) To prove this conclusion, we first analyze the entropy of ∀i ∈ V ′.
Suppose i is de-anonymized to j ∈ V ′′ under some DA scheme π (we will discuss
how to determine π later), i.e., π(i) = j. Then, we analyzed the AD caused by
mapping (i, j). On one hand, if j = i, an AD will be induced if i has one attribute in
exactly one of V ′ and V ′′. It follows that the AD corresponding to mapping (i, j = i)
is Dij = Dii ∼ B(N,α), where B(N,α) is a binomial variable with parameters N
and α. On the other hand, if j ̸= i, the AD corresponding to mapping (i, j) is
Dij ∼ B(N, β). Clearly, β > α.
Let E be the event that ∃j ̸= i such that Dii ≥ Dij. Then, according to Lemma
1, we have
Pr(E) ≤ 2 exp(− (Nβ −Nα)
2
8(Nβ +Nα)
) = 2 exp(−Nϑ). (155)
Furthermore, the possible number of such events can be counted by t. Let Et be the
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event that E happens t times. Then, we have
Pr(Et) = C(n− 1, t) · Pr(E)t · (1− Pr(E))n−t (156)




· 2 exp(−Nϑt) (158)
= exp(t ln(n− 1)− ln t!) · 2 exp(−Nϑt) (159)
= 2 exp(t ln(n− 1)− ln t!−Nϑt) (160)




According to the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, we have Pr(Et)→ 0 as n→∞. Therefore,
when ϑ ≥ 2 lnn+t ln(n−1)−ln t!+1
Nt
, with probability 1, E happens less than t times.
Algorithm 2: An implementation of π
1 for i ∈ V ′ do
2 sorting the users in V ′′ in the increasing order of Dij for j ∈ V ′′ and the
sorted sequence is denoted as < j1, j2, · · · , jn >;
3 mapping i to jk (1 ≤ k ≤ t) with probability 1t ;
Based on the analysis, we define a simple de-aonymization scheme π as shown in
Algorithm 2. From Algorithm 2, we have Pπi =< p
π
j1










, · · · , 1
t
, 0, · · · , 0 >. Furthermore, considering that Pr(Et)→ 0, we conclude that
π can successfully de-anonymize any user in V ′ with probability 1
t
. Then, ∀i ∈ V ′, we






(ii) Now, we prove the second conclusion. Let Eall be the event that there exists
some t such that Et happens. Then, Pr(Eall) =
n∪
t=1






















According to the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, we have Pr(Eall)→ 0 as n→∞, i.e., when
ϑ ≥ 3 lnn+t ln(n−1)−ln t!+1
Nt
, @t such that Et happens. This further implies that with
probability 1, ∀i ∈ V ′ and ∀j ∈ V ′′, if j ̸= i, Pr(Dii < Dij)→ 1 as n→∞.
Algorithm 3: Another implementation of π
1 for i ∈ V ′ do
2 mapping i to j ∈ V ′′ such that j = argmin
j
{Dij|j ∈ V ′′};
Based on our analysis, we give another simple implementation of π as shown
in Algorithm 3. Under π, each user in V ′ can be successfully de-anonymized with
probability 1 as n→∞. Therefore, Hπ(i) = 0 for ∀i ∈ V ′. It follows A(G′) = 0, i.e.,
all the users can be successfully de-anonymized by π with probability 1. 2
In Theorem 20, we analyzed the impacts of attributes (non-PII) on the anonymity/de-
anonymizability of SAG data under the A2 model. Based on our analysis, the at-
tributes may also significantly reduce the anonymity of SAG data, which is similar to
the graph structure (as shown in [61, 63, 113]). To make our analysis more practical,
we extend it to general scenarios in the following subsection.
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(a) n = 108, N = 104, q′ = q′′ = 0


















(b) n = 108, p′ = p′′ = 0.6, q′ = q′′ = 0



















(c) n = 108, N = 104, κ = 0.05














(d) n = 108, p′ = p′′ = 0.8, κ = 0.06
Figure 22: Numerical evaluation of A(G′).
5.3.2 Extension: Practical Scenarios
In the analysis under the A2 model, W ′ and W ′′ are two random subsets of W ,
which implies that ∀i ∈ V , A′i and A′′i are two random subsets of Ai. However, in
reality, it is possible that some attributes in Ai may not appear in A′i/A′′i or some
attributes in A \Ai may appear in A′i/A′′i . Therefore, in this subsection, we conduct
the attribute-based anonymity analysis for SAG data under a more general model.
Under the general model, ∀aij ∈ W , it is appeared inW ′ andW ′′ with probabilities
p′ and p′′ respectively, i.e., Pr(aij ∈ W ′|aij ∈ W ) = p′ and Pr(aij ∈ W ′′|aij ∈ W ) = p′′.
Furthermore, ∀aij /∈ W , it is appeared in W ′ and W ′′ with probabilities q′ and q′′
respectively, Pr(aij ∈ W ′|aij /∈ W ) = q′ and Pr(aij ∈ W ′′|aij /∈ W ) = q′′. Let
WU = {aij|i ∈ V, j ∈ A} be the universal set of all the possible user-attribute links.
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. Let κ = |W ||WU |
and define ζ = κ(p′(1 − p′′) + p′′(1 − p′)) + (1 − κ)(q′(1 − q′′) + q′′(1 − q′)), δ =
(κp′+(1−κ)q′)(κ(1−p′′)+(1−κ)(1−q′′))+(κ(1−p′)+(1−κ)(1−q′))(κp′′+(1−κ)q′′),
and ϖ = (δ−ζ)
2
8(δ+ζ)
. Then, we have the following theorem to quantify the impacts of
attributes on the achievable anonymity of G′.
Theorem 21. Let t be a natural number and t ∈ [1, n − 1]. Then, (i) if δ > ζ and
ϖ ≥ 2 lnn+t ln(n−1)−ln t!+1
Nt
, A(G′) = log t
logn




Proof: This theorem can be proven using similar techniques as in Theorem 20. 2
In Theorem 21, we show the achievable anonymity of G′ under a general statistical
model. From Theorem 21, the condition onϖ is similar to that of ϑ in Theorem 20. In
addition, Theorem 21 has one more constraint δ > ζ, which actually comes from the
fact that for i ∈ V , the attributes that do not appeare in Ai may appear in A′i and/or
A′′i . Similar to Theorem 20, Theorem 21 also implies that the attributes associated
with users (non-PII) may have significant impacts on the anonymity of SAG data.
5.3.3 Evaluation
In this subsection, we evaluate our attribute-based anonymity analysis both numeri-
cally and via experiments that leverage real world SAG datasets. Since there exists
randomness in our evaluations, we repeat each group of evaluations 100 times. The
results are the average of these 100 evaluations.
5.3.3.1 Numerical Evaluation
Since the analysis under the A2 model can be viewed as a special case of that under
the general model, our numerical evaluation follows the anonymity analysis under the
general model, i.e., Theorem 21. Furthermore, to simplify the evaluation process, we
set p′ = p′′ and q′ = q′′. Note that this setting does not limit our evaluation, and it
can be removed directly by considering more scenarios.
139
Table 10: Data statistics.
n m N M κ
GP1 4,693,129 47,130,325 991,545 3,644,103 7.83E-07
GP2 17,091,929 271,915,755 3,108,141 14,693,125 2.77E-07
GP3 26,244,659 410,445,770 4,147,389 19,344,382 1.78E-07
GP4 28,942,911 462,994,069 4,443,631 20,592,962 1.60E-07
GP5 107,614 13,673,453 19,044 387,261 1.89E-04
Facebook 4,039 88,234 1,283 37,257 7.19E-03
Twitter 81,306 1,768,149 216,839 1,245,234 7.06E-05
In our evaluation, we first randomly generate a SAG G with the specified n, N ,
and κ. Subsequently, we generate G′ and G′′ from G according to p′, p′′, q′, and q′′.
Finally, we evaluate A(G′) based on Theorem 21. The detailed parameter settings
are specified in each group of evaluations.
We show the evaluation results in Fig.22. We analyze the results as follows.
1. From Fig.22 (a), with the increase of κ, A(G′) decreases under different p′.
This is because a larger κ implies more attribute information is associated with
each user, statistically. Therefore, different users are more distinguishable with
respect to attributes, i.e., with a higher probability Dii ≤ Dij. Furthermore,
given κ, better anonymity is achieved when p′ is smaller, e.g., given κ = 0.02,
A(G′) = 0.361 when p′ = 0.7 while A(G′) = 0.038 when p′ = 0.95. This is
because a larger p′ implies more attributes can be preserved in G′ and G′′ (since
p′′ = p′), and thus it is more likely that Dii < Dij, i.e., a large p
′ implies more
anonymity loss, which is consistent with our theoretical analysis.
2. From Fig.22 (b), given n, p′, p′′, q′, and q′′, A(G′) decreases when κ increases
under different N . The reason is the same as in Fig.22 (a): a larger κ implies
a higher probability of Dii < Dij, i.e., more anonymity loss. In addition, given
κ, a larger N also implies more anonymity loss. For instance, given κ = 0.065,
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A(G′) = 0.932 when N = 103 while A(G′) = 0.113 when N = 104. This
is because when κ is fixed, a larger N also implies richer attributes associated
with each user and thus Dii < Dij happens with a higher probability, i.e., A(G′)
decreases.
3. Fig.22 (c) shows the impacts of q′ (q′′) on A(G′). From Fig.22 (c), when q′
increases, A(G′) increases under different p′. This is because q′ indicates the
percentage of fake user-attribute relationships being added to G′ and G′′ (q′′ =
q′). A larger q′ implies more link noise has been added to W ′ and W ′′ and
thus a lower probability of Dii < Dij has been induced, followed by the increase
of A(G′). Furthermore, given q′, a smaller p′ implies more anonymity can be
achieved. The reason is the same as analyzed before: a smaller p′ implies less
common attributes are shared between G′ and G′′. Hence, better anonymity
can be achieved by G′.
4. In Fig.22 (d), we examine the impacts of q′ and N on A(G′). Again, when
q′ increases, A(G′) also increases under different N . Additionally, given q′, a
larger N implies more anonymity loss. The reason is also the same as before. A
larger N implies more attribute information is available for each user followed
by less achievable anonymity according to our theoretical analysis.
5.3.3.2 Real World Data-based Evaluation
Now, we evaluate our attribute-based anonymity analysis leveraging real world SAG
datasets.
Datasets. The employed SAG datasets include five Google Plus (GP) datasets,
denoted by GPk (1 ≤ k ≤ 5) respectively [15, 16, 49], one Facebook dataset [16], and
one Twitter dataset [16] as shown in Table 10, where n = |V | (the number of users),
m = |E| (the number of user-user links), N = |A| (the number of attributes), M =
|W | (the number of user-attribute links), and κ = M
n·N (the connectivity between users
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(a) q′ = q′′ = 0


















(b) q′ = q′′ = 0













(c) p′ = p′′ = 0.8

















(d) p′ = p′′ = 0.8
Figure 23: Evaluation of A(G′) leveraging on real data.
and attributes). All the SAG datasets include both the graph structure information
and the attribute information (non-PII) associated with users. We introduce the
datasets as follows.
• GP is a social networking service launched in June 2011. It is designed to be a
place to connect with friends and family. GP1, GP2, GP3, and GP4 are four GP
datasets crawled in July 2011, August 2011, September 2011, and October 2011,
respectively [15, 49]. In addition to the social relationship information, there
is also attribute information in the four GP datasets, e.g., gender, affiliation
information, education, city. They are available under application. GP5 is an-
other GP dataset which is publicly available at [16]. The attribute information
in GP5 includes education, hometown, language, etc.
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• Facebook is one of the most popular social networking services in the world. It
is designed as a social utility that connects people with friends and others who
work, study, and live around them. The employed Facebook dataset is publicly
available at [16]. The attribute information in Facebook includes birthday,
education, location, employer, etc.
• Twitter is also a popular online social networking service that enables users to
send and read short messages named tweets. The employed Twitter dataset
is publicly available at [16]. The attribute information in the Twitter dataset
includes interests, cities, sports, websites, etc.
Results and Analysis. When conducting real world SAG data based evaluation,
we first generate G′ and G′′ from each dataset according to the specified p′, p′′, q′,
and q′′. Then, we evaluate the anonymity of G′ following our analysis in Theorem
21. The evaluation results are shown in Fig.23, where the parameters are specified in
each group of simulations. We analyze Fig.23 as follows:
1. In Fig.23 (a) and (b), we show the impacts of p′ on the achievable anonymity of
each dataset, from which we can see that with the increase of p′, the anonymity
of each dataset decreases. For instance, when p′ is increased from 0.6 to 0.8,
A(Facebook) is decreased from 0.826 to 0.381. The reason is similar to that
in the numerical evaluation. A larger p′ implies more attribute information is
preserved in G′ and G′′. This further implies that the probability of Dii < Dij
increases, followed by the decrease of the anonymity. From Fig.23 (a) and (b),
we can also see that the anonymity of GP1, GP2, GP3, and GP4 are higher
than that of GP5, Facebook, and Twitter, e.g., when p′ = 0.85, A(GP1) =
0.964 while A(Twitter) = 0.145. The main reason is that the connectivity of
GPk (1 ≤ k ≤ 4) is much smaller than that of GP5, Facebook, and Twitter.
Therefore, GPk (1 ≤ k ≤ 4) can achieve better anonymity, which is consistent
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with our analysis.
2. Fig.23 (c) and (d) show the impacts of q′, which is defined as q′ = k · qe =
k · (1−p
′)M
|nN−M | (1 ≤ k ≤ 40)
1, on the anonymity of the seven datasets. From
Fig.23 (c) and (d), the anonymity of each dataset increases with the increase
of q′, e.g., when q′ is increased from 5qe to 35qe, the anonymity of Facebook
is increased from 0.482 to 0.785. The reason is that when q′ increases, more
fake user-attribute links (noise links) will be added to G′ and G′′. Then, the
probability of Dii < Dij is decreased, followed by the increase of the anonymity,
which is consistent with our analysis.
5.3.4 Discussion
From Section 5.1, structure-based de-anonymizability analysis for graph data has
been conducted in [61, 63, 69, 113, 151]. In this chapter, for the first time, we study
the impacts of attributes (non-PII) on the anonymity of graph data both theoret-
ically and experimentally. Based on our analysis and evaluation results, we find
that the attribute information associated with users may significantly reduce graph
data anonymity. Therefore, our study together with existing structure-based de-
anonymiability quantification research provides a much more complete understanding
on the anonymity of graph data.
5.4 De-anonymization
In this section, we present a new DA framework, namely De-SAG, which consider-
s both the graph structure and the attributes associated with users. Since graph
structure-based DA has been well studied, we design De-SAG on top of existing
structure-based DA attacks. Therefore, De-SAG can be considered as an enhanced
1Here, we set q′ in terms of p′. This is because we do not want to add too many fake user-attribute
links in G′ and G′′ compared to the number of removed real user-attribute links. Otherwise, the








Figure 24: User-based DA and set-based DA.
version of existing DA attacks. To facilitate our design, we define a new notation
V ′′i,t for i ∈ V ′, which denotes the t-most similar users of i in V ′′ with respect to
attributes. Evidently, V ′′i,t can be obtained using the same technique as in Algorithm
2 (i.e., let V ′′i,t = {jk|k = 1, 2, · · · , t}). Let Dmax = max{Dij|i ∈ V ′, j ∈ V ′′} be
the maximum AD between any user in V ′ and any user in V ′′. Then, we define the




With respect to the DA process, existing structure-based DA attacks can be classified
as user-based DA schemes, e.g., [69, 104, 108, 151], and set-based DA schemes, e.g.,
[63, 64, 127] (the detailed explanations are given later). Since De-SAG is proposed on
top of existing DA attacks, we present two implementations of the De-SAG framework
based on the two classes of DA schemes.
5.4.1.1 User-based De-SAG
In user-based DA schemes [69, 104, 108, 151], as shown in Fig.24 (a), during each DA
iteration, one anonymized user i in V ′ is selected based on some criteria (e.g., hav-
ing the maximum degree, having the most number neighbors being de-anonymized,
having the most number of seed neighbors). Then, i is mapped (de-anonymized) to
some user in V ′′ according to the proposed DA technique and the next DA iteration
is started.
To enhance existing user-based DA attacks, we present an implementation of the
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Algorithm 4: User-based De-SAG
1 while V ′ ̸= ∅ do
2 select i from V ′ as the user for DA according to the criteria in
[69, 104, 108, 151];
3 map i to some user j in V ′′i,t according to the enhanced structure-based DA
technique in [69, 104, 108, 151], i.e., taking the attribute similarity as an
extra mapping feature;
4 V ′ = V ′ \ {i};
5 V ′′ = V ′′ \ {j};
user-based version of De-SAG as shown in Algorithm 4. From Algorithm 4, De-SAG
basically follows the same process of existing user-based DA attacks. The primary
improvements are (i) when de-anonymizing i ∈ V ′, instead of considering all the users
in V ′′ as candidates, we select the t-most-similar users of i with respect to attributes
from V ′′ as candidate mappings. Here, t is a pre-defined parameter which controls
the trade-off between DA accuracy and efficiency (a theoretically optimal t can be
approximately estimated based on our anonymity analysis in Section 5.32); and (ii) i
is de-anonymized to one of the t-most similar users according to an enhanced version
of existing structure-based DA attacks. In existing attacks, i is mapped to some
user j in V ′′ according to the similarity of i and j’s structural features, e.g., degree,
betweenness centrality, closeness centrality [69, 104, 108, 151]. In the enhanced version
of existing attacks, De-SAG takes the attribute similarity as an extra mapping feature.
Let O(T ) and O(S) be the time and space complexities of the enhanced user-
based DA scheme in Algorithm 4, respectively. Then, the time complexity of De-
SAG in Algorithm 4 is upper bounded by O(n2 log n + T ) since the candidate set
size is reduced (the O(n2 log n) time complexity is used to compute V ′′i,t). The actual
2To estimate the theoretically optimal t, we first specify a temporary mapping from V ′ to V ′′.
For instance, we can simply mapping V ′ to V ′′ according to the users’ degree sequence: sorting
the users in V ′ and V ′′ according to the degree non-increasing order and denoting the obtained
user sequences as < i1, i2, · · · , in > and < j1, j2, · · · , jn >, respectively; and mapping ik to jk for
1 ≤ k ≤ n. Second, we estimate G as G = (V = V ′ = V ′′, E = E′ ∪ E′′, A,W = W ′ ∪W ′′). Third,
we estimate p, p′, and p′′ based on G, G′, and G′′. Fourth, we can estimate ϑ in terms of p, p′, and
p′′. Finally, we estimate t as t = argmin
t
ϑ ≥ 2 lnn+t ln(n−1)−ln t!+1Nt .
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time complexity of De-SAG depends on the particular enhanced structure-based DA
attack. The space complexity of De-SAG is also O(S), i.e., De-SAG does not increase
the space complexity of the enhanced scheme.
5.4.1.2 Set-based De-SAG
In set-based DA schemes [63, 64, 127], as shown in Fig.24 (b), during each DA it-
eration, a subset of un-de-anonymized users Ṽ ′ is selected from V ′ and a subset of
auxiliary users Ṽ ′′ is selected from V ′′, respectively. Subsequently, a complete weight-
ed bipartite graph G̃ = (Ṽ , Ẽ) with Ṽ = Ṽ ′ ∪ Ṽ ′′ and Ẽ = {lij|i ∈ Ṽ ′, j ∈ Ṽ ′′} is
constructed, where the weight of each link lij, denoted by w(lij), is determined ac-
cording to the proposed DA techniques (usually, the weight of link lij measures how
structurally similar i and j are and a larger weight means they are more structurally
similar) [63, 64, 127]. After constructing G̃, the DA problem reduces to a Maximum
Weighted Bipartite graph Matching problem (MWBM) on G̃. Finally, by addressing
the MWBM problem on G̃ (e.g., using the Hungarian algorithm), a mapping from Ṽ ′
to Ṽ ′′ can be determined and the next DA iteration is started.
Algorithm 5: Set-based De-SAG
1 while V ′ ̸= ∅ do
2 determine Ṽ ′ ⊆ V ′ according to the criteria in [63, 64, 127];
3 determine Ṽ ′′ ⊆ V ′′ according to the criteria in [63, 64, 127];
4 for i ∈ Ṽ ′ do
5 Ṽ ′′i,t ← V ′′i,t ∩ Ṽ ′′;
6 construct a bipartite graph G̃ = (Ṽ ′ ∪ Ṽ ′′, Ẽ), where
Ẽ = {lij|i ∈ Ṽ ′, j ∈ Ṽ ′′i,t};
7 for lij ∈ Ẽ do
8 determine w(lij) according to the technique in [63, 64, 127];
9 wa ← 1− DijDmax ;
10 w(lij)← c · w(lij) + (1− c) · wa;
11 de-anonymize Ṽ ′ based on G̃ using the technique in [63, 64, 127];
12 subtract the de-anonymized users from V ′ and V ′′, respectively;
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To enhance the set-based DA schemes [63, 64, 127], we present a set-based im-
plementation of De-SAG as shown in Algorithm 5, where wa denotes the attribute
similarity of i ∈ V ′ and j ∈ Ṽ ′′i,t, and c ∈ [0, 1] is a pre-defined constant value. From
Algorithm 5, De-SAG basically follows a similar process as existing set-based DA at-
tacks. During each DA iteration, it improves existing schemes by further leveraging
the attribute information. Specifically, De-SAG enhances existing set-based DA at-
tacks in two perspectives. First, instead of constructing a complete bipartite graph, it
reduces the number of links in G̃ by setting Ẽ = {lij|i ∈ Ṽ ′, j ∈ Ṽ ′′i,t}. Second, it resets
the weight associated with each link by taking account of the attribute similarity of
two users (using w(lij)← c ·w(lij) + (1− c) ·wa). Leveraging the two enhancements,
(i) the computational complexity of existing set-based DA schemes can be reduced
(since the mapping problem now is addressed on a non-complete bipartite graph);
and (ii) the performance of existing set-based DA attacks can be improved (since the
attribute similarity is used to enhance the DA process).
Let O(T ) and O(S) be the time and space complexities of the enhanced set-based
DA scheme in Algorithm 5, respectively. Then, similar to Algorithm 4, the time
complexity of De-SAG in Algorithm 5 is upper bounded by O(n2 log n + T ) and the
space complexity of De-SAG is also O(S). Again, the actual time complexity of
De-SAG depends on the particular enhanced structure-based DA attack.
5.4.2 Evaluation
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of De-SAG and compare it with
state-of-the-art structure-based DA attacks.
5.4.2.1 Evaluation Setting
Since De-SAG has two implementations depending on the enhanced structure-based
DA attacks, we compare De-SAG with the latest user-based DA scheme proposed
in [69], denoted by VLDB14, and the latest set-based DA scheme proposed in [63],
148

































































































































Figure 25: De-SAG Evaluation (vs p′). Default setting: q′ = q′′ = 0 and c = 0.5.
denoted by CCS14.
To conduct the evaluation, we employ three SAG datasets from Table 10: G-
P5, Facebook, and Twitter, and follow the following methodology. First, given a
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Figure 26: De-SAG evaluation (vs q′). Default setting: p′ = p′′ = 0.8 and c = 0.5.
raw dataset G = (V,E,A,W ) (i.e., GP5, Facebook, and Twitter here), we ob-
tain the anonymized graph G′ = (V ′, E ′, A′,W ′) and the auxiliary graph G′′ =
(V ′′, E ′′, A′′,W ′′) according to the parameter setting of each group of evaluations.
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When constructing (V ′, E ′) and (V ′′, E ′′) from G, we employ the same technique as
in [63, 69] for fairness and accuracy. Specifically, we let V ′ = V ′′ = V and E ′ and
E ′′ are random subsets of E with each link in E appearing in E ′/E ′′ with probability
s, i.e., Pr(lij ∈ E ′|lij ∈ E) = Pr(lij ∈ E ′′|lij ∈ E) = s. For A′ and A′′, we assume
A′ = A′′ = A according to our model. We also determine W ′ and W ′′ according
to our data model. Specifically, similar to the evaluation setting of our theoretical
anonymity analysis, we set Pr(aij ∈ W ′|aij ∈ W ) = p′ = Pr(aij ∈ W ′′|aij ∈ W ) = p′′
and Pr(aij ∈ W ′|aij /∈ W ) = q′ = Pr(aij ∈ W ′′|aij /∈ W ) = q′′. Second, we employ
VLDB14, CCS14, and De-SAG to de-anonymize G′ leveraging G′′, respectively. The
successful DA rate of each DA algorithm is defined as χ(·) = nc
n
, where nc is the
number of users that have been successfully de-anonymized and n = |V | is the total
number of users in an anonynized dataset.
As summarized in Section 2, VLDB14 is a seed-based attack and CCS14 is a
seed-free attack. Therefore, in our evaluation, we feed VLDB14 50 seed mappings,
which are the top-50 users in G with respect to node degree. For other parameters,
we specify them in each group of evaluations.
5.4.2.2 Results
In Fig.25, we show the impacts of p′ on the performance of VLDB14, CCS14, and
De-SAG when de-anonymizing GP5, Facebook, and Twitter. Specifically, we show
the change of χ(De-SAG)
χ(VLDB14)
with respect to the increase of p′ in Fig.25 (a)-(c) and the
change of χ(De-SAG)
χ(CCS14)
with respect to the increase of p′ in Fig.25 (d)-(f), respectively.
We analyze Fig.25 as follows.




increase under different s. This
is because when p′ increases, more attribute information appears in both the
anonymized graph and the auxiliary graph, i.e., the users in G′ and G′′ have
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more common attributes (which implies that the users in G′ and G′′ have bet-
ter attribute similarity in Algorithms 4 and 5). Then, χ(De-SAG) increases





. Note that this result is also consistent with our the-
oretical analysis and experimental evaluation in Section 5.3: the increase of p′
implies the decrease of the anonymity of G′.
2. When de-anonymizing GP5, Facebook, and Twitter, on average, the success-
ful DA rate of De-SAG is 1.63, 4.63, and 2.75 times of that of VLDB14 re-
spectively, and is 1.94, 7.79, and 1.53 times of that of CCS14 respectively.
This demonstrates that the attribute information is very powerful in enhanc-
ing existing structure-based DA attacks, which further confirms our attribute-
based anonymity analysis (the attribute information can significantly reduce
the anonymity SAG data).
3. In most of the scenarios, De-SAG leads to more improvements compared to
VLDB14 and CCS14 for smaller s than larger s. For instance, when de-
anonymizing Facebook employing De-SAG and VLDB14 (Fig.25 (b)), on av-
erage, χ(De-SAG)
χ(VLDB14)
= 5.42 when s = 0.7, χ(De-SAG)
χ(VLDB14)
= 4.65 when s = 0.8, and
χ(De-SAG)
χ(VLDB14)
= 3.82 when s = 0.9; and when de-anonymizing Twitter employing
De-SAG and CCS14 (Fig.25 (f)), on average, χ(De-SAG)
χ(CCS14)
= 1.64 when s = 0.7,
χ(De-SAG)
χ(CCS14)
= 1.54 when s = 0.8, and χ(De-SAG)
χ(CCS14)
= 1.41 when s = 0.9. This is
because a small s implies that less links in E appeare in E ′ and E ′′, followed
by less structural similarity between G′ and G′′. Therefore, the structure-based
DA attacks VLDB14 and CCS14 will have a performance degradation. On the
other hand, the attributes associated with users can provide relatively more
useful information for successful DA.
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Leveraging GP5, Facebook, and Twitter, we show the impacts of q′ on the perfor-
mance of VLDB14, CCS14, and De-SAG in Fig.26, where q′ is defined as q′ = k · qe
(k = 2, · · · , 10, and qe = (1−p
′)M
|nN−M | which is the same as in Section 5.3). Specifically,
the impacts of q′ on χ(De-SAG)
χ(VLDB14)
are shown in Fig.26 (a)-(c), and the impacts of q′ on
χ(De-SAG)
χ(CCS14)
are shown in Fig.26 (d)-(f), respectively. We analyze the results in Fig.26
as follows.




decrease under different s. For
instance, when de-anonymizing GP5 employing De-SAG and VLDB14 in the
case of s = 0.7 (Fig.26 (a)), χ(De-SAG)
χ(VLDB14)
is decreased from 1.49 to 1.34 when q′ is
increased from 2qe to 10qe; and when de-anonymizaing GP5 employing De-SAG
and CCS14 in the case of s = 0.7 (Fig.26 (d)), χ(De-SAG)
χ(CCS14)
is decreased from 2.15
to 2.11 when q′ is increased from 2qe to 10qe. This is because, as indicated in
Section 5.3, with the increase of q′, more fake user-attribute links will be added
to G′ and G′′, and thus the benefit of employing the attribute information for




decrease. This is consistent with our analysis and evaluation in
Section 5.3.
2. As in Fig.25, when de-anonymizing GP5, Facebook, and Twitter, on average,
the successful DA rate of De-SAG is 1.33, 6.46, and 2.77 times of that of VLDB14
respectively, and is 1.99, 9.41, and 1.57 times of that of CCS14 respectively. This
demonstrates that De-SAG can significantly improve existing structure-based
DA attacks by taking account both the structure and the attribute information.
3. Given q′, similar to that in Fig.25, the improvements of De-SAG over VLD-
B14/CCS14 is higher for smaller s in most of the scenarios. For instance, when
de-anonymizing Facebook (Fig.26 (b) and (e)), on average, χ(De-SAG)
χ(VLDB14)
= 7.06
when s = 0.7, χ(De-SAG)
χ(VLDB14)




s = 0.9; and χ(De-SAG)
χ(CCS14)
= 10.1 when s = 0.7, χ(De-SAG)
χ(CCS14)
= 9.8 when s = 0.8, and
χ(De-SAG)
χ(CCS14)
= 8.33 when s = 0.9. Again, this is due to the fact that the attributes
associated with users can relatively provide more information for DA when less
structural information is available.
5.4.3 Discussion
Based on our analysis and the evaluation results, De-SAG can significantly improve
the performance of existing structure-based DA attacks by taking account both struc-
ture and attribute information. Therefore, in graph data sharing/publishing research,
it is also important to protect the user-attribute relationships in addition to protect-
ing the graph structure. However, to the best of our knowledge, most, if not all, of the
existing graph anonymization techniques only consider to anonymize graph structure
[97, 122, 159]. Hence, we plan to conduct SAG data anonymization research in the
future by considering both the graph structure and the user-attribute relationships.
Our attribute-based anonymity analysis and evaluation are expected to shed light on
such research.
5.5 Chapter Summarization
In this chapter, we study the impacts of the attribute information (non-PII) on the
privacy of SAG data both theoretically and experimentally. First, we conduct an
attribute-based anonymity analysis for SAG data. By careful quantification, we ex-
plicitly obtain the correlation between the graph anonymity and the associated at-
tribute information. Through numerical and real world data-based evaluations, we
validate our analysis and show that the attribute information may cause significan-
t graph anonymity loss. Subsequently, according to our attribute-based anonymity
analysis, we propose a novel DA framework, namely De-SAG, to graph data, which
takes account both graph structure and attribute information. By extensive eval-
uation, we demonstrate that De-SAG can significantly improve the performance of
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state-of-the-art DA attacks. Our attribute-based anonymity analysis and DA frame-
work are expected to fill the gap in understanding the actual privacy vulnerability of







Several graph anonymization, De-Anonymization (DA), and DA quantification tech-
niques have been proposed. However, there are still some important yet open prob-
lems in this area, such as: is there correlation between the anonymity, utility, and
de-anonymity of graph data? if the correlation exists, how can it be quantified? what
is the performance of state-of-the-art anonymization and DA techniques and is there
room for improvement? Understanding these open problems are important for users
and researchers. On one hand, it can help users and researchers understand how much
utility is preserved after applying an anonymization scheme, what is the achievable
data anonymity, what is the achievable de-anonymity given an auxiliary graph, as well
as the correlation between anonymity, utility, and de-anonymity. On the other hand,
it can also help users and researchers evaluate the performance of state-of-the-art
anonymization and DA techniques compared to the achievable theoretical anonymity
and de-anonymity.
To address the aforementioned problems, in this chapter, we quantify and evaluate
the Anonymity-Utility-De-anonymity (AUD) for graph data under both the mathe-
matical Erdős-Rényi (ER) model and a general data model. We also apply our AUD
quantification to evaluate the performance of state-of-the-art anonymization and DA
techniques. Specifically, our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We introduce three metrics to measure the anonymity, utility, and de-anonymity
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of anonymized graph data, respectively. Based on these metrics, we conduct a
comprehensive quantification of the correlation of graph anonymity, utility, and
de-anonymity under both the mathematical ER model and a general data model.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on quantifying the AUD
correlation of graph data and providing close-forms to explicitly demonstrate
such correlation.
• Based on our correlation quantification, we conduct a large scale evaluation on
the AUD of real world graph data leveraging 12 datasets that are generated
from various computer systems and services. Our results demonstrate that the
achievable anonymity/de-anonymity of graph data depends on multiple factors,
e.g., the utility carried by the data, the quality of the employed auxiliary data.
• Based on our AUD quantification, we evaluate the performance of state-of-the-
art anonymization and DA techniques. Interestingly, we find that there is still
a significant room for state-of-the-art DA techniques to be improved. More
importantly, for the first time, our results also explicitly and quantitatively in-
dicate the improvement room. For instance, when using the latest seed-free DA
attack ODA ([63], Chapter 3) to de-anonymize a Facebook dataset (64K users,
0.82M edges) that is anonymized by the state-of-the-art DP-based anonymiza-
tion technique [118, 122], our evaluation shows that more than 83.4% theoret-
ically de-anonymizable users cannot be correctly de-anonymized by ODA, i.e.,
ODA can be significantly improved.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we provide the
system model. We conduct the AUD correlation quantification under the ER model
and a general model in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, respectively. In Section 6.5, we evaluate
the AUD of real world graph data. In Section 6.6, we conduct the AUD quantification
based evaluation of the performance of existing anonymization and DA techniques.
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We conclude this chapter in Section 6.7.
6.2 System Model and Definitions
In this section, we provide the system model and the formal definitions of utility,
de-anonymity, and anonymity.
6.2.1 Utility
First, we model the raw data (e.g., social network data, email networks, contact
graphs) for sharing/publishing by a graph Gr = (V r, Er), where V r = {1, 2, · · · } and
Er = {ei,j|i, j ∈ V r} characterize the set of users and the set of relationships among
users in the dataset respectively. Let |V r| = n, i.e., the number of users is n. When
sharing/publishing Gr, it is first anonymized by an arbitrary anonymization technique
denoted by Π. Let Ga = (V a, Ea) = Π(Gr) be the anonymized graph. Without loss
of generality, we assume V a = V r (this is consistent with existing anonymization
techniques [38, 53, 88, 97, 118, 122, 131, 142, 152, 158, 160]).
As shown in [38, 53, 88, 118, 122, 131, 142, 152, 158, 160], the utility of Ga can
be measured by many perspectives, e.g., degree distribution, joint degree distribution,
cluster coefficient, network resilience, application-based utilities, etc. These metrics
demonstrate the utility of the data from different perspectives. However, a general
metric does not exist. On the other hand, we notice that existing utility metrics
depend highly on how structurally/topologically similar Gr and Ga are. Therefore,
we define an edge-based general utility metric µ. The objectives of defining µ are the
following: consistent with existing utility metrics ; sufficiently general to characterize
the correlation between the raw and anonymized graphs ; and mathematically tractable
when quantifying the correlation of anonymity, utility, and de-anonymity. For Ga =
Π(Gr), it is defined as
µ(Ga) =




where |·| is the cardinality of a set, EU is the universal set of all the possible edges that
can be formed among users in V r, Ea = EU \Ea = {ei,j|ei,j /∈ Ea}, and Er = EU \Er.
To be more accurate, we further define µ1 =
|Ea∩Er|







Therefore, when µ1 = µ0, we have µ(G
a) = µ1 = µ0. From the definition of µ(G
a), it
measures the degree of Ga on preserving the structure (both the existing and the non-
existing relationships) of Gr. We further experimentally demonstrate the performance
of µΠ in Section 6.5.
6.2.2 De-anonymity
To de-anonymize Ga, as in [61, 63, 104, 108, 127], we assume an auxiliary graph Gu =
(V u, Eu) is available to the adversary. In reality, Gu can be obtained through multiple
means, e.g., online crawling, data mining and aggregation, government publishing,
third-party applications [63, 104, 108, 127]. Without loss of generality, we assume
V u = V r = V a = V (this is a common assumption in existing analysis [61, 63, 69,
113]). When V u ̸= V a, we can (i) either apply our analysis to the overlap users of
V a and V u, or (ii) simply redefine V a = V a ∪ (V u \ V a) and V u = V u ∪ (V a \ V u)
without changing Ea or Eu. Since Gu and Gr/Ga characterize the relationship of a
same group of users, it is reasonable to assume Gu and Gr/Ga are correlated with
each other. For instance, let Gr be an email network and Gu be an auxiliary Google+
graph of the same user set V . Then, for two users Alice and Bob in V , if they have
a connection in Gr, they are also more likely to have a connection in Google+. To
characterize this correlation between Gr and Gu, we statistically define
Pr(ei,j ∈ Eu|ei,j ∈ Er) = τ, (170)
and
Pr(ei,j ∈ Eu|ei,j /∈ Er) = γ, (171)
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i.e., statistically, an edge appearers in Gu with probability τ when it is also appeared
in Gr while with probability γ when it does not appear in Gr.
To be consistent with existing work [61, 63, 69, 113], we mathematically define a
DA attack as a mapping
σ : V a → V u. (172)
Specifically, σ := {(i, σ(i))|i ∈ V a, σ(i) ∈ V u}. To simplify the discussion, a mapping
(i, σ(i)) is correct when i = σ(i) and incorrect otherwise. Given σ, let ω be the
number of incorrect mappings in σ. Then, the ratio of successfully de-anonymized





Let S be the set of all the possible DA schemes. Since |V u| = |V a| = n, evidently, we
have n! possible mappings from V a to V u, i.e., |S| = n!. The de-anonymity of Ga is
defined as
β(Ga) = max{βσ|σ ∈ S}. (174)
From the definition, the de-anonymity of Ga is measured by the maximum ratio of
users that can be successfully de-anonymized. Intuitively, for an anonymized graph
Ga, its practical de-anonymity depends on multiple factors, e.g., the correlation be-
tween the anonymized graph and the auxiliary graph. Therefore, it is difficult, if not
possible, to derive the exact β(Ga) for an arbitrary Ga. A practical quantification
would seek to understand the de-anonymity of Ga relative to the utility carried by
Ga. Toward this objective, we quantify the the lower bound of the de-anonymity of
Ga given the utility of Ga and an auxiliary graph in our AUD quantification.
6.2.3 Anonymity
We employ an information theoretical approach to define the anonymity of Gr/Ga
given Π and σ, which is similar to that in [108]. For a user i ∈ V a and ∀j ∈ V u, let
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pi,j be the probability of the event that i is mapped to (de-anonymized as) j in a DA
scheme σ (i.e., (i, j) ∈ σ) and this mapping is a correct DA, i.e., j = σ(i) (i and j
correspond to the same user). For instance, if σ randomly and uniformly maps each




Based on the definition of pi,j, we define PΠ,σ(i) = {pi,j|j ∈ V u} to be the mapping
probability distribution of i under σ. Then, using information theory, the uncertainty




pi,j log pi,j. (175)
Evidently, when PΠ,σ(i) = {pi,j = 1n |j ∈ V
u} (i is mapped to any user in V u randomly
and uniformly), i.e., the successful DA probability of i is pi,j =
1
n
for ∀j ∈ V u under
Π, H(i) reaches its maximum value log n. In this scenario, an anonymization scheme
Π is optimal from the perspective of protecting the privacy of i. On the other hand,
if PΠ,σ(i) = {pi,1 = 0, · · · , pi,i−1 = 0, pi,i = 1, pi,i+1 = 0, · · · , pi,n = 0}, i.e., the
probability that i is successfully de-anonymized is 1, H(i) reaches its minimum value
0. In this scenario, Π cannot protect the anonymity/privacy of i at all, i.e., the DA
scheme σ can successfully break the privacy of i.
Based on H(i), we can quantify the uncertainty of de-anonymizing Ga, denoted








a) be the maximum entropy that Ga can be achieved. Since max{H(i)} =
log n, we have
Hmax(G
a) = log n. (177)
Here, if H(Ga) = Hmax(G
a) = log n, Ga achieves the optimal anonymity. Then, the
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which measures how optimal Ga is on achieving uncertainty. Specifically, α(Ga) ∈
[0, 1], where 1 implies Ga achieves the best anonymity while 0 implies no anonymity
at all.
From the anonymity definition, it is measured by the uncertainty of the process of
de-anonymizing Ga. When studying the AUD correlation, our objective is to quantify
the upper bound of the achievable α(Ga) relative to the utility preserved in Ga and
the available auxiliary graph Gu.
In the remainder of this chapter, we use µ = µ(Ga), β = β(Ga), and α = α(Ga)
for convenience of discussion. In addition, for the lowercase parameter x, we define
x = 1− x, e.g., when x = µ, x = µ = 1− µ.
6.3 AUD Quantification: ER Model
In this section, we quantify the AUD of graph data under the Erdős-Rényi (ER)
model. We extend our quantification to the general scenario in the next section.
6.3.1 Preliminaries
Suppose Gr follows the ER model G(n, p), i.e., there are n users in Gr and ∀i, j ∈
V r, the edge ei,j appeares in E
r with probability p (Pr(ei,j ∈ Er) = p). When
sharing/publishing Gr, it is first anonymized by an arbitrary anonymization scheme
Π and the obtained anonymized graph is Ga. ∀i ∈ V a, its neighborhood is defined as
Nai = {j|∃ei,j ∈ Ea}. Similarly, ∀i ∈ V u, we define Nui = {j|∃ei,j ∈ Eu}.
Given σ : V a → V u, to measure the quality of the mapping (i, j) ∈ σ, similarly as




{σ(v)}) \Nuj |+ |(
∪
v∈Nju
{σ−1(v)}) \Nai |, (179)
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i.e., ∆σ:(i,j) counts the neighborhood difference of i ∈ V a and j ∈ V u under σ. Then,






We quantify the AUD of an anonymized graph in this subsection. First, we quantify
the NDF of a given σ. Given Π, Ga, Gu, and σ, let µ be the utility of Ga, qc(µ) =
pµ1τ+p·µ0 ·γ+pµ1τ+pµ0γ, and qi,c(µ) = (pµ1+p·µ0)(pτ+p·γ)+(pµ1+pµ0)(pτ+pγ).
Then, we show the NDF of σ in Lemma 2.














where B(·, ·) denotes a binomial variable.
Proof: To facilitate our analysis, we denote the correctly and incorrectly de-
anonymized users by Vc and Vω, respectively. Furthermore, let Ec, Eω, and Ec,ω
be all the possible edges among the users in Vc, among the users in Vω, and between
the users in Vc and Vω, respectively. Hence, |Vc| = n− ω and |Vω| = ω.
To quantify ∆σ, we employ an edge-based quantification technique. Specifically,
we consider the following three cases.
Case 1: ei,j ∈ Ec. In this case, ei,j causes a Neighborhood Difference (ND) when
it appears in one graph (Ga/Gu) while not in the other one (Gu/Ga). Specifically,
the probability of causing this ND is
pµ1τ + p · µ0 · γ + pµ1τ + pµ0γ = qc(µ). (182)






Case 2: ei,j ∈ Ec,ω. In this case, ei,j is an edge connecting a correctly de-
anonymized user (suppose it is i) and an incorrectly de-anonymized user (suppose
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it is j). Hence, ei,j will cause a ND if only one of ei,j and ei,σ(i). Let qi,c denote the
probability that ei,j causes a ND. Then,
(pµ1 + p · µ0)(pτ + p · γ) + (pµ1 + pµ0)(pτ + pγ) = qi,c(µ). (183)
Therefore, the NDs caused by the edges in Ec,ω is also a binomial variable B(ω(n −
ω), qi,c(µ)).
Case 3: ei,j ∈ Eω. In this case, ei,j connects two incorrectly de-anonymized users
i and j. We further partition the edges in Eω into two subcases. First, under σ, if
σ(i) = j and σ(j) = i, then ei,j is a transposition edge. In this subcase, ei,j causes
a ND with probability qc(µ). Furthermore, the number of transposition edges in Eω
is at most ω/2. In this second subcase, ei,j is called a non-transposition edge and it
causes a ND with probability qi,c(µ). Therefore, the NDs caused by the edges in Eω





− t, qi,c(µ)), where t is the
number of transposition edges in Ec,ω and t ≤ ω/2.






































Based on Lemma 2, we can quantify the correlation of the utility, anonymity, and
de-anonymity of an anonymized graph as shown in Theorem 22.
Theorem 22. Let f(µ) =
(qi,c(µ)−qc(µ))2
8(qi,c(µ)+qc(µ))
be a utility function depending on the utility
of Ga and ω be the number of possibly incorrectly de-anonymized users in a DA













Proof: (i) First, we prove the first conclusion. Let S′ be the set of all the possible
DA schemes from V a to V u (including the scheme that correctly de-anonymizes all
the users in V a). Evidently, |S′| = n!, which is countable and enumerable. Therefore,
to prove our conclusion, it is sufficient to prove that given µ, we can find a DA scheme
σ ∈ S′ such that at most ω users are incorrectly de-anonymized under σ.
Let σ be the scheme in S′ such that σ induces the least NDF, i.e., ∆σ = min{∆ℑ|ℑ ∈
S′}. Intuitively, σ can be found in S′ in finite time by a brute-force searching algorith-
m, and thus σ is a deterministic DA scheme. In addition, let σ∗ ∈ S be the optimal
DA scheme such that all the users are correctly de-anonymized (note that, we do not
actually know which scheme is σ∗ in S′ till now although it exists). Furthermore, let
σ′ ∈ S be another scheme such that ω (ω ∈ [2, n]) users are incorrectly de-anonymized.





































+ ω(n− ω), qi,c(µ)). (193)
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Further, let λX and λY be the expectation values of X and Y , respectively. Since
qi,c(µ) > qc(µ), λY > λX . Hence, according to the Pedarsani-Grossglauser Lemma
[113],
Pr(∆σ∗ ≥ ∆σ′) (194)
= Pr(λX ≥ λY ) (195)


















+ ω(n− ω)) · f(µ)) (198)




Then, according to the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, Pr(∆σ∗ ≥ ∆σ′) →
n→ ∞
0, i.e., Pr(∆σ∗ <
∆σ′) →
n→ ∞
1. Furthermore, considering that ∆σ = min{∆ℑ|ℑ ∈ S′} and σ∗ ∈ S′, we
have ∆σ ≤ ∆σ∗ < ∆σ′ . Therefore, we conclude that the DA scheme σ has at most ω
incorrect mappings. It follows that β ≥ βσ = Ω(n−ωn ).
(ii) Now, we prove the second conclusion. From the proof of the first conclusion,
given Gu and σ, at least n − ω users can be successfully de-anonymized. Let V ac
be the set of users that are successfully de-anonymized under σ and V uc = {σ(i) ∈
V u|i ∈ V ac }. Then, we determine the mapping probability distribution of each user
in V a. ∀i ∈ V a, if i ∈ V ac , PΠ,σ(i) = {0, · · · , 0, pi,i = 1, 0, · · · , 0}; if i ∈ V ac ,
PΠ,σ(i) = {pi,j = 0|j ∈ V uc } ∪ {pi,j ∈ [0, 1]|j ∈ V u \ V uc }. Therefore, H(i) = 0 if







Remarks. In Theorem 22, we quantify the correlation between µ, β, and α.
From the quantification results, the lower bound of the utility function f(µ) is defined
by a decreasing function of ω (the number of possible incorrect mappings). When
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parameter ω increases, a looser condition is required for the utility function f(µ),
followed by a lower de-anonymity β and a higher anonymity α of Ga are achievable.
On the other hand, if higher de-anonymity is expected (i.e., lower anonymity can
be achieved by Ga), a stricter condition is required on f(µ). Furthermore, from the
proof of Theorem 22, When the specified conditions on qc(µ), qi,c(µ), and f(µ) are
satisfied, a DA scheme σ that correctly de-anonymizes at least n−ω users can be found
by a brute-force searching algorithm. Although the searching algorithm has a time
complexity of O(n!), which makes it computationally infeasible in reality, practical
heuristics/approximation-optimization based DA attacks can be designed, e.g., [63,
104, 127]. Therefore, the significance of our quantification is to help users/researchers
understand the theoretical correlation of anonymized graph data’s utility, anonymity,
and de-anonymity; and thus improve the anonymization/DA research.
6.4 AUD Quantification: In General
In the previous section, we quantified the correlation of data utility µ, de-anonymity
β, and anonymity α of Ga, given Π, Gu, and σ. However, as indicated in [61, 63],
it is seldom to see, if ever seen, that real world graph data follow the ER model.
The reason is that a graph under the ER model has a Poisson degree distribution,
while real world graph data may follow any degree distribution, e.g., the power-law
distribution. Although the ER model is more likely to be a theoretical model, the
quantification under the ER model can still shed light on the quantification of utility,
de-anonymity, and anonymity under a practical model. In this section, we quantify
the correlation of µ, β, and α under a general model, where the graph can have an
arbitrary degree distribution.
We assume Gr(V r, Er) can follow an arbitrary degree distribution. Let mr = |Er|.
The graph density of Gr is defined as ρ = mr|EU | =
2mr
n(n−1) . Let ϕc(µ) = µ1τ + µ1τ ,
ϕi,c(µ) = µ1(ρτ + ρ · γ) + µ1(ρτ + ργ), ψc(µ) = µ0 · γ + µ0γ, and ψi,c(µ) = µ0(ρτ +
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ρ · γ) + µ0(ρτ + ργ). Before quantifying the correlation of µ, β, and α, we first use
Lemma 3 to quantify the NDF of a DA scheme σ, which has ω incorrect mappings.
Lemma 3. Let θmin = min{ϕc(µ), ψc(µ)}, θmax = max{ϕc(µ), ψc(µ)}, τmin = min{ϕi,c(µ),
























Proof: To facilitate our analysis, we basically employ the same notations as in
Lemma 2. Specifically, we denote the correctly and incorrectly de-anonymized users
by Vc and Vω, respectively. Furthermore, let Ec, Eω, and Ec,ω be all the possible edges
among the users in Vc, among the users in Vω, and the users in Vc and Vω, respectively.
Then, we conduct our proof by quantifying the ND caused by each edge in EU . Let
∆ei,j be the ND caused by ei,j. Specifically, we have the following six cases.
Case 1: ei,j ∈ Er ∩ Ec. In this case, ei,j appeares in Gr and i and j are correctly
de-anonymized under σ. Therefore, ei,j causes a ND if it is appeared in one graph
(Ga/Gu) while not in the other one (Gu/Ga). It follows that ∆ei,j ∼ B(1, µ1τ+µ1τ) =
B(1, ϕc(µ)).
Case 2: ei,j ∈ Er ∩Ec,ω. In this case, ei,j appeares in Gr and exactly one of i and
j is incorrectly de-anonymized. Suppose j is incorrectly de-anonymized. Then, a ND
is caused if ei,j appeares in G
a while ei,σ(j) does not appeare in G
u and vice versa.
Therefore, ∆ei,j ∼ B(1, µ1(ρτ + ρ · γ) + µ1(ρτ + ργ)) = B(1, ϕi,c(µ)).
Case 3: ei,j ∈ Er ∩ Eω. In this case, ei,j appeares in Gr and both i and j are
incorrectly de-anonymized under σ. To quantify the ND caused by ei,j, we consider
two subcases. In the first subcase, if ei,j is a transposition edge under σ, then ∆ei,j ∼
B(1, ϕc(µ)); otherwise, ∆ei,j ∼ B(1, ϕi,c(µ)).
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Case 4: ei,j ∈ Er ∩Ec. In this case, ei,j is not an edge in Gr and both i and j are
correctly de-anonymized under σ. Again, ei,j will case a ND if it appears in G
a/Gu
while not in Gu/Ga. Therefore, ∆ei,j ∼ B(1, µ0 · γ + µ0γ) = B(1, ψc(µ)).
Case 5: ei,j ∈ Er ∩ Ec,ω. In this case, ei,j does not appear in Er and exactly one
of i and j is incorrectly de-anonymized under σ. Therefore, ∆ei,j ∼ B(1, µ0(ρτ + ρ ·
γ) + µ0(ρτ + ργ)) = B(1, ψi,c(µ)).
Case 6: ei,j ∈ Er ∩ Eω. In this case, ei,j does not appear in Gr and both i
and j are incorrectly de-anonymized. Then, if ei,j is a transposition edge under σ,
∆ei,j ∼ B(1, ψc(µ)); otherwise, ∆ei,j ∼ B(1, ψi,c(µ)).
Let t1 and t2 be the numbers of transposition edges in E
r ∩ Eω and Er ∩ Eω,
respectively. Then, t1 + t2 ≤ ω/2. In summary,
∆σ ∼ B(|Er ∩ Ec|+ t1, ϕc(µ)) +B(|Er ∩ Ec,ω|+ |Er ∩ Eω| − t1, ϕi,c(µ)) (203)
+B(|Er ∩ Ec|+ t2, ψc(µ)) +B(|Er ∩ Ec,ω|+ |Er ∩ Eω| − t2, ψi,c(µ)) (204)
=
n→ ∞
B(|Er ∩ Ec|, ϕc(µ)) +B(|Er ∩ Ec,ω|+ |Er ∩ Eω|, ϕi,c(µ)) (205)
+B(|Er ∩ Ec|, ψc(µ)) +B(|Er ∩ Ec,ω|+ |Er ∩ Eω|, ψi,c(µ)) (206)
Therefore,




























In Lemma 3, we derive the lower and upper bounds of ∆σ for a given σ. Based
on Lemma 3, we quantify the correlation of µ, β, and α under a general data model
in Theorem 23.






function depending µ, and ω be the number of possibly incorrectly de-anonymized users












Proof Sketch: Basically, this theorem can be proven by applying similar techniques
as in Theorem 22. For convenience, we use the same notations as in Theorem 22.
Specifically, let S′ be the set of all the possible DA schemes, σ ∈ S′ such that ∆σ =
min{∆ℑ|ℑ ∈ S′}, σ∗ ∈ S′ be the optimum DA scheme, and σ′ ∈ S′ be a DA scheme
with ω incorrect mappings. Evidently, σ is a DA scheme that can be found by a brute
force algorithm in finite time O(n!).
(i) To prove the first conclusion, it is sufficient to prove that under σ, at least


































, τmin). Furthermore, let
λX and λY be the expectation values of X and Y , respectively. Since θmax < τmin, we
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Table 11: Data statistics.
Name Type n m ρ davg
Wiki (WK) WikiTalk Data 2.4M 5M 1.63E-6 3.9
Gnutella (GT) P2P Network Data 36.7K 88.3K 1.32E-4 4.8
YouTube (YT) Social Networks 1.1M 3M 4.64E-6 5.3
Oregon (OG) Autonomous Systems 11.5K 32.7K 4.98E-4 5.7
Brightkite (BK) Location-based Social Networks 58K .2M 1.32E-4 7.5
Gowalla (GW) Location-based Social Networks .2M 1M 4.92E-5 9.7
Enron (EN) Email Data 36.7K .2M 3.19E-4 10.7
Skitter (SK) Autonomous Systems 1.7M 11.1M 7.73E-6 13.1
Facebook (FB) Social Networks 64K .82M 4.02E-4 25.64
Google+ (G+) Social Networks 4.7M 90.8M 8.24E-6 38.7
Twitter (TW) Social Networks .5M 14.9M 1.20E-4 54.8
Flickr (FL) Social Networks 80.5K 5.9M 1.82E-3 146.56
have






+ ω(n− ω)) · g(µ)) (215)




Therefore, Pr(∆σ∗ < ∆σ′) →
n→ ∞
1. Then, we have ∆σ ≤ ∆σ∗ < ∆σ′ , which implies
that at most ω users are incorrectly de-anonymized under σ and thus β ≥ βσ ≥ n−ωn ,
i.e., β = Ω(n−ω
n
).
(ii) Based on the above proof, this conclusion can be proven using the similar
technique as in Theorem 22. 2
Remarks. From Theorem 23, the correlation of µ, β, and α under a general model
is similar to that under the ER model. However, they are different with respect to
required conditions and generality/applicability. Fundamentally, to achieve the same
anonymity/de-anonymity, the conditions under the general model (specified by g(µ),
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τmin, and θmax) are stricter than that under the ER model (specified by f(µ), qc(µ),
and qi,c(µ)). On the other hand, the quantification in Theorem 22 is dedicated for
graphs under the ER model while the quantification in Theorem 23 is applicable to
graphs following any distribution.
6.5 Utility Metric and AUD Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our AUD quantification using real world graph datasets.
6.5.1 Datasets
In the evaluation, we employ 12 real world graph datasets, which are generated from
various computer systems: Social Networks, Location-based Social Networks, Email
networks, WikiTalk networks, P2P networks, and Autonomous Systems. All the
datasets are now publicly available and can be found at Berkeley Datasets [15], Stan-
ford SNAP [16], and ASU Datasets [1]. We show the basic statistical information of
the 12 datasets in Table 11, where n, m, ρ, and davg denote the number of users, the
number of edges, the graph density, and the average degree of each user, respectively.
We briefly introduce each dataset as follows.
• Wiki (WK). The Wiki dataset is a graph consisting of Wikipedia users and
their Wikipedia Talk (WikiTalk) relationship.
• Gnutella (GT). The Gnutella dataset is a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing graph,
where nodes represent hosts/users and edges represent sharing connections a-
mong users.
• YouTube (YT). YouTube is a video-sharing service. The YouTube dataset is a
social graph of YouTube users and their relationships.
• Oregon (OG). The Oregon dataset is a route-view Internet topology graph rep-
resenting the connections (edges) of routers (nodes) in an Autonomous System
(AS).
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• Brightkite (BK). The Brightkite dataset is a location-based social network
graph, where nodes represent users and edges represent the friendships among
users.
• Gowalla (GW). The Gowalla dataset is also a location-based social network
graph representing the friendships among users.
• Enron (EN). The Enron dataset is an email communication graph, where n-
odes represent users and edges represent the email communication relationships
among users.
• Skitter (SK). Similar as Oregon, the Skitter dataset is also an Internet topology
graph.
• Facebook (FB). Facebook is one of the most popular online social networking
service. The Facebook dataset is a social network graph where nodes represent
users and edges represent friendships.
• Google+ (G+). Google+ is a social network and a social layer for Google
services. The Google+ dataset is a social network graph of Google+ users and
their connections.
• Twitter (TW). Twitter is an online social networking service that enables users
to send and read short 140-character messages called “tweets”. The Twitter
dataset is a social network graph of Twitter users and their following relation-
ships.
• Flickr (FL). Flickr is an image hosting website. The Flickr dataset is a social
network graph of Flickr users and their friendships.
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Figure 27: The performance of the utility metric µ.
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(a) Wiki (WK), Gnutella (GT), and Y-
ouTube (YT)













(b) Oregon (OG), Brightkite (BK), and
Gowalla (GW)













(c) Enron (EN), Skitter (SK), and Facebook
(FB)













(d) Google+ (G+), Twitter (TW), and Flickr
(FL)
Figure 28: AUD vs. µ1.
6.5.2 Performance of the Utility Metric µ
Before evaluating our AUD quantification, we first examine the performance of our
utility metric µ. According to the definition of µ, it measures the performance ofGa on
preserving the structure (both the existing and the non-existing relationships) of Gr.
Furthermore, since µ is defined based on µ1 and µ0, we examine the effectiveness of µ
by evaluating the utility of Ga with respect to different µ1 and µ0. Due to the space
limitation, here, we employ three datasets Enron, Facebook, and Twitter as example
datasets for the evaluation, and the evaluated utilities of Ga are Degree distribution
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(a) Wiki (WK), Gnutella (GT), and Y-
ouTube (YT)













(b) Oregon (OG), Brightkite (BK), and
Gowalla (GW)













(c) Enron (EN), Skitter (SK), and Facebook
(FB)













(d) Google+ (G+), Twitter (TW), and Flickr
(FL)
Figure 29: AUD vs. µ0.
(Deg), Path Length distribution (PL), and Cluster Coefficient distribution (CC)1.
The reason we choose to evaluate Deg, PL, and CC is because they are the most
fundamental graph utilities and most of the other graph utilities (e.g., infectiousness,
reliable email, secure routing, community property, and influence propagation) are
highly dependent on them [137, 152].
Evaluation Methodology. The evaluation methodology is as follows: (i) given
1In SecGraph, 12 graph utilities (e.g., degree distribution, joint degree distribution, path length,
closeness centrality distribution) and 7 application utilities (e.g., influence maximization, community
detection, secure routing) are implemented [20, 62]. Using SecGraph, it is straightforward to evaluate
the effectiveness of µ with respect to these graph and application utilities. Basically, our utility metric
is positively correlated with the graph and application utilities in SecGraph.
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µ1 and µ0 and a raw dataset G
r, we employ the Rand Add/Del anonymization algo-
rithm in [152] to anonymize Gr (by deleting existing edges and adding new edges)
such that the obtained anonymized graph Ga has utility of µ1 and µ0; (ii) compute the
Deg, PL, and CC utilities of both Gr and Ga; and (iii) compute the cosine similarity
of each utility of Gr and Ga.
Results. We show the evaluation results in Fig.27, where when changing µ1 in
each evaluation, we set µ0 = 1 − µ1·|E
a|
|EU\Ea| (note that, µ0 is an increasing function of
µ1)
2. From Fig.27, we have the following two observations.
First, with the increase of our utility metric µ1/µ0, all the three fundamental
graph utilities Deg, PL, and CC are also increasing, which demonstrates that our
utility metric is consistent with existing utility metrics. The reason is because µ1 and
µ0 measures the degree of G
a to preserve the existing and non-existing relationships
of Gu. When Ga and Gu share more common relationships, they are more structurally
similar followed by high utility of Ga. Furthermore, based on Theorems 22 and 23,
µ1/µ0 also enables our AUD quantification tractable. Therefore, our utility metric is
effective.
Second, the changing magnitude of PL is smaller than the other two utilities with
the increase of µ1/µ0. This is because the graph diameters of Enron, Facebook, and
Twitter are 10, 10, and 7 respectively, which are relatively small. Therefore, the
impact of anonymization (adding/deleting edges) to PL is also relatively small. On
the other hand, when µ1/µ0 is small, a significant number of relationships in G
r have
been changed in Ga. Since Deg and CC are local graph properties, they are more
sensitive to local edge changes, i.e., µ1/µ0.
2The purpose of this setting is to make Ga have relatively similar performance on preserving the
existing and non-existing relationships of Gr.
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6.5.3 AUD Evaluation
In this subsection, we evaluate the AUD of real world graph datasets (shown in Table
11) based on our AUD quantification.
Evaluation Methodology. For each dataset, it is the raw graph Gr in our
evaluation. Then, given µ1, µ0, τ , and γ, the structures of both G
a and Gu can be
derived from Gr. Finally, we apply our quantification technique in Section 6.4 to
quantify the anonymity and de-anonymity of Ga based on Gu. Specifically, according
to our proofs in Theorem 22 and Theorem 23, statistically, the optimum DA scheme
(mapping) incudes the least NDF. Therefore, after specifying Ga and Gu, we can drive
the anonymity and de-anonymity of Ga based on the utility preserved in Ga and Gu
(relative to the raw data Gr) using Theorem 23 (the proof of Theorem 23). Note that,
here, we are not trying to quantify the exact anonymity/de-anonymity of Ga (and
thus, we do not need to seek the optimum DA scheme). Our objective is to derive
the upper bound of the achievable anonymity and the lower bound of the achievable
de-anonymity with statistical guarantee. Furthermore, in all the evaluations in this
subsection, the default parameter settings are µ1 = 0.7, µ0 = 0.9, τ = 0.75, and
γ = 0.02.
6.5.3.1 AUD vs. µ
First, we evaluate the anonymity and de-anonymity of the datasets in Table 11 with
respect to the utility (characterized by µ1 and µ0) preserved by G
a. The results
are shown in Fig.28 (changing µ1) and Fig.29 (changing µ0), α(·) and β(·) are the
anonymity and de-anonymity of the corresponding dataset, respectively. From Fig.28
and Fig.29, we have there observations.
First, when µ1 (resp., µ0) increases, the de-anonymity of each dataset increases
while the anonymity of each dataset decreases, e.g., in Fig.28 (a), when µ1 is increased
from 0.6 to 0.7, β(YouTube) is increased from 0.364 to 0.63 while α(YouTube) is
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decreased from 0.617 to 0.345. This is because µ1 (resp., µ0) indicates the degree of
Ga on preserving the existing relationships (resp., non-existing relationships) of Gr.
A high µ1 (resp., µ0) implies that G
a is more structurally similar to Gr, and thus is
more structurally similar to Gu (for a given τ and γ). Therefore, more users in Ga
are de-anonymizable leveraging the structural similarity between Ga and Gu.
Second, generally, the datasets with high davg (average degree) are more de-
anonymizable (less anonymous) than that with low davg, e.g., for a given µ1/µ0,
Facebook (davg = 25.64) is more de-anonymizable than YouTube (davg = 5.3). This
is because a higher davg implies richer local structural information is available in both
Ga and Gu for de-anonymizing each user on average. Thus, a user is more likely to
be correctly de-anonymized by structure-based DA attacks.
Finally, both the anonymity and the de-anonymity of graph data may exhibit
the percolation phenomena3, i.e., when µ1/µ0 is below some threshold value, a graph
achieves almost perfect anonymity; while when µ1/µ0 is above some threshold value,
an obvious loss of the anonymity happens. For instance, when µ1 is increased from
0.46 to 0.48, the anonymity of Oregon is decreased from 0.999 to 0.663. This implies
that the actual anonymization/DA performance is sensitive to the utility carried byGa
and the structural similarity between Ga and Gu. Some increase on the similarity of
Ga and Gu can induce a significant loss (resp., improvement) of the graph anonymity
(resp., de-anonymity).
3It has been observed in [61, 104], the number of de-anonymizable users in seed-based two-phase
DA attacks may exhibit the percolation phenomena with respect to the number of available seeds,
i.e., when the number of seeds is below some threshold value, only a few users can be correctly
de-anonymized; while when the number of seeds is above some threshold value, a significant portion
of users are de-anonymizable.
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(a) Wiki (WK), Gnutella (GT), and Y-
ouTube (YT)













(b) Oregon (OG), Brightkite (BK), and
Gowalla (GW)













(c) Enron (EN), Skitter (SK), and Facebook
(FB)













(d) Google+ (G+), Twitter (TW), and Flickr
(FL)
Figure 30: AUD vs. τ .
6.5.3.2 AUD vs. τ and γ
Now, we quantify the AUD of the datasets in Table 11 given different auxiliary graphs,
which are characterized by τ and γ. First, when τ increases, the anonymity and de-
anonymity of each dataset are shown in Fig.30, from which we have two observations.
First, with the increase of τ , the anonymity (resp., de-anonymity) of each dataset
decreases (resp., increases), e.g., when τ is increased from 0.5 to 0.7, α(Oregon)
is decreased from 0.57 to 0.204 while β(Oregon) is increased from 0.403 to 0.763.
This is because τ indicates how similar Gu and Gr are with respect to the existing
relationships in Gr. Thus, a high τ implies Gu is more structurally similar to Gr and
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(c) Enron (EN), Skitter (SK), and Facebook
(FB)













(d) Google+ (G+), Twitter (TW), and Flickr
(FL)
Figure 31: AUD vs. γ.
thus to Ga (when µ1, µ0, and γ are given), followed by G
a is more de-anonymizable
by structure-based DA attacks leveraging Gu.
Second, again, the datasets with high davg are more de-anonymizable than those
with low davg, e.g., Enron (davg = 10.7) is more de-anonymizable than Wiki (davg =
3.9) given a τ . The reason is also the same as we analyzed in Fig.28 and Fig.29.
A higher davg implies richer local structural information is available, which further
enables more effective structure-based DA. In addition, similar to that in Fig.28 and
Fig.29, the anonymity and de-anonymity of a dataset may exhibit the percolation
phenomena with respect to τ , e.g., Wiki, Gnutella, YouTube, and Oregon.
181
When γ increases, the AUD of the datasets in Table 11 is shown in Fig.31. From
Fig.31, we have three observations.
First, when γ increases, the anonymity of each dataset increases while the de-
anonymity of each dataset decreases, e.g., when γ is increased from 0.01 to 0.02,
α(YouTube) is increased from 0.302 to 0.345 while β(YouTube) is decreased from
0.674 to 0.63. This is because γ indicates the difference of Gr and Gu on users’ non-
existing relationships. Therefore, a large γ implies more structural difference between
Gr and Gu with respect to the non-existing relationships, followed by more structural
difference between Ga and Gu. Hence, less structural information can be leveraged
to conduct successful DA and the anonymity of Ga is increased.
Second, generally, the anonymity and de-anonymity of datasets with low davg are
more sensitive to the change of γ than that of datasets with high davg. For instance,
when γ is increased from 0.02 to 0.04, α(Gowalla) (davg = 9.7) is increased by 23.6%
while α(YouTube) (davg = 5.3) is increased by 31%; at the same time, β(Gowalla) is
decreased by 17% and β(YouTube) is decreased by 1.9%. This is because for graphs
with lower davg, the available structural information for de-anonyming each user is
relatively less, and thus the structural/edge difference between Ga and Gr has more
impacts on the achievable anonymity and de-anonymity.
Finally, similar as the results in Fig.28, Fig.29, and Fig.30, the anonymity and
de-anonymity of a dataset may exhibit the percolation phenomena (e.g., Wiki).
6.6 AUD-based Evaluation of State-of-the-Art Anonymiza-
tion and De-anonymization Techniques
6.6.1 Methodology
In this section, we conduct an AUD-based evaluation of the performance of state-
of-the-art graph anonymization and DA techniques. The evaluation methodology is
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as follows: (i) given some graph datasets, anonymizing these datasets using state-of-
the-art anonymization techniques; (ii) employing state-of-the-art DA attacks to de-
anonymize the anonymized data and studying the data’s practical de-anonymity; (iii)
employing our AUD quantification technique to quantify the theoretical de-anonymity
(anonymity) of the anonymized data; and (iv) finally, analyzing the practical and
theoretical de-anonymity of the anonymized data.
6.6.2 Evaluation Setting
Here, we use three example datasets Enron, Facebook and Twitter as shown in Table
11 for this group of evaluation. The employed anonymization techniques are the
latest cluster-based anonymi-zation technique [131], denoted by Cluster, and the latest
differential privacy-based anonymization technique [118, 122], denoted by DP. As we
summarized in Section 2, Cluster is a technique to make the users within a cluster have
same local structures, and DP is a technique to make the dK -series of the anonymized
graph meet a DP requirement. The employed DA attacks are the Distance-Vector
(DV) based scheme proposed in [127] and the Optimization-based DA (ODA) scheme
proposed in [63] (Chapter 3). As summarized in Section 2, DV is a powerful seed-based
DA attack while ODA is the latest seed-free DA attack.
When anonymizing the datasets, the key anonymization parameter for Cluster is
the cluster size ζ [131] and for DP is the differential privacy parameter ξ [118, 122].
Basically, a larger ζ indicates a higher anonymization level for Cluster while a smaller
ξ indicates a higher anonymization level for DP. In our evaluation, we consider the
scenarios of ζ = 10 and ζ = 60 for Cluster and ξ = 150 and ξ = 300 for DP (which
are similar to the settings in [122, 131]), respectively. For DV, since it requires seeds
to bootstrap the DA, we randomly select 50 seed mappings from Ga to Gu in each
evaluation. During the DA evaluation, the auxiliary datasets are obtained using a
random edge adding/deleting process according to the specified τ and γ. In all the
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evaluations, we set γ = τ ·|E
r|
|Er| . Furthermore, the required parameters µ1 and µ0 for
AUD quantification can be obtained according to their definitions given Gr and Ga.
For each group of evaluation, it will be repeated 50 times and the result is the average
of the 50 runs.




































































Figure 32: AUD-based Evaluation of state-of-the-art anonymization and DA tech-
niques.
6.6.3 Resutls
Let σ be a DA attack (e.g., DV and ODA) and nc be the number of users that
are successfully de-anonymized under σ. Then, the practical de-anonymity of an
anonymized graph under σ is defined as β(σ) = nc
n
. Furthermore, to be consistent
with previous notations, we use β(·) (e.g., β(Enron)) to denote the AUD-based de-








under different anonymization/DA scenarios in Fig.32, where
“Cluster” and “DP” represent the anonymization algorithms, 10, 60, 150, and 300
represent the anonymization parameters, and DV and ODA represent the DA attacks,
respectively. For instance, Cluster10-DV means that the anonymization algorithm
applied is Cluster, the anonymization parameter used is 10, and the employed DA
attack is DV. From Fig.32, we have there observations.
First, when τ increases, β(σ)
β(·) also has some increase, which implies both DV and
ODA can de-anonymize more users regardless of whether the dataset is anonymized
by Cluster or DP. The reason is straightforward: a large τ implies Ga and Gu are
more structurally similar and thus Gu is more structurally similar to Ga. Therefore,
more anonymized users can be successfully de-anonymized based on the structural
information (leveraging the structural similarity between Ga and Gu).
Second, for the scenarios of using Cluster as the anonymization algorithm, Clus-
ter60 achieves better anonymity than Cluster10. This is because more users are made
structurally similar under Cluster60 than that of Cluster10. However, intuitively,
Cluster60 also sacrifices more data utility. Similarly, DP150 achieves better anonymi-
ty than DP300 at the cost of sacrificing more data utility. Overall, the datasets
anonymized by DP achieves a better anonymity than that of Cluster. This is because
DP changes more structural information of Ga than that of Cluster, i.e., the datasets
anonymized by Cluster achieves a better utility than DP.
Finally and interestingly, there is still significant room for state-of-the-art DA tech-
niques to be improved. From Fig.32, we have β(σ)
β(·) < 0.95 in all the scenarios. Specifi-







< 0.16 for both DV and ODA. Note that, according to our quantification,
β(·) is only the lower bound of the de-anonymity of an anonymized graph. Therefore,
the practical de-anonymity achieved by state-of-the-art DA attacks are much lower
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than the achievable theoretical de-anonymity. For instance, when using ODA to de-
anonymize Facebook anonymized by DP150, β(ODA)
β(Facebook)
< 0.166, which implies more
than 83.4% theoretically de-anonymizable users cannot be correctly de-anonymized
by ODA. Thus, theoretically, significant room exists to improve existing DA attacks
in some scenarios.
6.7 Chapter Summarization
In this chapter, we study the correlation of graph data’s anonymity, utility, and
de-anonymity. Specifically, we conduct the first AUD correlation quantification for
anonymized graph data under both the mathematical ER model and a general data
model. Based on our quantification, we further conduct a large scale evaluation on the
anonymity, utility, and de-anonymity of real world graph data leveraging 12 datasets
that are generated from various computer systems and services. Third, we evaluate
the performance of state-of-the-art anonymization and DA techniques in terms of our
AUD quantification. We find that there is still significant space to improve existing
DA attacks, and for the first time, our evaluation results explicitly and quantitatively
indicate such possible improvement space. Finally, we discuss to extend and enhance
state-of-the-art graph data anonymization and DA evaluation system SecGraph. By




SECGRAPH: SECURE GRAPH DATA
PUBLISHING/SHARING
7.1 Introduction
As summarized in Chapter 2, to protect graph data’s privacy, several anonymization
techniques have been proposed to anonymize graph data, which can be classified into
six categorizes: Naive ID Removal, Edge Editing (EE) based techniques [152], k-
anonymity based techniques [38, 88, 156, 158, 160], Aggregation/Class/Cluster based
techniques [30, 53, 131], Differential Privacy (DP) based techniques [117, 118, 122,
137, 142], and Random Walk (RW) based techniques [97]. Fundamentally, these
techniques try to protect users’ privacy by perturbing the original graph’s structure
while preserving as much data utility as possible.
Furthermore, following Narayanan and Shmatikov’s work [104], many new Structure-
based De-Anonymization (SDA, we use DA and SDA interchangeably in this disser-
tation) attacks on graph data have been proposed, which can be categorized into two
classes: seed-based attacks, e.g., Narayanan-Shmatikov’s attack [104], and seed-free at-
tacks, e.g., Ji et al.’s attack [63]. For both types of attacks, the goal is to de-anonymize
anonymized users using their uniquely distinguishable structural characteristics.
Surprisingly, although we already have many sophisticated anonymization tech-
niques (e.g., [53, 97, 122, 152, 158]) and powerful SDA attacks (e.g., [63, 69, 102, 104,
108, 112, 127]), whether state-of-the-art anonymization techniques can defend against
modern SDA attacks is still an open problem. This is because of the incomplete eval-
uation of existing anonymization and DA techniques. For anonymization works, they
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usually only evaluate the data utility performance of their proposed techniques (al-
though some works provide a theoretical security guarantee, these guarantees usually
do not hold due to improper assumptions or incomplete considerations as analyzed in
Section 7.4). For DA works, they usually evaluate their attacks’ performance without
applying state-of-the-art anonymization techniques (e.g., k-anonymity based schemes,
DP based schemes) to their test data.
To address the above open problem, we systematically study, implement, and
evaluate existing graph data anonymization techniques and DA attacks. Specifically,
our main contributions are as follows.
(a) We design and implement a Secure Graph data publishing/sharing (SecGraph)
system (available at [20]). SecGraph enables data owners to anonymize their data us-
ing state-of-the-art anonymization techniques, measure the anonymized data’s graph
and application utilities, and comprehensively evaluate their data’s actual vulnerabil-
ity against modern DA attacks. To the best of our knowledge, SecGraph is the first
such system publicly available to both academia and industry. More importantly,
SecGraph provides the first uniform platform that enables researchers to conduct ac-
curate comparative studies of anonymization/DA techniques, and to comprehensively
understand the resistance/vulnerability of existing or newly developed anonymization
techniques, the effectiveness of existing or newly developed DA attacks, and graph
and application utilities of anonymized data.
(b) In SecGraph, we systematically analyze, implement, and evaluate 11 state-
of-the-art graph data anonymization schemes and 19 graph and application utility
metrics. We also analyze the 11 anonymization schemes with respect to the 19 utility
metrics, both analytically and experimentally. The evaluation results demonstrate
that most existing anonymization algorithms can partially or conditionally preserve
most graph utilities. However, all the anonymization schemes lose one or more appli-
cation utility.
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(c) We summarize and analyze the fundamental properties of existing SDA attacks.
Then, we systematically implement and evaluate 15 modern SDA attacks on real-
world graph datasets. Our results show that modern SDA attacks are powerful and
robust to seed mapping errors. Furthermore, no attack is optimum in all scenarios.
The DA performance of an attack depends on the similarity between the anonymized
and auxiliary data, graph density, DA heuristics, etc.
(d) We analytically and experimentally evaluate the performance of existing graph
data anonymization schemes on defending against modern SDA attacks. We find that
existing anonymization techniques are vulnerable to modern SDA attacks. Their de-
gree of vulnerability depends on how much data utility is preserved in the anonymized
data.
Abbreviations. For convenient reference, we summarize the used abbreviations
in Table 12.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, we study existing
graph data anonymization schemes and their utility performance. In Section 7.3, we
study modern SDA attacks. In Section 7.4, the effectiveness of existing anonymization
schemes against modern DA attacks is analyzed. We systematically implement and
evaluate SecGraph in Section 7.5 and conclude this chapter in Section 7.6.
7.2 Anonymization and Utility
Generally, an anonymization scheme can be evaluated from two perspectives: data
utility preservation and resistance to DA attacks. However, most, if not all, existing
graph anonymization works have not been significantly evaluated with respect to their
utility or resistance to DA attacks. On one hand, most existing graph anonymization
works only conducted limited evaluations on their utility preservation, e.g., degree
distribution, path length distribution, which are insufficient to understand their value
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LCC Local Clustering Coefficient
























DV Distance Vector [127]
RST Randomized Spanning Tress [127]
RSM Recursive Subgraph Matching [127]
DeA De-Anonymization [64]
ADA Adaptive De-Anonymization [64]
BDK Backstrom et al.’s attacks [27]
NS Narayanan-Shmatikov’s attack [104]
NSR Narayanan et al.’s attack [102]
NKA Nilizadeh et al.’s attack [108]
PFG Pedarsani et al.’s attack [112]
YG Yartseva-Grossglauser’s attack [151]
KL Korula-Lattanzi’s attack [69]
JLSB Ji et al.’s attack [63]
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for high-level data mining tasks and applications, e.g., sense-making, search for similar
users, user classification, reliable email, influence maximization. On the other hand
and more seriously, to the best of our knowledge, no work (including existing DA
works) actually evaluated the resistance of state-of-the-art anonymization techniques
against modern SDA attacks.
To address these concerns, we comprehensively analyze the utility of existing
graph data anonymization algorithms in this section and defer the detailed resistance
analysis to Section 7.4. Before performing the analysis, we first present the used
utility metrics, which can be classified as graph utility metrics or application utility
metrics.
7.2.1 Graph Utility Metrics
Graph utility captures how the anonymized data preserves fundamental structural
properties of the original graph after applying an anonymization technique. Par-
ticularly, we examine 12 graph utility metrics of existing anonymization schemes as
follows1.
• Degree (Deg.), which refers to the degree distribution;
• Joint Degree (JD), which refers to the degree distribution {p(x,y)|p(x,y) is the
fraction of edges in a graph that connect users of degree x and degree y};
• Effective Diameter (ED), which is defined as the minimum number of hops in
which 90% of all connected pairs of nodes can reach each other;
• Path Length (PL), which refers to the distribution of the shortest path lengths
between all pairs of users;
• Local Clustering Coefficient (LCC) and Global Clustering Coefficient (GCC).
Clustering coefficient measures the degree to which users in graph data tend to
1Without of causing confusion, we interchangeably use node and user in this chapter.
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cluster together. The LCC of a user quantifies how close its neighbors are to





The GCC is based on triplets of users. Let nt and nc be the number of triangles
and the number of connected triples of users in a graph, respectively. Then,





• Closeness Centrality (CC), which is defined as the inverse of the farness of a
user within a graph and measures how long it takes to spread information from
a user to all other users sequentially;
• Betweenness Centrality (BC), which quantifies the number of times a user acts
as a bridge along the shortest path between two other users;
• EigenVector (EV). The EV of the adjacency matrix A of a graph G is a non-zero
vector v such that Av = λv, where λ is some scalar multiplier;
• Network Constraint (NC), which measures the extent to which a user links to
others that are already linked to each other;
• Network Resilience (NR) [26], which measures how robust a graph is and is
defined as the number of users in the largest connected component when users
are removed from the graph in the degree decreasing order;
• Infectiousness (Infe.) [138], which measures the number of users infected by a
disease, given that a randomly chosen user is infected and each infected user
transmits this disease to its neighbors with some infection rate;
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7.2.2 Application Utility Metrics
In reality, most data is published/shared for data/network mining tasks, high-level
applications, etc. Therefore, besides examining data’s fundamental structural utility,
it is also crucial to ensure that the anonymized data is useful for practical applica-
tions. Toward this objective, we evaluate 7 popular application utility metrics for
anonymization schemes as follows.
• Role eXtraction (RX) [59]. Based on users’ structural behavior, users in a
graph can be labeled as having different roles, e.g., clique members, periphery-
nodes. RX is an important operation for graph data that is useful for many
network mining tasks such as sense-making. We measure the RX utility of an
anonymization scheme using the method in [59].
• Reliable Email (RE) [47]. RE is a whitelisting system leveraging users’ neigh-
borhoods to filter and block spam emails. To evaluate the structural utility of
an anonymization scheme with respect to RE, we take a similar method as in
[122] to compute the number of users who can be spammed by a fixed number
of compromised neighbors in a graph.
• Influence Maximization (IM) [52]. The IM problem seeks to find a set of θ users
such that these θ users have the maximum influence to the network under some
influence propagation model. IM is important for many real world applications,
e.g., advertisements. For our purpose, we evaluate the IM application utility of
an anonymization scheme using the recently proposed method in [52].
• Minimum-sized Influential Node Set (MINS) [56]. MINS is another popular
and important application utility metric that leverages a graph’s structure to
identify the minimum-sized set of influential nodes, such that all other nodes
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in the network could be influenced with a probability above a threshold. MIN-
S can be used in many meaningful applications, e.g., social problems allevia-
tion, new products promotion. We evaluate the MINS application utility of an
anonymization scheme using the recent method in [56].
• Community Detection (CD) [150]. CD is a popular application on graph data
which enables comprehensive analysis of a network structure and supports other
applications, e.g., classification, routing (information propagation). To measure
the CD utility of an anonymization scheme, we employ the hierarchical agglom-
eration algorithm proposed in [150].
• Secure Routing (SR) [92]. The structure of graph data can also be used to
improve the performance of secure routing for systems such as P2P systems.
For our purpose, we evaluate the SR application utility of an anonymization
scheme using the method designed in [92].
• Sybil Detection (SD) [154]. In a Sybil attack, an adversary tries to subvert a
system by forging multiple identities. Sybil attacks are a serious threat to both
centralized and distributed systems, e.g., recommendation systems, anonymity
systems. Recently, several effective schemes, e.g., SybilLimit [154], have been
proposed to defend against Sybil attacks. For our purpose, we evaluate the SD
application utility of an anonymization scheme using the method in [154].
7.2.3 Anonymization vs Utility
We are ready to analyze the utility performance of existing graph data anonymization
techniques. We summarize the graph and application utilities, and Resistance to SDA
attacks (R2SDA) (e.g., [63, 64, 104, 151]) of existing graph anonymization schemes


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(a) For the Naive ID removal scheme, it is straightforward that it preserves all the
data utility. However, it is also the most vulnerable scheme to SDA attacks.
(b) Add/Del and Switch are both designed to protect the node and link privacy
of graph data [152]. Since Add/Del randomly adds and deletes edges, which is an
global edge edition operation and thus it may change many fundamental structural
properties of a graph. It follows that it can conditionally or partially preserve both
graph and application utilities. However, utilities like JD, GCC, NC, CD, and MINS
would be destroyed if too many existing edges are deleted while new edges are added.
For Switch, it switches two randomly selected qualified edges, which preserves the
degree of each user. Consequently, Switch can preserve Deg. and partially preserve
most other utilities. Furthermore, compared to Add/Del, Switch can conditionally
preserve the RX and CD utilities which are destroyed in Add/Del. This is because
that Add/Del randomly changes users’ degree in the global edge edition process and
thus some global structure-sensitive application utility is lost or significantly affected.
Furthermore, Add/Del and Switch cannot defend against modern SDA attacks as
shown in [63, 104, 127].
(c) The k-anonymity based anonymization schemes k-NA [158], k-DA [88], and k-
auto [160] can partially/conditionally preserve the graph and most application utilities
except for the RX utility. This is because the fundamental idea of k-anonymity based
schemes is to make k users/subgraphs structurally similar. Therefore, there is a
tradeoff between anonymity and utility. If k is large, more users will be structurally
similar while more utility will be lost. On the other hand, if k is chosen to be small,
more utility will be preserved at the cost of lower anonymity guarantee. Furthermore,
since every user is guaranteed to be structurally similar to at least k − 1 other users
while the RX utility tries to distinguish users based on their structural differences, it
turns out k-anonymity based schemes cannot preserve the RX utility. As we discussed
before, k-iso achieves structure anonymization by partitioning the original graph into
196
k isomorphic subgraphs. Therefore, several fundamental properties of a graph will be
destroyed, e.g., connectivity. It follows that several important graph and application
utilities are lost in k-iso, e.g., PL, GCC, NR, Infe., RX, RE, IM, and SR. Finally,
compared with other schemes, k-NA, k-auto, and k-iso have higher computational
complexities.
(d) Similar to k-anonymity based schemes, the cluster based schemes [53, 131] can
conditionally/partially preserve graph and application utilities except for RX. This
is because the fundamental idea of cluster based schemes is to make the users within
a cluster structurally indistinguishable. Therefore, to what extent these schemes can
preserve data utility depends on the cluster size setting. Again, since RX is achieved
based on users’ structural difference, this utility is not preserved in cluster based
schemes.
(e) For DP based schemes (e.g., [122, 142]), their main objective is to protect link
privacy by perturbing the edges of a graph. The fundamental idea of these schemes is
to make an anonymized graph structurally similar to its neighboring graphs and thus
an adversary cannot infer the existence of an edge. Therefore, they can conditional-
ly/partially preserve most graph and application utilities. However, if a high level of
privacy is guaranteed, many edges in the graph are changed. Furthermore, similar to
Add/Del, the edge perturbation in DP also belongs to global edge edition. Therefore,
the global structure-sensitive high-level application utilities, e.g., RX, MINS, and CD,
are destroyed or significantly reduced in DP based schemes.
(f) In the RW based scheme [97], link privacy is achieved by replacing a random
walk path with an edge, and thus this scheme, theoretically, will not change the
degree distribution of the original data. It follows that several utilities, e.g., Deg.,
RX, SD, NR, Infe., can be preserved or partially preserved. However, some other
global utilities, e.g. JD, GCC, are lost in the RW based scheme due to the significant
change of the overall graph structure.
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Table 14: Analysis of existing graph DA techniques. SF = seed-free, AGF = auxiliary
graph-free, SemF = semantics-free, A/P = active/passive attack, Scal. = scalable,
Prac. = practical, Rob. = robust to noise, 3 = true, G#= partially true,  =
conditionally true, and 7 = false.
SF AGF SemF A/P Scal. Prac. Rob.
BDK [27] 3 3 3 A, P 7 G# 7
NS [104] 7 7 3 P 3 3 3
NSR [102] 7 7 3 P 3 3 3
NKA [108]  7 3 P   
DV [127] 7 7 3 P   3
RST [127] 7 7 3 P   3
RSM [127] 7 7 3 P   3
PFG [112] 3 7 3 P 3  
YG [151] 7 7 3 P 3  3
DeA [64] 7 7 3 P 3 3 3
ADA [64] 7 7 3 P 3 3 3
KL [69] 7 7 3 P 3  3
JLSB [63] 3 7 3 P 3 3 3
(g) From Table 13, no existing work evaluates the resistance of state-of-the-art
anonymization schemes against modern SDA attacks. Although most of the schemes
have nice theoretical privacy guarantees, unfortunately, that privacy analysis cannot
guarantee that they can defend against modern SDA attacks due to the improper
model of the adversary’s auxiliary information, problematic assumptions, etc. There-
fore, aiming to address this open problem, we evaluate the effectiveness of existing
graph data anonymization schemes against modern SDA attacks in Sections 7.4 and
7.5.
7.3 Graph De-anonymization
In this section, we analyze the performance of existing graph data DA algorithms.
For convenience, in the rest of this chapter, we denote Backstrom et al.’s attacks
[27] by BDK (the initials of the authors), Narayanan-Shmatikov’s attack [104] by
NS, Narayanan et al.’s attack [102] by NSR, Nilizadeh et al.’s attack [108] by NKA,
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Srivatsa-Hicks’ three attacks [127] by DV, RST, and RSM, respectively, Pedarsani
et al.’s attack [112] by PFG, Yartseva-Grossglauser’s attack [151] by YG, Ji et al.’s
two attacks [64] by DeA and ADA, respectively, Korula-Lattanzi’s attack [69] by KL,
and Ji et al.’s attack [63] by JLSB. We show our analytical results in Table 14 and
discuss the result as follows.
(a) Except for BDK, all the existing SDA attacks are passive attacks and require
auxiliary graphs to perform the attack, i.e., they employ the structural similarity
between the the anonymized graph and the auxiliary graph to break the anonymity.
However, when we examine the anonymization schemes in Table 13, we find that none
properly consider such auxiliary information in their threat models.
(b) To perform BDK attacks [27], an adversary either has to insert some Sybil
users in the dataset before the actual anonymized data release, or has to be an
internal user that knows its neighborhoods. In either case, such attacks can only de-
anonymize some users but cannot de-anonymize users in large scale. Furthermore, the
attacks cannot tolerate any topological change of the original data. Therefore, BDK
attacks are not scalable or robust. These attacks require that an adversary successfully
launches Sybil users or be an internal user that obtains his neighborhoods.
(c) All the examined DA attacks are semantics-free. This is because the structural
information itself is sufficient to perfectly or partially de-anonymize graph users. Fur-
thermore, compared to semantics information, structural information is widely avail-
able in large scale, resilient to noise, and easily computable [63, 104, 127]. Following
this fact, all the attacks except for BDK are (conditionally) scalable, practical, and
robust.
(d) Specifically, DV, RST, and RSM [127] are conditionally scalable and practical.
This is because they are not computationally feasible when the number of seeds is
large. PFG [112] is conditionally practical and robust. This is because it is very
sensitive to the graph density of the anonymized data. Generally, this attack is
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suitable for sparse graphs however it has a significant performance degradation as
the graph density increases. YG [151] is conditionally practical because it is designed
to de-anonymize users of degree no less than 4 in the anonymized data. In many
real world graph datasets, the users with degree less than 4 could dominate or take
a significant portion of graph data based on the statistics in [63]. The conditional
practicability of KL [69] comes from its improper assumption that Θ(ι · n) (ι ∈ (0, 1]
is a constant and n is the number of nodes in a graph) seeds are available, which is
too strong to hold for real world DA attacks. Note that, the community-level DA
of NKA [108] is scalable (with complexity of O(n2)). However, the NKA [108] is
conditionally scalable, practical, and robust. This is because, if the community-level
DA of NKA [108] is employed to enhance DV, RST, RSM, YG, and/or KL, it is
conditionally scalable, practical, and/or robust. NS [104], NSR [102], DeA, ADA,
and JLSB [63, 64] adaptively perform DA employing several heuristics based on a
graph’s local and global structural characteristics. It follows that they are scalable,
practical, and robust as long as similarity exists between anonymized graphs and
auxiliary graphs.
(e) Both seed-based attacks (e.g., NS, DV) and seed-free attacks (e.g., PFG, JLS-
B) have advantages depending on the application scenarios. On one hand, seed-based
attacks are more stable with respect to de-anonymizing arbitrary anonymized graphs.
The reason is straightforward since seed knowledge provides more auxiliary informa-
tion to an adversary. On the other hand, it is possible that in some scenarios seeds
are not available, and thus seed-free attacks are more general. Furthermore, if there
is some error in the seed seeking phase (which is possible in real world attacks),
seed-based attacks will suffer performance de-gradation or will possibly fail.
(f) From Table 14, we see that BDK attacks can be defended against by state-of-
the-art anonymization algorithms. This is because an implicit assumption in BDK
attacks is that data publishers only anonymize the data by naive ID removal, i.e.,
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Table 15: DA attacks vs anonymization techniques. Naive = naive ID removal, EE
= EE based schemes [152], k-anony. = k-anonymity based schemes [38, 88, 158, 160],
Cluster = cluster based schemes [53, 131], DP = DP based schemes [117, 118, 122, 137,
142], RW = the random walk based scheme [97], and 3, , and 7 = the anonymization
scheme is vulnerable, conditionally vulnerable, and invulnerable (i.e., resistant) to the
DA attack, respectively.
Naive EE k-anony. Cluster DP RW
BDK [27] 3 7 7 7 7 7
NS [104] 3 3   3 3
NSR [102] 3 3   3 3
NKA [108] 3    7 7
DV [127] 3 3   3 3
RST [127] 3 3   3 3
RSM [127] 3 3   3 3
PFG [112] 3 3   3 3
YG [151] 3 3   3 3
DeA [64] 3 3   3 3
ADA [64] 3 3   3 3
KL [69] 3 3   3 3
JLSB [63] 3 3   3 3
no edge change (e.g., addition, deletion, switching) happens during the anonymiza-
tion. Evidently, this assumption does not hold in any state-of-the-art anonymization
schemes. However, whether state-of-the-art anonymization schemes can defend a-
gainst SDA attacks (e.g., [63, 64, 104, 151]) is still an open problem. To fill this void,
we conduct such analysis in the following section.
7.4 Anonymization vs DA Analysis
As we analyzed in Tables 13 and 14, understanding the vulnerability/resistance
of state-of-the-art graph data anonymization schemes against modern SDA attacks
is still an open problem. After carefully analyzing existing anonymization and DA
techniques, we summarize the vulnerability of existing anonymization schemes in
Table 15. We further experimentally validate our analysis in Section 7.5. Below, we
analyze and discuss the results in Table 15.
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(a) It has been shown in both academia and in practice that the naive ID removal
anonymization cannot protect graph data’s privacy. Therefore, naive anonymization
is vulnerable to all the existing SDA attacks.
(b) As we analyzed before, all other state-of-the-art anonymization schemes (e.g.,
EE, k-anony., Cluster, DP, and RW) are resistant to BDK attacks. Again, this is
because an assumption of BDK attacks is that data is anonymized by the naive ID
removal technique.
(c) For EE based anonymization schemes ([152]), they are conditionally vulnerable
to NKA [108] and vulnerable to all the other modern SDA attacks [63, 64, 104, 151].
This is because although EE can partially modify the structure of a graph, to preserve
data utility, many structural properties, e.g., neighborhood, degree distribution, close-
ness/betweenness centrality distribution, and path length distribution, are generally
preserved. Therefore, given an auxiliary graph consisting of the same or overlapping
group of users with the anonymized graph, powerful DA heuristics can be designed
based on these structural properties to break the privacy of EE based anonymization
schemes. Furthermore, the availability of seed users make such heuristics more ro-
bust to the noise introduced by EE. For instance, NS breaks EE by employing degree
and neighborhood similarity [104], DV, RST, and RSM break EE by employing path
length and neighborhood similarity [127], DeA and ADA break EE by employing
centrality similarity [64], etc. As we analyzed in Table 13, EE based anonymization
schemes (e.g., Add/Del) may destroy graphs’ community utility, and thus they are
conditionally vulnerable to NKA [108].
(d) k-anonymity based anonymization schemes ([38, 88, 158, 160]) are condition-
ally vulnerable to modern SDA attacks [63, 64, 104, 151]. The reasons are as follows:
k-anonymity is initially designed for traditional relational data, which makes a user
semantically indistinguishable with k−1 other users. Unlike relational data, which are
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structurally independent of each other, users in graph data have strong structural cor-
relation in addition to semantic similarity. When researchers extended k-anonymity
to graph data, they extended the concept of traditional semantics to graph data as
different structural properties (e.g., degree, neighborhood, and subgraph), and de-
signed schemes to make k users structurally indistinguishable with respect to some
structural semantics, i.e., degree, neighborhood, subgraph, etc. However, even if user-
s in graph data cannot be distinguished with respect to some structural semantics,
e.g., degree, neighborhood, subgraph, they can be de-anonymized by other structural
semantics, e.g., path length distribution, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality,
or the combinations of several structural semantics. Theoretically, the only way to
make users indistinguishable with respect to all structural semantics is to make a
graph completely connected or disconnected, which also implies that all the data utili-
ty is destroyed. Therefore, as long as some data utility is preserved in the anonymized
data, k-anonymity based schemes are vulnerable to modern SDA attacks. The degree
of vulnerability depends on how much data utility is preserved.
(e) Cluster based schemes ([53, 131]) are also conditionally vulnerable to modern
SDA attacks [63, 64, 104, 151]. The analysis is similar to that of k-anonymity. The
fundamental idea of cluster based schemes is to cluster users first and then to make
the users within a cluster indistinguishable with respect to neighborhoods. Again,
even if users are indistinguishable by neighborhoods, they can be de-anonymized by
other structural semantics or the combinations of other semantics, e.g., centralities
scores, path length distribution. Consequently, cluster based schemes are vulnerable
as long as some data utility, especially graph utilities, are preserved in the anonymized
data, and the vulnerability depends on the amount of data utility preserved.
(f) DP and RW based schemes ( [97, 117, 118, 122, 137, 142]) are vulnerable
to modern SDA attacks except NKA [108]. The reasons are as follows: First, they
are designed with the objective of protecting the link privacy of graph data and no
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dedicated node privacy protection techniques are considered. Second, to protect link
privacy, the edges are perturbed in DP based schemes and random walk paths are
replaced by edges in the RW based scheme, both with a nice theoretical privacy
guarantee. However, after the edge anonymization process, many data utilities, e.g.,
degree, path length distribution, are still preserved. This implies that, given an
auxiliary graph, users are still de-anonymizable based on several structural semantics
under DP and RW based schemes. Furthermore, as shown by Narayanan et al. in
[102], link privacy can be breached after de-anonymizing the users in an anonymized
graph (we also employ the same approach to break users’ link privacy [20]). Again,
as we analyzed in Table 13, since DP and RW based schemes cannot preserve data’s
community utility, they are resistant to NKA.
In summary, based on our analysis, state-of-the-art anonymization schemes are
still vulnerable to modern DA attacks. The fundamental reasons are: first, existing
anonymization schemes only ensure that graph data users are indistinguishable with
respect to some structural semantics (properties). However, other structural seman-
tics, especially global ones, and the combinations of multiple structural semantics can
still enable effective DA of users; and second, as one of the main objectives, all the
anonymization schemes try to preserve as much data utility as possible. However,
data utility from the adversary’s perspective is equivalent to structural information,
which can be used along with an auxiliary graph for conducting powerful DA attacks.
7.5 SecGraph
As we found when discussing existing anonymization and DA techniques, they all
have limitations when evaluating the techniques’ performance. For instance, it is
still an open problem to understand the resistance/vulnerability of state-of-the-art
anonymization schemes against modern DA attacks. To address this open problem,



















Figure 33: SecGraph: system overview.
7.5.1 System Overview
The overview of SecGraph is shown in Fig.33. SecGraph consists of three main
modules: Anonymization Module (AM), Utility evaluation Module (UM), and DA
evaluation Module (DM). The main functions of each module are briefly summarized
as follows.
AM: the main function of this module is to anonymize raw graph data and gen-
erate anonymized data. In this module, we implement 11 state-of-the-art graph data
anonymization schemes, including EE based algorithms [152], k-anonymity based
algorithms and its variants [38, 88, 156, 158, 160], aggregation/class/cluster based
algorithms [30, 53, 131], differential privacy based algorithms [117, 118, 122, 142],
and the random walk based algorithm [97].
UM: in this module, we evaluate raw/anonymized data’s utility with respect to
the 12 graph utility metrics and 7 application utility metrics as defined in Section 7.2.
With the UM, we can determine whether the data to be published/shared (e.g., the
anonymized data) satisfies required utility requirements. We can also evaluate how
an anonymization algorithm preserves data utility.
DM: in this module, we implement 15 SDA algorithms (all the existing SDA
algorithms, to the best of our knowledge). By this module, the security of data to be
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published/shared can be evaluated with real-world SDA attacks. More importantly,
the effectiveness of an anonymization algorithm can be examined by this module, i.e.,
whether the anonymized data of an anonymization algorithm is resistant to modern
SDA attacks.
We make further remarks on SecGraph and its modules and functions as follows.
(a) From Fig.33, raw data can be published/shared in multiple forms depending
on the data owners’ requirements on the security/privacy and utility of the data to be
published. Each path in Fig.33 represents a data publishing scenario. For instance,
the path raw data → publishing data means to publish the raw data directly. The
path raw data → AM → anonymized data → evaluation → publishing data means
that the raw data is anonymized first. Then, the anonymized data will be evaluated
with respect to utility and/or practical de-anonymizability before actual publishing.
The anonymization and evaluation process may be repeated several times until certain
security and utility requirements are met.
(b) To the best of our knowledge, SecGraph is the first implemented uniform secure
graph data publishing system, which systematically and comprehensively integrates
state-of-the-art anonymization schemes, DA schemes, and graph/application utility
measurements. The significance of SecGraph to the graph data anonymization and
DA area lies in the following aspects. First, SecGraph enables data owners to con-
veniently and freely choose any modern anonymization algorithm to anonymize their
data. They can also employ different evaluation modules to examine whether the
anonymized data meets their security/privacy and utility requirements. Second, Sec-
Graph is a uniform platform for testing and comparing different anonymization and
DA algorithms. Previously, due to the lack of a uniform system, existing anonymiza-
tion/DA algorithms are often proposed and implemented on separate platforms and
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different environments/settings. Consequently, a number of implementation and e-
valuation differences (e.g., particular assumptions, models, evaluation datasets, pro-
gramming, testing environments, parameter settings) limit researchers’ understanding
of the performance of existing anonymization and DA algorithms in different scenar-
ios. However, as a uniform platform, SecGraph can reduce the evaluation bias caused
by implementation and testing differences as much as possible. Therefore, SecGraph
allows data owners to choose and compare the actual performance of different data
anonymization algorithms on their data and thus to make the best decision. Addition-
ally, SecGraph allows data anonymization researchers to compare their anonymization
schemes to existing solutions as well as to examine their schemes’ resistance against
modern DA attacks. SecGraph also allows data DA researchers to evaluate the perfor-
mance of new DA attacks by de-anonymizing the anonymized data of state-of-the-art
anonymization schemes. Therefore, SecGraph is helpful to both data owners and re-
searchers in conveniently applying existing schemes, comprehensively understanding
existing algorithms, and effectively developing new anonymization/DA techniques.
(c) Besides providing a uniform platform, SecGraph is an easily portable and ex-
tendable system. First, the algorithms in SecGraph are implemented in Java and
thus it is system independent. Second, all the modules of SecGraph are independent
of each other, which means that each module can work individually. Additional-
ly, as shown in Fig.33, multiple modules can also work together to perform data
anonymization, utility evaluation, and de-anonymizability evaluation. Third, all the
schemes/measurements within each module are independent, which means that they
can be implemented, evaluated, and employed independently. Furthermore, newly




The implementation of SecGraph is as follows.
(a) In the AM, we implement 11 algorithms, which cover all the categories of
state-of-the-art anonymization techniques. Specifically, the implemented anonyzation
algorithms are naive ID removal, two EE based algorithms Add/Del [152] and Switch
[152], two k-anonymity based algorithms k-DA [88] and k-iso [38], two cluster based
algorithms bounded t-means clustering [131] and union-split clustering [131], three
DP based algorithms Sala et al.’s scheme [122], Proserpio et al.’s scheme [117, 118],
and Xiao et al.’s scheme [142], and one RW based algorithm [97]. Note that, we do
not implement all the algorithms discussed in Section 7.2 even though we cover all the
categories. The implementation criteria includes representativeness, scalability, and
practicality, which led us to implement the latest, scalable, and practical schemes.
(b) In the UM, we implemented the 12 graph utility metrics and 7 application
utility metrics as discussed in Section 7.2.
(c) In the DM, we implement all the 15 SDA attacks discussed in Section 7.3. To
the best of our knowledge, these are all of the existing SDA attacks.
7.5.3 SecGraph-based Analysis
7.5.3.1 Primary Datasets
The employed datasets for evaluation are Enron, an email network consisting of 36.7K
users and .2M edges, and Facebook, a Facebook friendship network in the New Orleans






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.5.3.2 Anonymization vs Utility
In this subsection, we evaluate the utility performance of anonymization algorithms.
Due to the space limitation, we do not show the evaluation results of all the imple-
mented algorithms. Particularly, we demonstrate the results of Switch [152], k-DA
[88], union-split clustering [131], the improved version of Sala et al.’s DP scheme
[117, 118, 122], and RW [97] which represent all the categories of anonymization algo-
rithms. The evaluation methodology is that we first anonymize the original graph by
an algorithm, and then measure how each data utility is preserved in the anonymized
graph compared to the original graph. Specifically, when measuring utilities Deg.,
JD, PL, LCC, CC, BC, NC, NR, Infe., RX, and RE, we measure the cosine similarity
between their distributions in the anonymized and original graphs; when measuring
ED, GCC, and EV, we measure their ratios between the anonymized and original
graphs; and when measuring MINS and CD, we measure their Jaccard similarity in
the anonymized and original graphs.
We demonstrate the results in Table 16. (more results are available in [20]). The
criteria for anonymization parameters settings are: (i) we follow the same/similar
settings as in the original works of these anonymization schemes; and (ii) many data
utilities can be preserved after anonymization. For the three graph utilities IM, SR,
and SD, we only test them on small graphs, and put the results in [20]. We analyze
the results in Table 16 as follows.
(a) Generally, the evaluation results in Table 16 are consistent with our analysis
in Table 13. Most anonymization algorithms can partially or conditionally preserve
most graph and application utilities. Therefore, most of the anonymized data can be
employed for graph analytics, data mining tasks, and graph applications.
(b) Among all the graph utilities, JD and GCC are the most sensitive utilities
to a graph’s structure change, and thus they are the easiest ones to be destroyed by
the anonymization algorithms. This is because these two utilities are very sensitive
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to edge changes. Even if the degree distribution of the anonymized data remains the
same as the original data, the JD distribution and GCC may change significantly.
(c) Compared to application utility, existing anonymization algorithms are better
at preserving graph utility. For instance, most algorithms lost the RX utility and CD
utility. This is because most application utilities depend on several graph utilities,
e.g., the role of a user in RX depends on that user’s degree, CC, BC, community
attributes, and other structural characteristics. Therefore, application utilities are
more easily affected than graph utilities, i.e., application utilities are more sensitive
to graph’s structural changes.
(d) No anonymization scheme is optimal in preserving every data utility. For
instance, Switch is better than k-DA on preserving Deg. and JD while it is worse than
k-DA on preserving GCC and MINS, and DP is better than RW on preserving LCC
and GCC while it is worse than RW on preserving Deg. Therefore, when choosing
an anonymization algorithm, it is better to take into account the specific application.
Furthermore, RW has the most utility loss, e.g., GCC, RX, MINS, and CD, which is
also consistent with our analysis in Table 13. This is because that the graph’s global
structure is significantly changed in RW by replacing random walk paths with edges.
7.5.3.3 DA Evaluation
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of modern DA attacks. As we ana-
lyzed before, BDK [27], RST [127], and RSM [127] are not scalable/practical; NSR
[102] and DeA [64] are simplified versions of NS [104] and ADA [64], respectively; and
NKA [108] actually depends on other attacks, e.g., NS. Therefore, here, we focus on
evaluating the seven general, practical, and scalable DA attacks: NS [104], DV (we
replace its seed identification phase with a scalable one) [127], PFG [112], YG [151],
ADA [64], KL [69], and JLSB [63]. Furthermore, PFG and JLSB are seed-free and




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































First, employing the same Enron and Facebook datasets as before, we evaluate the
DA performance of the seven DA attacks. The evaluation methodology is generally
the same as in previous works [63, 64, 104, 108, 112, 127, 151]: we first randomly sam-
ple two graphs with probability s from the original data as the anonymized graph and
auxiliary graph respectively, and then employ the auxiliary graph to de-anonymize
the anonymized graph. Furthermore, for seed-based attacks, e.g., NS, DV, YG, ADA,
and KL, we feed them 50 pre-identified seed mappings. The DA performance of the
evaluated attacks with respect to different s is shown in Table 17. From Table 17, we
have the following observations.
(a) With the increase of s, more users can be successfully de-anonymized under
each algorithm. For instance, DV successfully de-anonymizes 12.77% Enron users
when s = .6 while 58.14% Enron users when s = .95. The reason is evident. Since
a large s implies that the anonymized graph and the auxiliary graph are more struc-
turally similar, more accurate structural information can be employed by all the SDA
algorithms. Hence, better DA performance can be achieved.
(b) Generally, all the algorithms have their advantages in some specific scenarios,
and no algorithm is the best in all the cases. For instance, to de-anonymize Enron,
KL has the best performance when s = .6 while ADA has the best performance
when s = .95. Similarly, to de-anonymize Facebook, YG has the best performance
when s = .6 while NS has the best performance when s = .95. Multiple reasons are
responsible for the results such as the similarity between the anonymized and auxiliary
graphs, the density of the anonymized/auxiliary graph, the heuristics employed by
an algorithm, etc.
(c) According to the results, NS is more suitable for the scenarios where the
anonymized and auxiliary graphs are highly similar while unsuitable when they are
not sufficiently similar, e.g., it can successfully de-anonymize 95.27% Facebook users
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when s = .95 while only 0.18% users when s = .6. The reason is because NS mainly
employs local graph structural properties to adaptively conduct user DA, and thus
is sensitive to users’ local structural characteristics. When s is small, most users are
indistinguishable with respect to their local structures, e.g., degree, followed by poor
DA performance.
(d) Compared to NS, the other attacks, especially DV, PFG, ADA, and JLSB, are
more stable even with a small s. For instance, when s = .6, DV, PFG, ADA, and JLSB
can successfully de-anonymize 15.63%, 10.87%, 15.68%, and 14.73% Facebook users,
respectively. This is because these attacks mainly employ global graph characteristics
(e.g., clossness centrality, the distance vector to seeds) to perform the DA, which are
more resilient to noise.
(e) For the seed-free attacks, PFG and JLSB, they can achieve comparable per-
formance as seed-based attacks in most scenarios even without any seed information.
For instance, when s = .95, PFG and JLSB can de-anonymize 43.7% and 54.38%
Enron users, respectively, which are better than several seed-based algorithms and
further demonstrate the power of structure-based attacks. The reason for the effec-
tiveness of seed-free attacks is that in most cases, the combination of a user’s local
and global structural characteristics, e.g., degree, neighborhood degree distribution,
closeness/betweenness centrality, is sufficient to distinguish him/her from other users.
7.5.3.4 Robustness of Modern SDA Attacks
The robustness of modern DA attacks with respect to graph noise (e.g., adding fake
edges and deleting true edges) has been extensively evaluated in existing works [63,
64, 104, 127]. However, to the best our knowledge, no existing work has evaluated
the robustness of any seed-based de-anonymizaton attack to incorrect seed mappings.
Employing Enron and Facebook, we address this open issue by conducting such an
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Table 18: DA robustness with respect to seed errors. Each algorithm is provided with
50 seed mappings, and Λe/Λ indicates the percentages of incorrect seed mappings.
Each value in the table indicates the ratio of successfully de-anonymized users.
Λe
Λ
De-anonymize Enron De-anonymize Facebook
NS DV YG ADA KL NS DV YG ADA KL
4% .341 .342 .148 .336 .302 .922 .456 .537 .442 .183
6% .341 .342 .133 .329 .303 .917 .456 .528 .440 .183
8% .338 .348 .135 .329 .310 .918 .456 .542 .428 .184
10% .007 .348 .147 .323 .310 .918 .456 .536 .420 .182
12% .007 .348 .142 .313 .311 .915 .456 .529 .414 .185
14% .006 .348 .112 .306 .307 .916 .456 .526 .403 .186
16% .006 .348 .129 .297 .303 .916 .456 .525 .394 .184
18% .006 .348 .099 .293 .308 .913 .456 .533 .380 .183
20% .006 .348 .126 .285 .306 .913 .456 .518 .356 .179
22% .005 .348 .125 .280 .303 .912 .456 .531 .347 .182
24% .005 .348 .116 .268 .304 .910 .456 .521 .332 .180
26% .005 .348 .118 .255 .303 .889 .456 .528 .319 .179
28% .004 .348 .112 .253 .300 .886 .456 .520 .309 .182
30% .004 .348 .120 .247 .307 .884 .456 .522 .283 .180
32% .004 .348 .106 .235 .305 .888 .456 .521 .270 .178
34% .004 .348 .081 .230 .304 .887 .456 .521 .259 .178
36% .004 .348 .084 .216 .300 .889 .456 .505 .245 .182
38% .004 .347 .096 .199 .301 .888 .456 .493 .230 .178
40% .004 .347 .065 .186 .302 .886 .456 .505 .214 .179
42% .003 .347 .071 .182 .302 .882 .456 .516 .195 .181
44% .003 .347 .106 .169 .303 .881 .456 .495 .185 .180
46% .003 .347 .050 .160 .299 .881 .456 .480 .173 .177
48% .003 .347 .059 .153 .297 .881 .456 .497 .161 .180
50% .002 .347 .063 .146 .298 .874 .456 .475 .148 .176
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evaluation and the results are shown in Table 18. We analyze the results in Table 18
as follows.
(a) Generally, all the DA algorithms are robust with respect to incorrect seed
mappings in most scenarios. This is because during the DA process, most algo-
rithms also employ other seed-independent structural properties, e.g., degree, close-
ness/betweenness centrality, in addition to relying on seed-dependent structural prop-
erties. Even for the pure seed-based DA attacks, e.g., YG and KL, they perform DA
in the decreasing order of user degrees. Therefore, the negative impacts of incorrect
seed mappings can be partially offset, i.e., even with some incorrect seed mappings,
many users are still distinguishable with respect to their structural characteristics.
(b) For all algorithms, when incorrect seed mappings increase, fewer users can be
correctly de-anonymized. The reason is evident: more incorrect seed mappings imply
more incorrect seed-dependent structural information is provided to each algorithm,
followed by the degradation of the DA performance of each algorithm.
(c) When de-anonymizing Enron, the performance of NS has a significant drop
when the percentage of incorrect seed mappings is increased from 8% to 10%. This
is because of the seed transitional phenomena as observed in [104], i.e., when the
correct effective seed-dependent structural information is below/above some crucial
threshold, NS’s performance has a significant transition.
(d) DV is much more stable than other algorithms. This is because it is a pure
global structure-based attack and thus incorrect seed mappings have minimum impact
on it.
7.5.3.5 Anonymization vs DA
Now, we evaluate the effectiveness of state-of-the-art anonymization techniques a-













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































we first employ different anonymization techniques to anonymize Enron/Facebook.
Then, we sample an auxiliary graph from Enron/Facebook with probability s. Final-
ly, we employ different DA algorithms to de-anonymize the anonymized data using
the auxiliary graph. We show the results in Table 19 and analyze the results as
follows.
(a) All the state-of-the-art graph anonymization algorithms are vulnerable to some
or all of the modern SDA attacks, which confirmed our analytical results in Table 15.
For instance, when s = .85, NS can still successfully de-anonymize more than 80%
Facebook users anonymized by Switch, k-DA, Cluster, or DP, and DV can successful-
ly de-anonymize 15.3% Facebook users anonymized by RW (t = 2). Similarly, when
s = .85, NS can successfully de-anonymize more than 35% Enron users anonymized
by k-DA (k = 5), Cluster (k = 5, 50), YG can successfully de-anonymize 13.73% and
15.49% Enron users anonymized by Switch (k = .05m) and DP (ϵ = 300) respective-
ly, and DV can successfully de-anonymize 19.23%/24.12% Enron users anonymized
by RW with t = 2/11. Based on the results, we conclude that modern SDA attack-
s are very powerful. As we analyzed in Table 15, two fundamental reasons make
state-of-the-art graph anonymization algorithms vulnerable. First, in existing graph
anonymization schemes, graph users are only indistinguishable with respect to some
structural properties/semantics. However, several other structural properties or the
combinations of them can still enable effective graph user DA. Furthermore, the de-
sign philosophy of existing anonymization schemes is to preserve as much data utility
as possible. However, data utility can be used to conduct powerful SDA attacks.
Therefore, it is still an open problem to design effective graph data anonymization
algorithms which can defend against modern SDA attacks.
(b) Generally, when s is large and the anonymization level (e.g., k for Switch and k-
DA) is low, more users can be correctly de-anonymized. The reason is straightforward.
A large s implies more structural information of the original graph can be preserved in
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the auxiliary graph and thus more accurate structural characteristics can be employed
for DA. Meanwhile, a low anonymization level implies less perturbation applied to
the original graph’s structure followed by the anonymized graph is more structurally
similar to the original graph and thus is easier to be de-anonymized.
(c) Among all the DA attacks, NS, YG, and ADA perform better than other
attacks in most scenarios. This is because they mainly employ the combinations of
several local structural characteristics to conduct the DA. According to our utility
analysis in Table 13 and evaluation results in Table 16, most existing anonymization
algorithms can preserve most graph utilities, especially the local graph utilities, e.g.,
Deg., LCC. It turns out that the graph utility preserved by anonymization algorithms
can be used by DA attacks to conduct effective DA. Therefore, in the scenarios where
an anonymization algorithm preserves more data utility, the corresponding dataset is
more vulnerable to modern SDA attacks.
(d) Among all the anonymization techniques, RW has better performance than
others in most of the cases. The reason is that, a random walk path of length t is
replaced by an edge in RW. It follows that the original graph structure is signifi-
cantly changed. Therefore, a RW-anonymized graph is more resistant to DA attacks.
However, RW achieves such DA resistance at the cost of sacrificing more data utility
compared with other anonymization techniques, which is consistent with our utility
analysis and evaluation results in Tables 13 and 16. Furthermore, we can also find
that in most scenarios, existing anonymization techniques can degrade the perfor-
mance of SDA attacks. Again, as shown in Tables 13 and 16, some data utilities are
also degraded/lost.
7.6 Chapter Summarization
In this chapter, we propose, implement, and evaluate SecGraph (available at [20]),
an open-source secure graph data publishing/sharing system. Within SecGraph, we
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systematically analyze, implement, and evaluate 11 graph data anonymization algo-
rithms, 19 data utility metrics, and 15 modern SDA attacks. To the best of our
knowledge, SecGraph is the first such system that provides a uniform platform en-
abling data owners to anonymize and evaluate the security of their data, and simul-
taneously enabling researchers to conduct fair studies of existing or newly developed
anonymization/DA techniques. Leveraging SecGraph, we conduct extensive experi-
mental evaluations. The results demonstrate that (i) most anonymization schemes
can partially or conditionally preserve most graph utility but lose some application
utility; (ii) no DA attack is optimum in all scenarios. The actual DA performance
depends on several factors; and (iii) all the state-of-the-art anonymization schemes
are vulnerable to modern SDA attacks. Based on our findings and analysis, we discuss




In this dissertation, we study the security of anonymized big graph data. Our main
contributions include: new De-Anonymization (DA) attacks, comprehensive anonymi-
ty, utility, and de-anonymizability quantifications, and a secure graph data publish-
ing/sharing system SecGraph.
New DA Attacks. We present two novel graph DA frameworks: cold start single-
phase Optimization-based DA (ODA) and De-anonymizing Social-Attribute Graphs
(De-SAG). Unlike existing seed-based DA attacks, ODA does not priori knowledge. In
addition, ODA’s DA results can facilitate existing DA attacks by providing more seed
information. We validated ODA’s performance leveraging real world graph dataset-
s. Gowalla (196,591 users and 950,327 edges) and Google+ (4,692,671 users and
90,751,480 edges). The results demonstrate that about 77.7% − 83.3% of the users
in Gowalla and 86.9% − 95.5% of the users in Google+ are de-anonymizable, which
implies seed-free DA is implementable and powerful in practice. De-SAG takes into
account both graph structure and attribute information. Through extensive evalu-
ations leveraging real world graph data, we demonstrated that De-SAG can signifi-
cantly enhance existing SDA attacks. For instance, when de-anonymizing a Facebook
dataset (4,039 users, 88,234 user-user links, 1,283 attributes, 37,257 user-attribute
links), De-SAG has a 3.82 ∼ 10.1 times better DA performance than state-of-the-art
structure-based deanonymization attacks.
Comprehensive Graph Anonymity, Utility, and De-anonymizability Quan-
tifications. We developed new techniques that enable comprehensive graph data
anonymity, utility, and de-anonymizability evaluation. First, we proposed the first
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seed-free graph de-anonymizability quantification framework under a general data
model. In our quantification, we answered several fundamental open problems: why
graph data can be de-anonymized based only on the topological information? what
are the conditions for perfect and (1−ϵ)-perfect seed-free DA, where ϵ is the error tol-
erated by a DA scheme? and what portion of users can be de-anonymized in a graph
dataset? Thus, our quantification provides the theoretical foundation for seed-free
SDA attacks.
Second, we conducted the first seed-based quantification on the perfect and par-
tial de-anonymizability of graph data both under the Erdös-Rényi (ER) model and
in general scenarios. Our quantification provides the mathematical foundation for
existing seed-based SDAs and closes the gap between seed-based DA practice and
theory.
Third, we conducted the first attribute-based anonymity analysis for Social-Attribute
Graph (SAG) data under both preliminary and general data models. Our theoretical
results demonstrate that the non-personal identifiable information can also lead to
significant anonymity loss of graph data. Our attribute-based anonymity analysis to-
gether with existing structure-based de-anonymizability quantifications provide data
owners and researchers a more complete understanding of the privacy of graph data.
Fourth, we conducted a comprehensive quantification of the correlation of graph
anonymity, utility, and de-anonymity. This is the first work on quantifying the
Anonymity-Utility-De-anonymity (AUD) correlation of graph data and providing
close-forms to explicitly demonstrate such correlation.
Finally, based on our quantifications, we conducted large-scale evaluations lever-
aging 100+ real world graph datasets generated by various computer systems and
services. Using the evaluations, we demonstrated the datasets’ anonymity, utility,
and de-anonymizability, as well as the significance and validity of our quantifications.
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SecGraph: A Secure Graph Data Publishing/Sharing System. We de-
signed, implemented, and evaluated a uniform and open-source Secure Graph da-
ta publishing/sharing (SecGraph) system (available at [20]). SecGraph enables da-
ta owners to anonymize their data using state-of-the-art anonymization techniques,
measure the anonymized datas graph and application utilities, and comprehensively
evaluate their datas actual vulnerability against modern DA attacks. To the best of
our knowledge, SecGraph is the first such system publicly available to both academia
and industry. More importantly, SecGraph provides the first uniform platform that
enables researchers to conduct accurate comparative studies of anonymization/DA
techniques, and to comprehensively understand the resistance/vulnerability of ex-
isting or newly developed anonymization techniques, the effectiveness of existing or
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